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This dissertation theoretically and empirically studies the roles of comparative 
advantage, monopolistic competition, and firm-level heterogeneity in international trade 
in various aspects.  
The following Chapter II investigates cross-country and cross-industry variation 
in the fractions of exporters among domestic firms. The paper presents a model of an 
economy in which countries are asymmetrically endowed with two production factors, 
industries vary in the relative intensity of the use of these factors, and firms differ in 
productivity level. The model predicts that the shares of exporting firms in the number of 
domestic producers are ranked in order of the industry’s relative intensity of the factor 
with which the country is relatively well-endowed. This quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin 
prediction is empirically tested using data from the manufacturing censuses of Chile, 
Colombia, India, and the United States. The result of the analysis shows that the 
correlation between the exporter fractions and industry skill intensities is larger (more 
positive) for a country with higher skilled-labor abundance. This result is evidence of the 
theoretical prediction and demonstrates the role of comparative advantage in exporter 
selection. 
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The third chapter is based on a co-authored paper with Na Yang. The paper 
examines how factor proportions determine the number of product varieties, or the 
extensive margin, in exports of countries. The model of a two-factor, two-country and 
multi-industry economy with productivity-heterogeneous firms that is introduced in the 
second chapter suggests that countries export more varieties in industries in which the 
countries have a comparative advantage. This theoretical prediction is confirmed by 
empirical tests that use disaggregated data on U.S. imports. The tests show that relatively 
(un)skilled-labor abundant countries tend to export more varieties in more (un)skilled-
labor intensive industries. This chapter provides both a theoretical foundation and 
empirical evidence for the importance of factor proportions in explaining the pattern of 
product varieties in exports.  
Chapter IV proposes an alternative test of the monopolistic competition model of 
international trade, based on its implication of a positive correlation between the volume 
of trade and the similarity among trading countries in the size of the economy. In the 
existing literature this implication has been tested for aggregate trade, which includes the 
sectors that are not characterized by product differentiation. In contrast, this paper 
focuses on trade of differentiated products, which are the sectors that the monopolistic 
competition model is designed to describe. The amended prediction is tested with 
disaggregated data on manufacturing trade and production, using various estimation 
procedures including a non-linear method to handle zero-trade observations. The result 
from this alternative approach demonstrates that (i) trade in the differentiated sectors 
among OECD countries is well described by the monopolistic competition model; but (ii) 
for non-OECD countries the predicted relationship between trade and country size 
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similarity is more pronounced in the non-differentiated sectors, implying that trade flows 
among non-rich countries may be driven or crucially influenced by forces other than 












 Some firms export but others do not. Since Bernard and Jensen (1995) pointed 
this out for the United States, this fact has been confirmed for various countries and 
industries. The fraction of exporters among domestic firms in a country, however, varies 
widely across industries. For instance, as shown in Table 2.1, in the United States, 49% 
of firms in the electric equipment industry export, while only 13% export in the stone, 
clay, and glass products industry,1 even though the total number of firms is almost the 
same in the two industries. A difference in the fraction of exporters among domestic 
firms can also be seen across countries in the same industry. For example, 54% of Indian 
firms in the apparel industry are exporters, while only 12% of American firms in this 
same industry export. At the same time, the share of exporters in the electric equipment 
                                                 
1 The data are for the year 1992. In 1992, the share of exporters in all firms was 22% in the manufacturing 
industry in total. Therefore, the exporter share in the electric equipment industry (U.S. Standard Industry 
Classification code 36) was more than the double of the exporter share in all the manufacturing sectors, 
while the share in the stone, cray, and glass products industry (U.S. SIC code 32) was about 60% of that in 
the whole manufacturing industry.  
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industry is 17% in India, but 49% in the United States.2 These examples illustrate that 
cross-industry variation in exporter fraction (i.e., in what industries firms are more likely 
to export) does not follow the same pattern for all countries.   
 This difference in the likelihood of domestic firms being exporters in different 
industries and countries indicates that country-based and industry-based influences must 
be involved. These affect individual firms’ decision to export or not. To date, however, 
empirical studies have focused on firm-level determinants generating heterogeneity in 
export behavior among firms. Little work has investigated how the fraction of exporters 
among domestic firms differs across industries and countries and what generates these 
differences. This paper explains this cross-industry and cross-country variation in the 
exporter fraction from the perspective of comparative advantage, in particular 
comparative advantage in terms of factor proportion. Although other potential country-
specific or industry-specific determinants of the selection of exporters can be considered, 
the empirical analysis in this paper shows that the observed patterns of the exporter 
fraction can be well explained by comparative advantage, or countries’ relative factor 
abundance and industries’ relative factor intensity.  
The influence of factor proportion-based comparative advantage on difference in 
firm-level export decision has been theoretically examined by Bernard, Redding and 
Schott (2007). They incorporate the model by Melitz (2003), which has provided a 
theoretical benchmark explaining the empirical regularity of self-selection of exporters 
(i.e., firms that are the most productive in a domestic market become exporters), into a 
two-country, two-factor and two-industry framework. To derive a prediction describing 
                                                 
2 The data for India are for the fiscal year 1997/98 (April 1997-March 1998). In this year, the share of 
exporters in all the manufacturing firms was 14% in India.  
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an empirical relationship between the exporter fraction and factor proportion, this paper 
extends the model by Bernard, Redding and Schott to a multi-industry framework. That 
is, this paper considers an economy that comprises two countries differing in the relative 
abundance of two production factors (skilled and unskilled labor) and a large number of 
industries differing in the relative intensity of the two production factors. In these two 
countries each industry is populated with a continuum of firms differing in total factor 
productivity. Two threshold levels of firms’ productivity, one of which divides domestic 
producers from “exiters” and the other divides these domestic producers into exporters 
and non-exporters, are created through monopolistic competition and costly international 
trade. However, the impact of international trade on the two productivity cutoffs is 
asymmetric across industries, due to the difference in factor proportion. Keener 
competition among firms seeking larger potential export profits raises the domestic-
production productivity cutoff more in comparative-advantage industries, while the cutoff 
for exporting is relatively lower in these industries due to the comparative advantage over 
foreign competitors. This impact of trade on the two productivity cutoffs is more 
pronounced with the strength of comparative advantage; as a result, the “gap” between 
the two productivity cutoffs, which is measured as the ratio of the export cutoff to the 
domestic-production cutoff, is the largest in the industry with the lowest relative intensity 
of the factor with which the country is relatively well-endowed, and the smallest in the 
industry with the highest relative intensity of that factor. This ratio of the two 
productivity cutoffs determines the ex post fraction of exporters among domestic 
producers (the smaller the gap, the larger the fraction). Therefore, if all other conditions 
are equal between countries and among industries, in the relatively more skilled-labor 
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abundant country, the exporter fraction rises with an industry’s relative skilled-labor 
intensity, and vice versa.  
 Empirically, this theoretical prediction is examined as a correlation between the 
fraction of exporters among domestic firms and the relative skill intensity of industries. 
That is, the correlation should be larger (i.e., more positive or less negative) for a country 
with higher relative skilled-labor abundance, compared to less skilled-labor abundant 
countries. This empirical prediction is tested using data from the manufacturing censuses 
of Chile, Colombia, India, and the United States. These four countries represent a variety 
of country groups in terms of relative skill abundance. The results of estimation for 
individual countries present that the correlation between the exporter fraction and 
industry skill intensity in fact differs across countries, and the values of correlation 
coefficients estimated for the four countries follow the order of the countries’ skilled-
labor abundance; i.e., the correlation is of the largest positive for the United States, and 
declines for Chile, Colombia, and towards a negative value for India. This relationship 
between the countries’ skill abundance and the correlation between the exporter fraction 
and industry skill intensity is more formally tested using pooled data for these four 
countries and 17 manufacturing industries classified according to the two-digit U.S. 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). The result confirms that the correlation between 
the exporter fraction and industry skill intensity rises (toward positive) with the relative 
skill abundance of a country.3 This result is robust across alternative measures of country 
skill abundance and industry skill intensity. The estimation using relative factor price (the 
ratio of skilled-labor wage to unskilled-labor wage) as another measure of comparative 
                                                 
3 This result can also be interpreted from the cross-country point of view in the following way: the 
correlation between the exporter fraction and country relative skill abundance is larger, or more positive, in 
a more skill-intensive industry. 
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advantage also supports the quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction about the exporter fraction. 
 The finding of quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin effect on the exporter fraction in this paper 
has an additional implication for international trade. In the representative- (or symmetric-
)firm framework by Romalis (2004), the industrial composition of a country’s exports in 
terms of the number of firms (or product varieties) is symmetric to the industrial 
composition of the country’s domestic production.4 In other words, a country has larger 
shares of world total exporters in comparative-advantage industries because the country 
has larger shares of world total producers. This is not necessarily the case in the current 
model. Since a country’s comparative advantage also affects the mechanism of exporter 
selection, it may be that despite a small share of producers in the world, a country’s share 
of exporters is large in a comparative-advantage industry. Some examples are found in 
Table 2.1. In the apparel industry, for instance, the number of Indian domestic firms is 
the double of the number of Chilean firms; however, the number of Indian exporters is 
eight-fold that of Chilean exporters in that industry. That is, the effect of comparative 
advantage on the number of firms (or the extensive margin) can be magnified through 
exporter selection.5  
 This study adds to the literature in two ways. First, this paper is the first to 
empirically investigate cross-country and cross-industry asymmetry in the (self-)selection 
of exporters. Since Bernard and Jensen (1995), a great number of empirical studies have 
investigated differences between exporters and non-exporters focusing on a single 
                                                 
4 More accurately, the number of domestic producers is the same as the number of exporters since the 
model does not have the mechanism of the selection of exporters (all domestic firms export).   
5 The effect of comparative advantage can be even more magnified in the volume of exports. For example, 
in the apparel industry the volume of Indian exports is more than 50 times greater than the volume of 
Chilean exports. (In contrast, in Romalis’ model the share in the volume of exports is also symmetric to the 
share in the number of firms.) Although this paper does not directly address this issue, the present model 
has the potential for explaining this magnification of the effect of comparative advantage in export volume 
as a result of differences in relative productivity among exporters in different industries. 
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country, some of which further narrow their focuses on a single industry (see Greenaway 
and Kneller (2007), Lopez (2005), and Wagner (2007) that are extensive surveys of this 
literature). This paper takes one step back in focus and addresses the issue of firm-level 
heterogeneity in export behavior from a cross-country and cross-industry perspective. In 
addition, this paper adds to few theoretical studies on firm-level heterogeneity in export 
decision that takes into account asymmetry of countries such as Falvey et al. (2004) and 
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), or of both countries and industries such as Bernard, 
Redding and Schott (2007).  
  Secondly, this paper empirically demonstrates the effect of the factor proportion-
based comparative advantage on another dimension of international trade, i.e., the 
fraction of exporting firms among domestic firms. The Heckscher-Ohlin framework, or 
the factor proportion theory, has been empirically tested for the specialization patterns of 
countries’ net trade flows (e.g., Baldwin (1971), Harkness (1978), and Stern and Maskus 
(1981); also see the survey by Deardorff (1984)), production (Harrigan and Zakrajzek 
(2000) and Fitzgerald and Hallak (2004)), and the relative volume of trade (Romalis, 
2004).6 The next chapter III of this dissertation demonstrates that the factor-proportion 
framework also provides a prediction about the relative product variety in countries’ 
exports. This paper demonstrates that the (quasi-) Heckscher-Ohlin framework also 
explains the patterns of the exporter fractions. In addition, this paper extends the model 
by Bernard, Redding & Schott to a multi-industry framework, which is analogous to the 
work by Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1980) that extends the standard Heckscher-
Ohlin model with perfect competition, and Romalis’ (2004) extension of the monopolistic 
                                                 
6 Another large branch of the literature is empirical tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model of the factor 
contents of trade.  
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competition model by Helpmand and Krugman (1985).  
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. The next section presents 
the economic model and derives the prediction of the cross-industry pattern of exporter 
selection. The third section describes the data that are used in the empirical analysis, 
which is demonstrated in Section 2.4. The concluding section discusses the results and 
implications.  
2.2 The Model 
 This paper adopts the model by Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) and extends 
it to the framework of two countries, two factors and multiple industries. The modeled 
economy comprises two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F); two factors, skilled labor 
(S) and unskilled labor (U); and N (>2) industries. Within each industry there is a 
continuum of firms that are heterogeneous in productivity. Countries differ in factor 
endowments: Home is relatively abundant in skilled labor, and Foreign is relatively 







S >  where HS  ( HU ) and FS  ( FU ) denote the 
total inelastic supply of (un)skilled labor in Home and Foreign, respectively.  
2.2.1 Consumption 
 The representative consumer possesses Cobb-Douglas preferences over N >2 









NCCCU αααα ∑         (2.1) 
where iC  represents the consumption index for Industry i =1,……,N. The representative 
consumer consumes all the available product varieties within each industry, and the 
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i         (2.2) 
where ω indexes product varieties within an industry, iΩ  denotes a set of available 
varieties in Industry i, and ωq  represents the quantity of each variety consumed. 




























σ  is the constant elasticity of substitution across varieties. 
2.2.2 Production 
Each firm produces a unique variety of products. A firm’s total cost of production 
is the sum of fixed costs and variable costs. The fixed costs are the same for all firms in 
an industry within a country,7 but the variable costs vary across firms according to the 
difference in their productivity )(0,∞∈φ . The cost function for Firm ω in Industry i in 































































      (2.4) 
where s is the wage for skilled labor, w  is the wage for unskilled labor, and the 
                                                 
7 As shown in Equation (2.4), since the fixed costs also depend on the prices of two production factors, the 
fixed costs is in general different between the two countries due to the difference in factor prices. 
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superscripts H and F denote Home and Foreign, respectively. The industries are ranked 
according to the Cobb-Douglas cost share of skilled labor )( iβ , such that the industry 
indexed with a large number for i has a larger skilled-labor cost share: 
1....0 121 <<<<< − NN ββββ . Within an industry, the cost share of each factor does not 
differ across countries or across firms. Note that the factor intensity of Industry i is also 
ranked using the rank of βi,8 and thus βi can be regarded as an indirect index of industry 
factor intensity.  
 In what follows, I present equations and expressions for Home, unless otherwise 
noted. The equations for Foreign are symmetric.  
 With the Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, the optimal price of a firm’s product variety 
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where HY  is the total national income of Home. The profit of each firm is equal to 












φπ −− 1,,,, )()(
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=)(       (2.7) 
                                                 











and therefore for any relative wage s/w > 0, Si/(Si+Ui) is larger for a larger βi.  
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2.2.3 Entry and Equilibrium in Autarky 
 To describe the general idea with simpler expressions, I first describe the 
equilibrium in an autarkic economy. To enter the domestic market, each firm incurs a 
sunk entry cost. Firms discover their productivity after the entry. The productivity 
parameter φ  is randomly drawn from a distribution )(φG , which is common across 
countries. The entry cost also depends upon the prices of the two input factors, and takes 
the following form: 
ii HH
ei wsf
ββ −1)()( ,  0>eif        (2.8) 
In other words, the Cobb-Douglas cost share of each factor in an industry commonly 
affects the sunk entry cost as well. 
 After paying the sunk entry cost (and realizing a productivity level), a firm must 
earn at least zero profit to remain and produce in the market. In other words, if the firm 
observes that its productivity is too low to earn a positive profit, it will shut down and 
exit. The minimum productivity requirement, or the productivity cutoff, for domestic 







ββσφ −∗ 1)()(=)(        (2.9) 
In Industry i, all the firms whose productivity is higher than or equal to Hi
∗φ  will continue 
operation, while less productive firms will exit. 
 The value of each firm is determined as the present discount value of the future 


































iv    (2.10) 
where 1<δ  is an exogenous probability of firm death in each period. In the long run 
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equilibrium, the expected value of entry, ω,iV , will equal the sunk entry cost for each firm 
in each industry. Since the expected value of entry is the expected value of the firm (or 
future profit stream) conditional on the ex ante probability of successful entry, the free-











φ −∗−= 1, )()(=)](1[      (2.11) 
where Hiπ  represents the per-period expected future profit for the firm successfully 




i ≡  where 
λφi  is the average 
productivity of the successful entrees in the industry.9 
 In the case of an autarkic economy, by combining the zero profit condition (2.9) 
and the free entry condition (2.11), the following equation to determine the cutoff-level 
productivity Hi






























∫       (2.12) 
where )(')( ⋅=⋅ Gg  is the common density function of productivity φ .10 The left-hand 
side of Equation (2.12) monotonically decreases as the value of Hi
∗φ  increases, and thus a 
unique value of Hi
∗φ is identified since the right-hand side of the equation is constant. 
                                                 
9 The average productivity of the successfully entering firms is determined by the ex post distribution of the 
































where g(.) = G’(.) is a density function of productivity φ .  
10 See Appendix A for the derivation of Equation (2.12).  
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2.2.4 Export 
 The main interest of this paper is a trading equilibrium, and I now analyze the 
decisions of the firms when a country is open to trade with the other country. 
 For each firm to export, it must incur per-year fixed costs for export, which 
depend on the domestic factor prices and industry factor intensity, as the fixed costs for 
domestic production and the sunk entry cost do. Specifically, the per-year fixed costs for 
export are described as 0,)()( 1 >− xi
HH
xi fwsf ii
ββ . In addition, international trade is 
subject to variable “iceberg” shipping costs such that only a proportion iτ/1  ( 1>iτ ) of 
the shipped quantity of products reaches the other country. The variable costs are 
assumed to be symmetric between the two countries. 
 The optimal export price of the product of Firm ω in Home in Industry i ( Hxip ω, ) is 
equal to the constant markup (1/ρ) over the marginal production cost inclusive of the 




















⋅≡      (2.13) 


































 Firms produce either to serve only the domestic market or to serve both domestic 
and foreign markets, depending on their productivity.11 Therefore, the total revenue of 
each firm is now as follows: 




totali rr   if the firm serves only the domestic market; 
                                                 
11 To preview the result, if they are sufficiently productive, domestic producers can also export.  
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totali rrr +  if the firm also exports. 
As in the closed economy case, the zero-profit condition and the free-entry 
condition jointly identify the productivity cutoff at which additional profits from 
exporting are zero. The profit of each firm now consists of two parts: 

























φπ −−= 1,, )()(
)(
)( . 
Accordingly, the zero-profit condition is two-fold, which consists of the following two 
equations: 
Zero-profit condition for domestic production, which involves the domestic 








ββσφ −∗ 1)()(=)(        (2.15) 










ββσφ −∗ 1)()(=)(        (2.16) 
Equations (2.15) and (2.16) jointly determine the relationship between the two cutoffs ∗iφ  
























































































,12 and PiH and PiF 
are the industry price indexes in Home and Foreign, respectively. Because empirical 
studies have shown that exporting firms tend to be more productive than non-exporters, I 
focus on the case where the productivity cutoff for export is higher than that for domestic 
production: i.e., )()( FHi
FH
xi
∗∗ > φφ , or 1)( >Λ FHi . This would be the case when the fixed 
costs for export is sufficiently higher than fixed costs for (domestic) production (fxi > fi), 
and/or the variable trade costs (τi) are sufficiently large. In this case, only a portion of 
firms that successfully enter the domestic market can export, i.e., selection of exporters 
occurs.13 Of all the firms in Home that draw a random productivity in return for the sunk 
entry cost, a fraction of )( HiG
∗φ  will exit because their revenues can not cover the fixed 
costs for domestic production. A fraction )()( Hi
H
xi GG
∗∗ − φφ  of the firms will serve only 
the Home domestic market because they will not be able to cover the higher fixed costs 
for export. Only the remaining firms (the fraction of )(1 *HxiG φ− ), which are the most 
productive, will be exporters. 
 The free-entry condition also comprises two parts: the expected future profit 
stream from the domestic market, and the expected future profit from the export market 
multiplied by the probability of being an exporter conditional on the firm successfully 
entering and staying the domestic market. The value (or the expected total future profit) 
of Firm ω is: 
                                                 
12 See Appendix A for the derivation of Equations (2.17) and (2.18). 
13 ΛiH > 1 will also hold when the industry price index in Home is higher than that in Foreign (PiH > PiF), 
and/or the Home economy is larger than Foreign (YH > YF). However, this also implies that ΛiH could be 
less than one if Home price index is sufficiently lower than that of Foreign, and/or the Home economy is 
























































≡  is the probability of exporting conditional on the firm 
successfully entering and producing in the domestic market. Hence, the free-entry 
condition with costly international trade is that the ex ante expected value of initial entry 
























i φππ ≡ is the per-period profit of the average domestic producer from the 




ix φππ ≡  is the per-period profit of the average exporter from 
export sales.14  
 Combining this free-entry condition (2.20) with the zero-profit condition (2.15) 
































































  (2.21) 
The first term of the left-hand side of this equation is monotonically decreasing in Hi
*φ , 
                                                 
14 The average productivity level of the group of domestically-producing firms is defined with the cutoff 






































































xixi   
15 The derivation of Equation (2.21) is shown in the Appendix A.  
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and the second term is monotonically decreasing in Hxi
*φ . Since Hxi
*φ  increases as Hi
*φ  






xi φφ ), the whole 
of the left-hand side of the equation monotonically decreases as the value of Hi
*φ  
increases. With the right-hand side being constant, this Equation (2.21) solves for the 
unique value of the domestic production cutoff Hi




2.2.5 Factor Prices 
 Because of fixed and variable trade costs, factor price equalization (FPE) fails. 
However, the relative prices of two factors will converge partially such that equilibrium 
relative factor prices will fall between their autarky and free trade levels. In autarky, the 
wage for skilled labor relative to that for the unskilled is lower in the skill-abundant 
Home. Opening the country to costly trade will result in an increase in the relative reward 
for the abundant factor in each country (i.e., s/w will rise in the Home and w/s will rise 
(or s/w will fall) in the Foreign), which will decrease the difference in relative factor 

































































where A, CT, and FT indicate autarky, costly trade, and free trade, respectively.16 The 
right-hand side (the third term) of the inequality above will be equal to one when free 
                                                 
16 See Appendix A for demonstration for the equilibrium factor prices. 
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trade leads to factor price equalization (FPE).17 
 This difference in equilibrium relative factor reward implies that the impacts of 
costly trade will differ across countries and industries due to factor proportion-based 
comparative advantage. The profits derived from exporting will also vary across 
countries, across industries, and across heterogeneous firms. 
2.2.6 Probability of Exporting 
 Having analyzed both firm-level production heterogeneity and country-level 
factor prices in equilibrium, I unite them to analyze the determinants of a firm’s 
exporting status. The ex ante probability for a domestic producer to be an exporter is 
determined by the two productivity cutoffs: *iφ  for domestic production and 
*
xiφ  for 


















In the equilibrium, this probability equals the ex post fraction of exporting firms in all the 
domestically-producing firms. That is, denoting the mass of the continuum of actively-






xi MM χ=/          (2.22) 
The concern of this paper is documenting the determinants of the cross-industry patterns 
of this probability of a domestic producer being an exporter. Before deriving a prediction, 
I introduce the following assumption on the distribution for firm productivity: 
                                                 
17 It can be shown that a free-trade equilibrium with FPE exists in this model economy. The author can 
provide the proof upon request.  
18 The inequality follows Hi
H
xi
















φ 1)(  for i = 1, 2, ….., N; k > 2σ 
That is, I assume that the ex ante distribution of firm productivity is a Pareto 
distribution.19 
i
φ  is the minimum value for productivity drawn in Industry i 
( ),[ +∞∈
ii
φφ ), and k is a shape parameter that indicates the dispersion of productivity 
distribution, which is assumed to be common across industries. I assume k > 2σ for the 
variances of both drawn productivities and sizes of firms (measured as domestic sales) to 
be finite.20  
 Now the following proposition is derived: 








S >  and Nβββ <<< ......21 , 
H
N
HH χχχ <<< ......21   and 
F
N
FF χχχ >>> ......21 .  
Proof: See Appendix A.  
This proposition implies that if fixed costs for production and export differ across 
industries only due to the cross-industry variation of the cost shares of two factors,21 and 
the “iceberg” shipping costs are also the same for all industries, then the ex ante 
probability for a domestic producer to be an exporter, which is equal to the ex post 
                                                 
19 See Chaney (2008) for references evidencing that a Pareto distribution well approximates the observed 
distribution of the sizes of the U.S. firms. A Pareto distribution is also used frequently for the distribution 
of firm productivity in this type of models: for example, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), Ghironi and 
Melitz (2005), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007).  
20 For the variance of drawn productivity to be finite, it must be that k > 2. For the variance of the domestic 
sales of firms to be finite, k > 2(σ-1). For these two conditions for k to be satisfied for any σ >1, I assume k 
> 2σ.  
21 Recall that both production fixed costs and export fixed costs depend on factor prices: 
ii HH
i wsf
ββ −1)()(  and ii HHxi wsf
ββ −1)()( . The cost shares of the two factors in these fixed costs 
differ across industries. Therefore, even though the parameters f and fx are the same for all industries, the 
fixed costs still vary across industries.   
 22
fraction of exporting firms to all domestic firms, will be higher in an industry that uses 
more intensively a production factor with which a country is relatively well-endowed. 
That is, if other things are equal, for the (un)skilled labor-abundant Home (Foreign) 
country, a larger fraction of firms that are serving the domestic market will export as an 
industry is more (un)skilled-labor intensive.  
 The key determinant of the ex ante probability of a domestic producer being an 
exporter is the “gap” between the two productivity cutoffs—the minimum productivity 
level for domestic production and the minimum for export. The gap between the two 
cutoffs, which is measured as the ratio of the export productivity cutoff to the domestic 
production productivity cutoff ( ** / ixi φφ ), thus decide the ex post fraction of exporters 
among active domestic firms. The predicted ranking of the exporter fractions that the 
proposition states is generated from the (reversed) ranking of the “gap” between the two 
productivity cutoffs in equilibrium. In other words, the “gap” is smaller in an industry 
with a stronger degree of comparative advantage (i.e., an industry that more intensively 
uses a factor with which the country is relatively well-endowed), as depicted in Figure 
2.1. While the “gap” is defined as the ratio of the two productivity cutoffs, Figure 2.1 
expresses the “gap” as a distance between the two cutoffs on a line (one can understand 
that the productivity levels in the figure are shown in a log scale).22 The mechanism that 
generates this cross-industry ranking of the productivity “gaps” is intuitively explained 
by competition in domestic factor markets. Consider the case for the skilled-labor 
abundant Home. When the country opens up to costly international trade, the potential 
profit will rise for firms with high productivity, as well as for new entrants that can 
                                                 
22 Figure 2.1 also normalizes the autarky productivity cutoffs for domestic production in all industries for 
an illustrative purpose.  
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possibly draw a high level of productivity, due to the additional sales opportunity in the 
foreign market. This will raise the domestic labor demand and thus increase domestic 
wages. The domestic wage increase results in the increase in production costs, and due to 
this production cost increase, all domestic firms will require a higher level of productivity 
for survival, thus raising the productivity cutoff for domestic production. This increase in 
the domestic-production productivity cutoff will occur in all industries, while the 
productivity increase will be more pronounced in more skill-intensive industries. The 
reason for this is that the increase in potential profit from export is larger in more skill-
intensive (i.e., comparative-advantage) industries, and the increase in firms’ factor 
demands will thus be larger in more skill-intensive industries. This results in a larger 
increase in the demand for skilled labor than in the unskilled-labor demand, and thus the 
relative price of skilled labor to the unskilled will rise. As a result, the increase in 
production costs will be larger and accordingly the rise in the minimum productivity level 
required for domestic production will be greater if the industry is more skill intensive. At 
the same time, for the “survivor” firms, exporting will be easier in more skill-intensive 
industries because of the country’s comparative advantage. In costly-trade equilibrium, 
the relative price of skilled labor will be lower in the Home than the Foreign, and this 
relative factor-price advantage will be more pronounced if the industry is more skill 
intensive. This results in a lower minimum productivity level for exporting in that 
industry.  
2.3 Data 
  The model predicts, as the Proposition in the last section states, that a larger 
fraction of firms that are active (i.e., producing and selling their products) in the domestic 
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market will become exporters in an industry in which the country’s comparative 
advantage is stronger. This implies that, for each country, the ratio of exporters to all 
active firms in an industry can be ranked according to the industry’s intensity of the use 
of the factor that is better-endowed in the country relative to the rest of the world. To test 
this prediction empirically, I need information on how many firms in each industry are 
active and how many out of those active firms export to other countries. I also need 
information on the factor intensity of each industry, as well as the factor abundance of 
countries in which the firms locate. In the current study, I use four countries for which at 
least limited data are available: Chile, Colombia, India, and the United States. 
2.3.1 Chilean Data 
 For Chile, I employ a firm-level dataset from an annual manufacturing census 
conducted by the national statistical institute of the country (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadisticas: INE), which was compiled and documented in English through a World 
Bank project.23 The manufacturing census dataset covers all establishments with ten or 
more employees. The dataset contains various kinds of information on each establishment 
including employment by type and the values of sales and exports. The dataset also 
contains the code of the industry that each firm belongs to, which is according to Chile’s 
national classification of economic activities (Clasificador de Actividades Economicas, 
CIIU24) at the four-digit level. Although the dataset covers the years 1979 through 1996, 
it has the export value of each firm only for 1990 through 1996. The dataset thus enables 
the calculation of the ratio of exporters to active firms and the skilled-labor intensity for 
various manufacturing industries for 1990 through 1996.  
                                                 
23 See Roberts and Tybout (1996) for the summary of the project funded by the World Bank.  
24 CIIU is indeed equivalent to the International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC), Revision 2.  
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2.3.2 Colombian Data 
 The dataset for Colombia that I use in this study is from an annual census of 
manufacturing by Colombia’s national statistical office (Departamento Administrativo 
Nacional de Estadistica: DANE), which was also compiled as a part of the World Bank 
project. The Colombian manufacturing census contains a variety of information on 
manufacturing plants with ten or more employees. The dataset covers the years 1981 
through 1991. The industry code is also available according to the International Standard 
Industry Classification (ISIC, Revision 2) at the four-digit level. The dataset allows for 
the calculation of the fraction of exporters among active firms and the skilled-labor 
intensity for each manufacturing industry for 1981 through 1991.     
2.3.3 Indian Data 
 Information on India is originally sourced from the Annual Survey of Industries 
(ASI) conducted by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation of India. 
The survey covers all industrial units that are registered under the Factories Act with 
more than 20 employees. This paper uses data that are aggregated for each of the four-
digit ISIC (Revision 2) industries from the original unit level data, which include the 
following industry-level variables: the numbers of industrial units, exporting units, skilled 
workers, and unskilled workers. The data are for a single year of the Indian fiscal year 
1997/98 (the period from April 1, 1997 through March 31, 1998).25   
2.3.4 U.S. Data 
  For the United States, although I do not have equally detailed firm-level data as 
those for the previously-mentioned three countries, I have collected the necessary data 
                                                 
25 I thank Jagadeesh Sivadasan for providing the aggregated data for India. Also see Sivadasan (2007) for 
the description of the original ASI data. 
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from published sources. The U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992) provides the numbers of 
establishments and exporting establishments in each of twenty manufacturing industries 
classified according to the 1987 U.S. Standard Industry Classification (SIC) at the two-
digit level, for the year 1992. Data on the number of production workers and the total 
employment in each two-digit U.S. SIC industry are available from the publications on 
the 1992 U.S. Census of Manufactures. These are used to measure the skilled-labor 
intensity of each manufacturing industry.   
2.3.5 Factor Endowment Data 
 For the information on how well these four countries are endowed with 
(un)skilled labor (i.e., the skilled-to-unskilled labor ratio: S/U), I employ the ratio of 
human capital to labor ratio provided by Hall and Jones (1999) as my benchmark 
measure. They measure human capital per worker in a country using the average years of 
schooling in the population of the country and return-to-schooling estimates.26, 27 I also 
use data on educational attainment reported by Barro and Lee (2000) as an alternative 
measure of the countries’ relative skill abundance for robustness checks. The details of 
this alternative measure are described in a later section. 
 Table 2.2a shows the relative skilled-labor abundance of the four countries 
according to the Hall and Jones’ measure of human capital per worker. The summary 
                                                 
26 More specifically, they measure human capital per worker in a country (c) as )(/ cEcc eLH
φ= , where 
Ec is the average years of schooling in the country’s population measured by Barro and Lee (1993), and 
)(' Eφ  is an estimated return to schooling in a Mincerian wage regression that is reported by 
Psacharopoulos (1994). They apply a piecewise linear specification to )(Eφ  assuming that the return to 
schooling differs for each segment of year length of schooling. See Hall and Jones (1999) for more details.  
27 I also use another measure of human capital per worker relative to the United States reported by Klenow 
and Rodriguez-Clare (1997). Their way of estimating the human capital to labor ratios for countries is 
similar but slightly different from the method applied by Hall and Jones (1999). See Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1997) for the details. My empirical results, however, do not change between these two 
measures, and thus I report only the results with Hall & Jones’ measure in the following part of this paper.   
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statistics of the variable for 127 countries covered in their data are also presented for 
reference. All the numbers are based on the statistics weighted by the amount of labor 
reported in the source data. Similarly, Table 2.2b reports the relative skill abundance of 
the four countries according to Barro and Lee’s measure of tertiary education completion 
in the total population over age 15, with the population-weighted summary statistics for 
103 countries covered in their data. Both tables show that these four countries represent 
diverse groups of countries in terms of skill-labor abundance. That is, the United States is 
very skill rich, Chile is moderately skill abundant, Colombia is about the “middle,”28 and 
India is skill scarce or unskilled-labor abundant.  
2.4 Empirical Analysis 
2.4.1 Individual Country Analysis 
 The theoretical two-country two-factor model suggests that if a country is more 
(un)skilled-labor abundant relative to the rest of the world, the fraction of exporting firms 
among all active firms in that country will be higher in more (un)skilled-labor intensive 
industries. To test this prediction, I apply the following empirical model for each 
individual country:  
iii skillshareex εθγ +⋅+=_        (2.23) 
where ex_sharei = (number of exporters) / (number of active firms) in Industry i, and 
skilli is the  skilled-labor intensity of the industry.29 The theoretical prediction is that the 
coefficient for the skilled-labor intensity (θ) will be larger (i.e., more positive or less 
                                                 
28 According to Hall and Jones’ data, Colombia is a slightly less skill abundant country compared to the 
median and the mean of the 127 countries, while the country falls between the median and mean of the 103 
countries in Barro and Lee’s data.  
29 The measure of skilled-labor intensity is described for each country later in this subsection. Because the 
categories of workers in the data are different for each country, the definition of the industry skill intensity 
is not exactly the same for all four countries.  
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negative) for the country with higher skilled-labor abundance. In the rest of this 
subsection, I test this prediction by estimating the regression equation (2.23) using the 
data for each of the four sample countries: Chile, Colombia, India, and the United States, 
and compare the coefficient θ estimated for each country.  
Chile 
 For Chile, using the dataset described in the previous section, I compute each 
variable in Equation (2.23) for 25 manufacturing industries classified according to the 
three-digit ISIC.30 Exporters are defined as firms with positive values of exports, and 
active firms are firms with positive total sales of goods. The skilled-labor intensity of 
each industry skilli is the share of skilled workers31, 32 in all workers employed in each 
industry.33 For Chile, as well as for Colombia in the following subsubsection, data are 
averaged over periods for cross-industry estimation; this is done to achieve a fair 
comparison of estimation results with those for India and the United States for which data 
are available only for a single year. Hence, for Chile, the average values of the variables 
                                                 
30 The three-digit ISIC lists 28 manufacturing industries. I exclude the following four industries from the 
estimation: 314 (tobacco products), 353 (petroleum refineries), 354 (miscellaneous petroleum and coal 
products), and 390 (other manufacturing products). The last category is excluded because of its 
miscellaneous status. The first three categories are excluded because these industries are extremely 
concentrated (Carree et al., 2000). In the data used in the present study, the number of active (domestic) 
firms is significantly lower in these industries compared to other three-digit industries in Chile, Colombia, 
and India. (Although industries are classified differently in the U.S. data, the number of firms in the U.S. 
data is also extremely small in industry categories corresponding to these three ISIC industries.) Alvarez 
and Lopez (2006) and Bergoeing and Repetto (2006), which use Chilean firm-level data, also exclude the 
tobacco and petroleum industries from their analyses because these industries “are organized as 
monopolies, operating with very few plants” (Bergoeing & Repetto, 2006).  
31 The categories of workers in the dataset are more detailed. I define skilled workers as the total of owners, 
executives, white-collar administrative workers, and white-collar production workers. Unskilled workers 
are the rest of the workers employed; i.e., blue-collar production and non-production workers, workers at 
home, and salespersons in commission. Therefore, the unskilled-labor intensity of each industry equals 1 - 
skilli. 
32 The proposition presented in the second section of this paper is based on the Cobb-Douglas cost share of 
skilled workers in an industry (βi). However, as explained in Footnote 10, with an equilibrium relative wage 
(s/w) in a country, the ranking of industry skill intensity measured by the physical unit of labor (Si/(Si+Ui)) 
corresponds to the ranking of βi.  
33 The total employment in each industry, as well as the number of (un)skilled workers, is computed by 
aggregating for each industry the numbers of workers (in each category) hired by the firms in the dataset.  
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over the years 1990 through 1996 are used for the analysis.34 
 The result of the estimation by OLS is presented in Table 2.3, and the plot of the 
fractions of exporters against the industry skill intensities is shown with the fitted line in 
Figure 2.2. In Chile the correlation between the exporter fractions and the industry skill 
intensities is positive ( 634.0ˆ =θ ) and significant.  
Colombia 
 Variables for estimating Equation (2.23) are computed from the previously-
mentioned Colombian dataset for the 25 industries classified according to the three-digit 
ISIC. The value of each variable is the average from 1981 to 1991.35 The definitions of an 
exporter and an active firm are the same as those in the Chilean case. The industry 
skilled-labor intensity is the share of workers in the categories of owners, management, 
skilled workers, and local and foreign technicians in all workers employed in each 
industry.36  
 Table 2.4 shows the estimation result, and Figure 2.3 plots the fractions of 
exporters against the skilled-labor intensities of the 25 three-digit industries. The 
correlation between the exporter fractions and the industry skill intensities is not 
significant in Colombia ( 091.0ˆ −=θ ).  
India 
 For India, I compute the variables for a regression from the data described in 
Section 2.3 for the 25 manufacturing industries classified according to the three-digit 
                                                 
34 I also estimated the coefficient theta using whole panel data for Chile (with time dummies, standard 
errors clustered by industry), and obtained virtually the same result for each country.   
35 The averaged data are used for the same reason as described for Chile in the previous subsubsection. 
Estimation with whole panel data does not alter the result, however.   
36 Unskilled labor is thus the sum of workers in other categories in the data (i.e., unskilled workers and 
apprentices).  
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ISIC. Exporter fraction in each industry is measured as the number of exporting industrial 
units divided by the number of all units in the industry. The skilled-labor intensity of each 
industry is the share of non-production workers in all employees in the industry. The 
variables are for the single fiscal year 1997/98.  
 Table 2.5 presents the result of the estimation. In India, the correlation between 
the exporter fractions and the industry skill intensities is negative ( 865.0ˆ −=θ ) and fairly 
significant. Figure 2.4 plots the exporter fractions vs the skilled-labor intensities of the 25 
manufacturing industries and shows the fitted line together.  
 Table 2.6 summarizes the results of these individual country regressions for the 
three countries in order to compare the estimates of the coefficient for the industry skill 
intensity. For all three countries, the data are for the common 25 manufacturing industries 
classified according to the three-digit ISIC. The correlation estimated by each individual 
country regression is larger, or more positive, for a country with higher skill abundance, 
as the theoretical model suggests. The coefficient estimate is negative for India while it is 
positive for Chile, and the estimate for Colombia falls in between.  
United States 
 Unlike for the other three countries, for the United States, industries are not 
classified according to the ISIC in the available data, but are classified according to the 
1987 U.S. SIC at the two-digit level. I thus estimate Equation (2.23) for the United States 
with 17 manufacturing industries.37 The exporter fraction (ex_sharei) is the number of 
exporting establishments divided by the number of (all) establishments in each industry. 
                                                 
37 There are 20 two-digit U.S. SIC manufacturing industries, but as for the other three countries, for the 
United States I exclude tobacco, petroleum and coal, and miscellaneous industries from estimation. The 
following three categories in the two-digit U.S. SIC corresponds to these three industries and thus are 
excluded: 21 (tobacco products), 29 (petroleum and coal products), and 39 (misc. manufacturing 
industries).  
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The industry skilled-labor intensity is measured as the share of non-production workers in 
all workers employed in each industry.38 The variables are for the single year 1992. 
 The result of the estimation with the 17 manufacturing industries by OLS is 
presented in Table 2.7. Figure 2.5 displays the plot of the fractions of exporters against 
the industry skill intensities along with the fitted line. The correlation between the 
exporter fractions and the industry skill intensities is positive ( 587.0ˆ =θ ) and fairly 
significant in the United States.  
Comparing Four Countries 
 The coefficient estimates for the industry skill intensity (θ) for the United States is 
not directly comparable with the estimates for the other three countries due to the 
difference in industry classification. For the cross-country comparison of the coefficient, 
I compute for Chile, Colombia, and India the exporter fractions and skill intensities in the 
two-digit U.S. SIC industries, using the concordance between the three-digit ISIC and the 
two-digit U.S. SIC, which is presented in Table 2.9. The re-classified data are used to re-
estimate Equation (2.23) for each of these three countries with the 17 two-digit U.S. SIC 
manufacturing industries. Table 2.8 compares the coefficients estimated for Chile, 
Colombia, India, and the United States.39 The table shows that the relative sizes of the 
coefficients correspond to the relative skill abundance of these countries. That is, the 
correlation between the exporter fractions and industry skill intensities is the largest 
                                                 
38 More specifically, since in the Census of Manufactures the number of production workers is available for 
each manufacturing industry, I first calculate unskilled-labor intensity that is defined as the share of 
production workers in the total employment, and then compute skilled-labor intensity as one minus 
unskilled-labor intensity.  
39 For Chile and India, the coefficient estimates with the 17 two-digit U.S. SIC industries are not significant 
whereas the estimates with the 25 three-digit ISIC industries are significant at least at the 10% level. This 
can be explained by the aggregation of the industries. The aggregation of the 25 manufacturing industries to 
the 17 reduces the variance of the exporter fractions, which makes the size of the slope coefficient smaller. 
The aggregation also reduces the variance of the skill intensities among industries, which makes the 
standard error of the estimate larger.  
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(most positive) for the most skill abundant United States, the second for Chile, the third 
for Colombia, and the smallest (most negative) for the least skill abundant India. This 
result is consistent with the case for the 25 three-digit ISIC industries shown in Table 2.6, 
and also with the theoretical prediction.      
Impact of Sample Truncation 
 As described in the previous section, manufacturing census data for these 
countries exclude small firms whose employment is below the threshold level.40 This 
omission of small firms might cause bias in estimation, in particular if the fraction of 
exporters among domestic firms in a sample systematically overestimate or underestimate 
the fraction in a population in relation to industry skill intensities. This possibility of 
estimation bias is examined in Appendix B; however, the exclusion of small firms should 
not affect the result of the present empirical analysis.      
2.4.2 Pooled Analysis 
 The predicted relationship among the relative factor abundance of countries, 
relative factor intensities of industries, and the ratio of exporters to all active firms has 
been confirmed by individual country regressions in the previous section. This quasi-
Heckscher-Ohlin prediction can be tested more formally using the following empirical 
model: 
iciccic skillshareex εγ +⋅Π+=_        (2.24) 
where i indexes an industry and c indexes a country. The coefficient cΠ for the industry 
skilled-labor intensity, as well as the constant term γc, being indexed by c means that 
                                                 
40 The U.S. Census of Manufactures also omits small firms that are excused from filing reports. See 1992 
Census of Manufactures General Summary (MC92-S-1, pp. VII-IX) for the details of company coverage in 
the census.   
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these parameters differ across countries. In particular, the theoretical prediction is that the 
slope coefficient cΠ  will be larger (more positive or less negative) for a country with a 
higher relative skilled-labor abundance, and smaller (less positive or more negative) for a 
country with a lower relative skilled-labor abundance (or a higher relative unskilled-labor 
abundance). To capture this correlation between the coefficient cΠ  and the skill 
abundance of a country, the following structure is imposed: 
ccc USUS )/(log=))/((= 21 ⋅+ΠΠ θθ       (2.25) 
where cUS )/(  is the skilled-labor to unskilled-labor ratio of Country c .
41 By substituting 
(2.25) for (2.24), the following equation is derived: 
icciicic USskillskillshareex εθθγ +⋅⋅+⋅+ )/(log=_ 21     (2.26) 
This equation is estimated with pooled data for the four countries (Chile, Colombia, 
India, and the United States) and the 17 manufacturing industries classified according to 
the two-digit 1987 U.S. SIC. The pooled data allows for the inclusion of industry 
dummies in estimation to control for the effects of industry-specific factors other than the 
skill intensity, such as fixed and variable costs for export. (Recall that in Section 2.2 the 
theoretical model derives quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction when the (factor-price-
adjusted) fixed costs for production, fixed costs for exporting, and variable shipping costs 
are the same across industries. These costs, however, are generally not the same.42) 
Hence, the equation is estimated in the following form:  
                                                 
41 The advantage of the log-scaled measure of relative factor abundance is that the size (absolute value) of 
the coefficient θ2 will be invariant to which of S or U is the denominator of the measure.  
42 For this reason, it is ideal to control for these industry-specific costs in individual regressions in the 
previous subsection. However, industry-specific dummies cannot be used since the observations in 
individual country data are unique for each industry. In addition, no relevant measures of these costs are 
available. Nevertheless, the result of the individual country analysis is valid as far as these industry-specific 
costs are symmetric or invariant across countries.  
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icicciic USskillshareex εηγθ +++⋅⋅ )/(log=_ 2     (2.26.2) 
where γc and ηi are series of industry-specific and country-specific intercepts, 
respectively.43  
 The fraction of exporters among active firms in each industry (ex_shareic) is 
obtained from the data for each individual country. For Chile, the variable is of the 
average over the years 1990 through 1996; for Colombia, the variable is of the average 
over 1981 through 1991; for India, the variable is for the fiscal year 1997/98; and for the 
United States, the variable is for the year 1992. The skilled-labor to unskilled-labor ratio 
in each country ((S/U)c) is measured as the human capital to labor ratio reported by Hall 
and Jones (1999). The variable skilli is now defined as the (Cobb-Douglas) cost share of 
skilled labor in each industry, which is assumed to be common across countries in the 
theoretical model. The cost-share measure, rather than the skill-intensity measure based 
on the physical amount of labor, is chosen because while the Cobb-Douglas cost share is 
the same for all countries, the employment-based intensity of each type of labor will 
differ across countries in general due to the difference in relative wage (s/w) in the costly-
trade equilibrium.44 This common cost-share variable is measured as wage payments to 
non-production workers as the share in the total annual payroll in each industry, using the 
data in the 1992 U.S. Census of Manufactures. The skilled-labor cost shares in the 17 
two-digit U.S. SIC manufacturing industries are shown in Table 2.10.  
The result of the estimation of Equation (2.26.2) is presented in Table 2.11. The 
positive and significant (at the 4% level) estimate 2θ̂  suggests that correlation between 
                                                 
43 Note that the first term (θ1·skilli) of Equation (2.26) is dropped from the estimation due to the inclusion of 
industry-specific dummies, because the industry skill intensity is unique for each industry.  
44 See Footnote 8.   
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the exporter fractions and industry skill intensities (defined by the cost shares) is larger 
(or more positive) for a country with a higher relative skill abundance. This result of the 
pooled-data analysis confirms the result of the individual country analysis, and thus 
supports the theoretical prediction.45  
2.4.3 Robustness Check of Pooled Analysis 
 Although non-production workers or white-collar workers are frequently used in 
empirical studies to represent skilled labor, these are crude proxies. A more desirable 
measure is to categorize workers according to their (potential) skill levels such as 
educational attainment. To check the robustness of the result of the pooled regression in 
the previous subsection, I employ a measure of industry skill intensity proposed by 
Morrow (2008). He uses data from the March U.S. Current Population Survey for the 
years 1988-92 that contain information on incomes and educational attainment of 
workers employed in various industries. He computes the Cobb-Douglas cost share of 
skilled workers using the share of employees in each educational category and the wage 
levels of workers in an educational category relative to the wage level of workers in other 
categories estimated from a Mincerian wage regression. While he reports the information 
for the three-digit ISIC manufacturing industries, for the current study, I use this 
information to compute the skilled-labor cost shares for the two-digit U.S. SIC industries. 
I define skilled labor as workers with one or more years of college education. The details 
of the computation are described in Appendix D. The obtained skilled-labor cost shares in 
the 17 two-digit U.S. SIC manufacturing industries are listed in Table 2.12.  
 Because the industry skill intensity is now measured based on the educational 
attainment of workers, for consistency I also employ an educational attainment-based 
                                                 
45 See Appendix C for further empirical exercise. 
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measure for the countries’ relative abundance of skilled labor, (S/U)c. Specifically, I use 
the percentage of the population that has attained tertiary education reported by Barro and 
Lee (2000). The percentages of tertiary education attainment for Chile, Colombia, India, 
and the United States are shown in Table 2.13.46                        
 Using these alternative measures of industry skill intensity and country skill 
abundance, Equation (2.26.2) is re-estimated with data for the four countries and 17 
manufacturing industries. The result is presented in Table 2.14. A positive coefficient is 
estimated ( 2θ̂  = 0.277) at the 5% level of significance (p-value = 0.018), which indicates 
that the estimated relationship among the factor abundance of countries, the skill 
intensities of industries, and the exporter fractions is robust  across different measures of 
country factor abundance and industry skill intensity.47 
 2.4.4 Factor Prices 
 In the current model, the mechanism that determines the cross-industry patterns of 
exporter fraction operates based on the relative prices of the two factors. As described in 
Section 2.2, in the costly-trade equilibrium, the relative wage is not equalized between 
countries. This relative wage difference creates the variation in the exporter fractions 
between comparative-advantage industries and comparative-disadvantage industries. To 
confirm this mechanism, in this subsection, I estimate the exporter fraction equation 
using wage data.  
 The source of information on wages is the Occupational Wages around the World 
                                                 
46 Since the exporter fractions are measured in different periods for each country, the educational 
attainment data for different periods are employed for each country to have the periods of the two variables 
being consistent. See Table 2.13 for the data periods for each country.    
47 The equation is also estimated using the alternative measure only for either industry skill intensity or for 
country skill abundance, maintaining the benchmark measure for the other variable. In any case, the 
estimated coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level or more.   
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(OWW) Database, an NBER dataset provided by Freeman and Oostendorp (2000). This 
is a comprehensive dataset of wages of various occupations in a large number of 
countries. The occupational wage data in the OWW Database are derived from the 
“October Inquiry,” which is a wage survey conducted by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO).48 However, the ILO’s data, which are based on reports from national 
governments, involve problems such as inconsistency in wage format (e.g., weekly or 
monthly, minimum or average), missing data, and erroneous records. Therefore, in the 
OWW Database, the original October Inquiry data have been cleaned and standardized 
by calibration.49 The OWW Database thus provides comparable wage data for a large 
number of occupations in many countries. In the current paper, I use an updated version 
of the OWW database by Oostendorp (2005) that covers 161 occupations (in various 
industries including services and the government sector) in 137 countries for the years 
1983 through 2003.50 The numbers of occupations and years covered in the database 
significantly vary across countries, however. For the four countries examined in the 
current study, wage data are available for the following years and numbers of 
occupations: for Chile, 89 to 134 occupations for 1984-86; for Colombia, 41 to 124 
occupations for 1988-90; for India, 13 to 93 occupations for 1985-2000; and for the 
United States, 11 to 152 occupations for 1984-2002.  
 The skilled-labor wage relative to unskilled-labor wage, s/w, needs to be 
measured for each country. Since both numbers and types of occupations reported in the 
                                                 
48 The original ILO data are available at http://laborsta.ilo.org/. Also see Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) 
for the description of ILO’s October Inquiry.  
49 See Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) and Oostendorp (2005) for the details of the procedure of data 
calibration and standardization.  
50 The database is available at http://www.nber.org/oww/. Specifically, I employ the data on wages with 
country-specific and uniform calibration and lexicographic weighting (the variable “x3wl”) in the database.  
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dataset vary across countries and years, I calculate the relative wage (s/w) in the 
following three ways: (i) taking the ratio of the highest occupational wage to the lowest 
(whatever these occupations are); (ii) dividing occupations into ten groups by wage 
deciles and taking the ratio of the mean wage in the highest-wage group to the mean 
wage in the lowest-wage group; and (iii) taking the ratio of the 90th percentile wage to 
the 10th percentile wage. After computing these three relative wage measures for each of 
the four countries for each year, I select the values of the three variables for the following 
period to match the wage data period to that of the exporter fraction for each country: for 
Chile, the averages over 1984-86;51 for Colombia, the averages over 1988-90;52 for India, 
the averages of 1997 and 1998; and for the United States, the year 1992. Table 2.15 lists 
the values of the relative skilled-to-unskilled wage in the three measures for each 
country.53 The table shows that the relative wage reflects the relative skilled-labor 
abundance of the countries, except for Chile and Colombia. Between these two 
“medium” countries, the relative positions in terms of comparative advantage are 
reversed when they are measured by the relative wage.    
 The quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction that the fraction of exporters among active 
domestic firms is higher in comparative-advantage industries for each country is tested 
using these three measures of the factor price ratio. The same empirical model as in the 
previous subsections is applied, but the skilled-to-unskilled labor ratio (S/U) is now 
replaced with the skilled-to-unskilled wage ratio (s/w), and thus the regression equation is 
                                                 
51 The periods do not match the ones for the exporter fractions (1990-96), but these are only periods for 
which the wage data are available for Chile.  
52 The periods do not completely match the ones for the exporter fractions (1981-91), but these are only 
periods for which the wage data are available for Colombia. 
53 Note that these three relative wage measures are based on different sets of occupations for different 
countries. In the following subsubsection, I estimate the same equation using alternative relative wage 
measures that are based on the same set of occupations for all four countries.   
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as follows:  
icicciic wsskillshareex εηγψ +++⋅⋅ )/(log=_      (2.27) 
ηi and γc are industry- and country-specific intercepts, respectively, as in Equation 
(2.26.2). The same 17 two-digit U.S. SIC manufacturing industries are used for 
estimation. As in Subsection 2.4.2, the industry skilled-labor cost share (skilli) is 
measured as the wages to non-production workers as the share in the total payroll (in 
Table 2.10). Note that since the relative price of skilled labor (s/w) is lower in a more 
skill-abundant country, the model expects ψ to be negative. 
 The results of the estimation of Equation (2.27) using the three relative wage 
measures are presented in Table 2.16. With any wage measure, the estimate of ψ is 
negative and significant at the 5% level (p-value is between 0.019 and 0.040).54 This 
indicates that the correlation between the exporter fraction and industry skill intensity 
(measured as the cost share) is larger in a country where the skilled labor is relatively 
cheaper, which is consistent with the prediction.  
Relative Wage Measures Based on Same Occupations 
Since the three measures of relative wage (s/w) are based on a different set of 
occupations for each country, the measured cross-country variation in the relative wage 
might be simply due to the difference of occupation composition. For instance, the large 
gap between the measured wages of skilled and unskilled workers in India may not 
reflect the relative unskilled-labor abundance of the country, but instead may be due to 
the fact that data for India contain extremely well-paid occupations that are not covered 
in data for other countries. To address this potential measurement issue, in this 
                                                 
54 The equation is also estimated using the measure of skilled-labor cost share based on workers’ 
educational attainment (following Morrow, 2008). The results do not change: with each relative wage 
measure, a similar size of the coefficient is estimated at least at the 5% level of significance.  
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subsubsection, I construct relative wage measures that are adjusted for occupation 
composition, and estimate Equation (2.27) with those alternative measures to check the 
robustness of the results presented above.          
 I first select a set of occupations that is in common across four countries. The 
occupation set consists of 25 occupations selected based on the availability of wage data 
in the OWW2 dataset. These 25 occupations are observed for Chile in 1985-86, for 
Colombia in 1988,55 for India in 1997-98, and for the United States in 1992.56 Based on 
this common occupation set, I compute the following three measures of skilled-to-
unskilled wage ratio, which are similar to the relative wage measures used for the 
preceding estimation: (i) the ratio of the highest wage to the lowest wage in each country 
(maximum to minimum wage ratio); (ii) the ratio of the mean wage of the three highest-
wage occupations to the mean wage of the three lowest-wage occupations (the top10% to 
the bottom10% mean wage ratio); and (iii) the ratio of the 90th percentile wage to the 
10th percentile wage (the top 90th to the bottom 10th percentile wage ratio). The values of 
the three relative wage measures for each country are shown in Table 2.17.57  
 These three alternative wage measures are used to re-estimate Equation (2.27) for 
the four countries for the 17 two-digit U.S. SIC industries. The results are presented in 
Table 2.18, and are very similar to the results of the preceding estimation in Table 2.16. 
These results imply that (i) the relative wage measures used for the first estimation, 
                                                 
55 The availability of wage data in the dataset is the most limited for Colombia among the four countries. In 
addition, sets of data-available occupations for Colombia substantially differ across years. Therefore, to 
maximize the number of occupations in a common set to all four countries, I select a single year 1988 for 
Colombia. Chilean wage data in 1984 are also omitted for the same reason.  
56 These 25 industries are, in the occupation codes in the ILO October Inquiry: 30, 36, 59, 65, 67, 70, 82, 
84, 85, 88, 90, 91, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 140, and 141. These occupations 
include a computer programmer, which is the best-paid occupation among these occupations in all four 
countries, and a laborer, which is one of the least-paid occupations in every country.     
57 Note that the order reversal between Chile and Colombia is also observed in these alternative wage 
measures.  
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although they are not adjusted for occupation composition, are well reflecting the 
countries’ relative factor abundance, and (ii) the relative wage-driven mechanism of the 
theoretical model is empirically supported.              
2.5 Conclusion 
 This paper investigates what patterns of the fractions of exporters among 
domestic firms emerge when countries and industries are asymmetric. The model of a 
two-country, two-factor and many-industry economy with productivity-heterogeneous 
firms, which is an extension of the two-factor, two-country and two-industry framework 
by Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007), suggests that a country’s comparative advantage 
in terms of relative factor abundance explains the cross-industry and cross-country 
patterns of exporter selection. That is, the probability that a domestic producer will be an 
exporter is higher in the country’s comparative-advantage industries. Furthermore, the 
fractions of exporters among domestic firms can be ranked according to the order of the 
industries’ intensity of a production factor with which the country is relatively well-
endowed. This quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction about exporter fractions is empirically 
tested using data for manufacturing firms in Chile, Colombia, India, and the United 
States. The result of the analysis confirms the quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin pattern: the 
correlation between exporter fractions and the skill intensity of industries is larger, or 
more positive, for a country with higher skilled-labor abundance. This empirical finding 
is robust across alternative measures of both industry relative factor intensity and country 
relative factor abundance.   
 By empirically demonstrating the effect of factor proportion on the selection of 
exporters in different industries and countries, this paper highlights one role of 
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comparative advantage that has not been adequately explored. The result of this study 
implies that, through the exporter selection, the influence of a country’s comparative 
advantage can be more pronounced in the industrial composition of the country’s export 
than in that of the country’s domestic production, at least in terms of the extensive 
margin.  
 The empirical analysis in this paper is in fact based on data for a limited number 
of countries. Having more countries in a sample would be desirable to more strongly 
confirm the theoretical quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction. Nevertheless, the four sample 
countries in this paper represent a variety of country groups in terms of relative skilled-
labor abundance, and the empirical result clearly demonstrates a comparative advantage-
driven variation in the patterns of exporter selection among countries.  
2.6 Appendix A 
2.6.1 Derivation of Equation (2.12) 
Note, from Equation (2.6), that the ratio of the revenues of two firms with 
































=       (2.A.1) 
Using this relationship, as well as Equation (2.7) for an individual firm’s profit and 
Equation (2.9) for the revenue of the firm with the cutoff-level productivity, the free-





























































































































































and thus Equation (2.12) follows. 
2.6.2 Derivation of Equations (2.17) & (2.18) 
Here I derive only Equation (2.17) for Home. Equation (2.18) for Foreign is 
derived analogously. 
From Equation (2.13) for the optimal pricing of exported product, the revenue of 


























      (2.A.2) 
From this and Equation (2.6), the ratio of the revenue earned by an exporter and that 








































       (2.A.3) 
Equation (2.A.1) can be modified to the following equation, which implies that the ratio 
of two firms’ productivities is a function of the ratio of the revenues that two firms earn 






















         (2.A.4) 
Using Equations (2.A.3) and (2.A.4), we can express the ratio of the productivity cutoff 

































































































































































































The last equality is from the zero-profit condition in the domestic market (2.6) and the 
zero-profit condition in the export market (2.15). Equation (2.17) thus follows by 
defining the right-hand side of the last line of the equation above as HiΛ . 
2.6.3 Derivation of Equation (2.21) 
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The second equality is derived using (2.A.1), and the third equality is from Equation 
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Substituting these equations for the average profit levels, as well as the average 





























































































































































ββ −= 1)()( ,  
which Equation (2.21) follows by canceling out the term ii HH ws ββ −1)()(  on the both 
sides.  
2.6.4 Relative Factor Prices under Costly Trade 
Here I demonstrate that in equilibrium the relative prices of the two production 
factors (S and U) is not equalized in our framework of costly trade. The wage for skilled 
labor relative to the that for unskilled labor will be lower in Home, where skilled labor is 










First, note that autarky and free trade are the two extreme cases, or limits, of the 
costly trade. That is, the former is the limit with infinitely large trade costs 
( ∞→∞→ ixif τ, ), and the latter is the limit with no additional costs for trade 
( 1,0 →→ iixif τ ). The equilibrium relative factor price under costly trade will fall in the 








< ). I will thus show how the 
relative factor prices in the two countries will be in these two limit cases. 
Autarky  
Since the production function (2.4) has a Cobb-Douglas form, the optimal 
allocation of the two factors in each industry is such that the total payment to each factor 
is proportional to the total revenue, which equals the total expenditure, in the industry. 












































      (2.A.6) 
where RiH is the total revenue in Industry i in Home, which is equal to the total industry 
expenditure in equilibrium. The industry expenditure is proportional to the national 
income due to the Cobb-Douglas utility function (2.1) (i.e., RiH = αiYH). 
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   (2.A.9) 






















      (2.A.9’) 
Since consumers share the identical preference and the Cobb-Douglas cost share 
of each production factor is common across countries within each industry (i.e., the 
parameters αi and βi are common across countries), the first term of the product in the 
right-hand side of Equations (2.A.9) and (2.A.9’) is the same for both countries. Hence, 
the relative factor price 
w
s  in each country is determined by the ratio of the two factors 
that the country is endowed with, 
U








>  by assumption, (2.A.9) and 








<  in the autarky equilibrium. 
Free Trade  
Here I focus on the case with FPE. We can identify the equilibrium relative factor 
price with FPE by solving for the problem of the integrated world economy, which is 
characterized by Equations (2.A.5) through (2.A.9) in the autarky case described above, 
but omitting the country script. The common relative factor price 
w
s  is determined by the 
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2.6.5 Proof of Proposition 
WLOG, in this proof I focus on the skill-abundant Home country.  
The probability of a domestic producer being an exporter, χiH, is determined by 
the ratio between the two productivity cutoffs, the one for domestic production Hi
*φ  and 
the one for exporting Hxi













































) depends upon the Home and 
Foreign industry price indexes (PiH and PiF), I take the following proof strategy: 
(i) I first show that the relative industry price index (Home to Foreign) is smaller 













<  for i ≠ j such that βi > βj); 
(ii) I next demonstrate that (i) implies that the ratio between the two productivity 

















<  for i ≠ j such that βi > βj);  
and 
                                                 
58 We can show that there exist the optimal allocations of the two factors to each industry in each country 
with FPE, although the allocations are not unique (Melvin’s indeterminacy). The authors can provide the 
proof upon request.  
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(iii) I then use the results in (ii) and the relationship between the relative factor 
prices in the two countries in equilibrium, which has been derived in Subsection 
2.6.4, to compare across industries the probability of the Home active firms to 
be an exporter, χiH and χjH. 
(i) Relative industry price index in two countries: 












<  for i ≠ j such that βi > βj, here I apply a similar 
logic to the one that I have used in above-mentioned 2.6.4 to show the relative factor 






s ). The relative industry price index in 






















































  (2.A.10) 
Since the autarky equilibrium and the free-trade FPE equilibrium are the two extreme or 
limit cases, the relative price index in the costly trade equilibrium falls between the one in 
the autarky equilibrium and the one in the free-trade FPE equilibrium. 
In autarky, which is characterized by τi = ∞ and fxi = ∞, no firms will be exporters 







































































   (2.A.11) 
Since )(/ iiii rRM φ=  and YR ii α=  for each country in the autarky equilibrium, 































































    (2.A.12) 
Note that the optimal pricing Equation (2.5) implies that the ratio of the prices charged by 
two firms with different productivity in the same market can be expressed as the ratio of 












Using this equation and Equation (A.1), as well as the optimal pricing (2.5) and the zero-















































































































































  (2.A.13) 
Note that the productivity cutoff for each country, *iφ , is determined by the free-entry 
condition (2.12), which is common for the two countries. Therefore, Fi
H
i
** φφ = , and 
accordingly, Fi
H
i φφ =  since the productivity distribution is also common across 


















































































































































































    (2.A.15) 








<  in autarky. Therefore, since βi > βj, 












<  in the autarky equilibrium. 
Next, consider the free-trade equilibrium, which is characterized by τi = 1 and fxi = 
0. Since all domestically active firms will export, χiλ = 1 in each country λ. Furthermore, 
with FPE, firms in the two countries will charge the same price for both domestic sales 














i pppp φφφφ ===  
(the average productivity is the same across countries since it is determined by the 














































<  for i ≠ j such that βi > βj in equilibrium. 
(ii) Ratio between the export cutoff productivity and the domestic production cutoff 
productivity: 


























































Suppose τi = τj = τ, fi = fj = f, and fxi = fxj = fx. Then, from the result in (i) above, these 
two equations imply that:  



















)1()1( .   (2.A.16) 
(iii) Cross-industry comparison of the probability of exporting: 










































































































Therefore, from (2.A.16),  






















































Since this holds for any industry pair i and j (i, j = 1, 2, ……, N) that satisfies βi > βj, the 
Proposition thus follows. ■ 
2.7 Appendix B 
This appendix examines the potential impacts of sample truncation in 
manufacturing census data on the result of the empirical analysis in this paper. As 
described in Section 2.3, the manufacturing census of each country omits firms whose 
employment is less than the threshold level (ten employees for the Chile and Colombia, 
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and 20 employees for India; the U.S. census also excludes small firms: see the General 
Summary of the U.S. Census of Manufactures for the details). The omission of small 
firms might potentially cause the overestimation of exporter fraction, since the number of 
domestic firms in the data, which is the denominator of the fraction, does not count such 
small firms.59 This overestimation of the exporter fraction might occur for all industries, 
but if the degree of the overestimation would differ systematically in relation to the factor 
intensity (or more specifically, the skill intensity) of the industries, it could result in the 
biased estimation of a correlation between the exporter fractions and the industry skill 
intensities. In what follows, I examine whether such estimation bias could crucially 
affect, or mislead, the result of the empirical findings presented in Section 2.4.     
From Theory 
The theoretical model presented in Section 2.2 suggests that the minimum 
productivity level required for domestic production is lower in comparative-disadvantage 
industries and higher in comparative-advantage industries. This implies that comparative-
disadvantage industries contain more small-size firms (in terms of employment) 
compared to comparative-advantage industries.60 Therefore, if the sample of firms is 
truncated at the same threshold employment level for all industries, the number of small 
domestic firms omitted from the sample is larger in comparative-disadvantage industries, 
and thus the exporter fraction is more overestimated in the sample for comparative-
                                                 
59 The omission of small firms might also affect the numerator of the fraction, if some of these small firms 
export. However, Bernard and Jensen (1995) and other studies have found that exporters are significantly 
larger than non-exporters in terms of employment size, and it is expected that, even though the small firms 
include exporters, the fraction of exporters in these small firms is (significantly) smaller than the exporter 
fraction in all firms. The exporter fraction observed in the census data might thus still overestimate the 
fraction in the population.     
60 The present model implies that a firm with a lower productivity level is smaller in both sales size and 
employment size. In addition, with the assumption of a Pareto distribution for firms’ productivity, both 
sales sizes and employment sizes of firms are also distributed in a Pareto distribution. The proof can be 
provided upon request.  
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disadvantage industries. This pattern of overestimation implies that the predicted 
relationship between the exporter fraction and comparative advantage is weaker in the 
sample than in the population. In other words, for a more skill-abundant country (e.g., the 
United States) the correlation between the exporter fractions and industry skill intensities 
in the sample is estimated to be less positive than how it should be in the population, and 
for a less skill-abundant country (e.g., India) the correlation in the sample is estimated to 
be less negative than how it should be in the population. This suggest that the quasi-
Heckscher-Ohlin pattern of the exporter fraction, which is found to be significant in the 
empirical analysis in Section 2.4, should be even stronger in the population of firms that 
includes small firms.     
 From Data 
  Recall Equation (2.23) for individual country analysis: 
iii skillshareex εθγ +⋅+=_        
Since ex_sharei on the left-hand side is the ratio of the number of exporters in a sample to 



























    (2.B.1) 
where EXi, exi, DOMi, and domi denote the numbers of exporters in a firm population, 
exporters in small firms omitted from the sample, domestic producers in the population, 
and domestic producers in the small firms in Industry i, respectively. Hence, if the second 









, would be positively 
(negatively) correlated to the industry skill intensity skilli, the estimation of Equation 
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(2.23) would provide a positive (negative) estimate for the coefficient θ even though the 
exporter fraction in the population is not correlated to the skill intensity at all. Or, at least, 
a regression would overestimate or underestimate the correlation in the population.61     
 To check whether such spurious correlation or the estimation bias is crucial in the 









 and the skill intensity term skilli for Chile and Colombia, for which 
data are available at the firm level.62 Since in the data I cannot observe omitted small 
firms with less than ten employees, I measure exi and domi using a group of the smallest 
firms in the data for each country, i.e., firms with (more than 10 and) less than 20 
workers; and measure the population counterparts EXi and DOMi from all firms included 
in the data. The variables are for 25 three-digit ISIC industries and of the average over 
the years 1990 through 96 for Chile, and 1981-91 for Colombia.  









 and skilli for Chile is -0.255 
with the p-value of 0.219. This implies that the coefficient θ estimated in Section 2.4, 
which is positive and significant, might be underestimated (but not significantly) in the 
sample, and therefore the population coefficient could be even more positive.63 For 
Colombia, the estimated correlation between the two terms is almost zero (the correlation 
coefficient is -0.085 with the p-value of 0.686). These results suggest that sample 
                                                 
61 The empirical result could be misled if overestimation would be the case for a positive coefficient 
estimateθ̂ , or if underestimate would be the case for a negative coefficient estimate.   
62 The data for India and the United States do not have sufficient firm-level information for the same 
examination.   
63 Note that this is consistent with what the theoretical model suggests.  
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truncation should not cause estimation bias and thus the empirical finding in Section 2.4 
should be valid.            
2.8 Appendix C 
This appendix performs an exercise to examine from a pure empirical perspective 
whether the relative factor abundance of a country and the relative factor intensity of an 
industry have a significant influence on the fraction of exporters among domestic firms in 
that industry in that country. For this purpose, I estimate a variant of Equation (2.26) 
using a larger pooled dataset that is composed as follows:   
• An observation is for one country, one industry, and one year. That is, data for 
seven years (1990-1996) are used for Chile, and data for eleven years (1981-
1991) are used for Colombia. The data for India and the United States are for a 
single year (1998 for India, 1992 for the U.S.).  
• Industry skill intensity is allowed to vary across countries and years (i.e., a 
standard Heckscher-Ohlin assumption is relaxed).64   
• Factor abundance in each country is assumed to be invariant over periods, and 
measured using the data provided by Hall and Jones (1999).  
• For every country, the manufacturing industries are classified according to the 
two-digit 1987 U.S. SIC; i.e., there are 17 observations65 for each country in each 
year.  
This way I can increase the number of observations in the dataset to 340.  
                                                 
64 Schott (2003) shows that in reality different countries employ different factor mixes for production in the 
same industry classified according to the three-digit ISIC. 
65 Tobacco, petroleum and coal, and miscellaneous industry categories are excluded.  
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The equation is estimated by OLS including various combinations of dummies for 
one or more groups (dummies for countries, industries, and/or years). Hence, the 
regression equation is as follows: 
ictcicictictict USskillskillshareex ενμηθθ )()/(log=_ 21 ++++⋅⋅+⋅    (2.C.1) 
where ηi, μc, and υt denote industry-specific, country-specific, and year-specific 
intercepts, respectively.  
The results of the regressions are shown in Tables 2.C.1 through 2.C.8. With any 
combination of the dummies (or with no dummies), the estimate of the coefficient of 
interest, θ2, is positive and significant at the 5% level or better. Two exceptions are (i) 
when only country-specific dummies are included, and (ii) both country-specific 
dummies and year-specific dummies are simultaneously included. However, even in 
these cases, the coefficient estimate is positive and large (above 0.8) and the p-value of 
the estimate is not very far from 0.1. These results indicate that the data strongly suggest 
an empirical relationship between comparative advantage and exporter selection.   
2.9 Appendix D 
This appendix describes how the alternative measure of industry skill intensity (or 
the skilled-worker cost shares of an industry) that is used in Subsection 2.4.3 is computed 
following Morrow (2008). For the details of Morrow’s calculation, see his paper.  
Morrow obtains the data on wages, educational attainment, and ages of workers 
from the March U.S. Current Population Survey for the years 1988-92. These data are 
used for a Mincerian (log of) wage regression. He groups the educational attainment of 
workers into the following four categories: 0-11 grades of school completed, 12th grade 
 58
completed, 1-3 years of college, and 4 or more years of college. The equation for his 
Mincerian regression is the following: 
2
210)log( ititit ageagew ⋅+⋅+= ααα  
ittcollegecollegecollegecollegethth DDD εγβββ ++⋅+⋅+⋅+ ++−− 4431311212  
where i indexes a worker, t indexes time. D12th = 1 if the worker has completed 12th 
grade, Dcollege1-3 = 1 if the worker has attained 1-3 years of college education, and 
Dcollege4+ = 1 if the worker has attained 4 or more years of college education. γt is time-
specific intercepts. The coefficient for each education-group dummy (β) indicates the 
wage for a worker in that education group relative to the wage for a worker in the 
benchmark (the lowest) education group in logarithm, when the two workers differ only 
in their educational attainment. That is; )exp(/ 0 eduedu ww β=  where edu is some 
education group and 0 denotes the benchmark education group. He reports the following 
coefficient estimates for the three education-group dummies:  
β12th βcollege1-3 βcollege4+ 
0.2939 0.4755 0.8128 
 
He also reports the share of workers in each education category, as well as the total 
number of workers reported in the Current Population Survey, for the 25 manufacturing 
industries classified according to the three-digit ISIC. Using these numbers, I calculate 
the share of workers in each education category for the 17 manufacturing industries 
classified according to the two-digit U.S. SIC, using the concordance presented in Table 
2.9. The obtained shares of workers in the three education categories in the 17 industries 
are shown in the table below.  
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Shares of Workers in Different Education Categories in Total Employment: 
for 17 Two-digit 1987 U.S. SIC Manufacturing Industries 
 
SIC Total No. 
Workers 
12th Grade 
Completion or Less 
1-3 Years of College 4+ Years of College 
20 6,427 0.714 0.174 0.111 
22 3,059 0.798 0.127 0.075 
23 3,369 0.834 0.110 0.056 
24 1,891 0.757 0.162 0.081 
25 2,118 0.777 0.145 0.077 
26 2,358 0.652 0.212 0.136 
27 6,132 0.501 0.246 0.253 
28 3,773 0.447 0.230 0.323 
30 3,068 0.691 0.189 0.121 
31 601 0.800 0.110 0.090 
32 1,944 0.703 0.176 0.121 
33 2,400 0.691 0.205 0.105 
34 3,911 0.688 0.201 0.110 
35 3,179 0.624 0.243 0.133 
36 10,699 0.501 0.243 0.256 
37 7,501 0.553 0.251 0.196 
38 2,225 0.493 0.246 0.261 
Source: Author’s calculation from Morrow (2008).  
 
From these data, I calculate the cost share of skilled workers in each two-digit U.S. SIC 
manufacturing industry. I define skilled labor by workers with one or more years of 
college education (i.e., workers in the highest two education categories). While Morrow’s 
benchmark education category is 0-11 grades of schooling, he does not report the share of 
workers in this category. Instead, he reports the share of workers with high school 
education or less, which combines the lowest two education categories of workers (0-11 
grades and 12th grade). Hence, I use the group of workers with 12th or lower grade of 
education as my benchmark category, and compute the skilled-labor cost share in each 
































where R0-12th is the share of workers with 12th or less grade, Rcollege1-3 is the share of 
workers with 1-3 years of college, and Rcollege4+ is the share of workers with 4 or more 
years of college. The calculated skilled-labor cost shares in the 17 manufacturing 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2a: Human Capital to Labor Ratio (H/L) 
 
 H/L (in logarithm) Percentile Rank 
Chile 0.783 73 37 
Colombia 0.590 36 61 
India 0.409 24 89 
United States 1.198 95 2 
Mean 0.671   
Min 0.122  
25% 0.414   
Median 0.739   
75% 0.791   
Max 1.215   
No. of countries   127 
 
Notes: The summary statistics, ranks and percentile ranks are among 127 
countries that are covered in the source data. All the numbers are based 
on the statistics weighted by the amount of labor (L) reported in the 
source data.  




Table 2.2b: Tertiary Education Completion in Total Population over Age 15 
 
1985 1990 1995  
 [%] (rank) [%] (rank)  [%] (rank)
Chile 4.1% [81] (24) 5.0% [81] (29) 6.1% [80] (29) 
Colombia 2.3% [70] (45) 3.2% [72] (44) 3.7% [70] (47) 
India 1.2% [45] (60) 1.7% [45] (58) 2.0% [44] (60) 
United States 15.4% [94] ( 1) 21.8% [94] ( 1) 22.5% [94] ( 1) 
Mean 2.86% 3.79% 4.35%  
Min 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%  
25% 0.7% 1.4% 1.8%  
Median 1.2% 1.7% 2.0%  
75% 2.6% 3.5% 4.0%  
Max 15.4% 21.8% 22.5%  
No. of 
Countries 
  103   103   103 
 
Notes: The summary statistics, ranks and percentile ranks are among 103 countries that are 
covered in the source data. All the numbers are based on the statistics weighted by the 
population over age 15.  
Sources: Barro and Lee (2000) for educational attainment; World Bank (2006) for population.  
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Table 2.3: Individual Country Regression: Chile 
 
Dependent variable = exporter_sharei 
  
Coef. for skilli (θ) 0.634** 
(0.299) 
  
Intercept (γ) 0.087 
(0.092) 
  
No. of observations 25 
R2 0.16 
Notes: The observations are for 25 three-digit ISIC industries excluding 314 
(tobacco products), 353 (petroleum refineries), 354 (misc. petroleum 
and coal products), and 390 (other manufacturing products).  
The standard errors are in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 





Table 2.4: Individual Country Regression: Colombia 
 
Dependent variable = exporter_sharei 
  
Coef. for skilli (θ) -0.091 
(0.217) 
  
Intercept (γ) 0.180** 
(0.068) 
  
No. of observations 25 
R2 0.01 
Notes: The observations are for 25 three-digit ISIC industries excluding 314 
(tobacco products), 353 (petroleum refineries), 354 (misc. petroleum 
and coal products), and 390 (other manufacturing products). 
The standard errors are in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 




Table 2.5: Individual Country Regression: India 
 
Dependent variable = exporter_sharei 
  
Coef. for skilli (θ) -0.865* 
(0.448) 
  
Intercept (γ) 0.388*** 
(0.121) 
  
No. of observations 25 
R2 0.12 
Notes: The observations are for 25 three-digit ISIC industries excluding 314 
(tobacco products), 353 (petroleum refineries), 354 (misc. petroleum 
and coal products), and 390 (other manufacturing products). 
The standard errors are in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 





Table 2.6:  Comparison of Estimated Coefficients for Industry Skill Intensity among 
Three Countries (with 25 three-digit ISIC manufacturing industries) 
 
Dependent variable =  
exporter_sharei
Chile Colombia India 
    
Coef. for skilli (θ) 0.634** -0.091 -0.865* 
(0.299) (0.217) (0.448) 
    
log(H/L) 0.783 0.590 0.409 
Notes: The coefficient for each country is estimated with 25 three-digit ISIC industries 
excluding 314 (tobacco products), 353 (petroleum refineries), 354 (misc. 
petroleum and coal products), and 390 (other manufacturing products). 
The standard errors are in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 
*** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% level. 
The log of human capital to labor ratio is from Hall and Jones (1999). 
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Table 2.7: Individual Country Regression: The United States 
 
Dependent variable = exporter_sharei 
  
Coef. for skilli (θ) 0.587* 
(0.303) 
  
Intercept (γ) 0.113 
(0.092) 
  
No. of observations 17 
R2 0.20 
Notes: The observations are for 17 two-digit 1987 U.S. SIC industries 
excluding 21 (tobacco products), 29 (petroleum and coal products), and 
39 (misc. manufacturing industries). 
The standard errors are in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 





Table 2.8: Comparison of Estimated Coefficients for Industry Skill Intensity among Four 
Countries (with 17 two-digit U.S. SIC manufacturing industries) 
 
Dependent variable  
= exporter_sharei 
USA Chile Colombia India 
     
Coef. for skilli (θ) 0.587* 0.534 0.248 -0.728 
 (0.303) (0.329) (0.188) (0.579) 
     
log(H/L) 1.198 0.783 0.590 0.409 
Notes: The coefficient for each country is estimated with 17 two-digit U.S. SIC 
industries excluding 21 (tobacco products), 29 (petroleum and coal products), 
and 39 (misc. manufacturing industries). 
The standard errors are in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 
*** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% level. 
The log of human capital to labor ratio is from Hall and Jones (1999). 
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311 Food products 20 Food and kindred products 
312 Animal feeds, etc   
313 Beverages   
(314) (Tobacco products) (21) (Tobacco products) 
321 Textiles 22 Textile mill products 
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 23 Apparel and other textile products 
323 Leather products 31 Leather and leather products 
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic   
331 Wood products, except furniture 24 Lumber and wood products 
332 Manufacture of furniture and 
fixtures, except primarily of metal 
25 Furniture and fixtures 
341 Paper and products 26 Paper and allied products 
342 Printing and publishing 27 Printing and publishing 
351 Industrial chemicals 28 Chemicals and allied products 
352 Other chemicals   
(353) (Petroleum refineries) (29) (Petroleum and coal products) 
(354) (Misc. petroleum and coal products)   
355 Rubber products 30 Rubber and misc. plastic products 
356 Plastic products   
361 Manufacture of pottery, china and 
earthenware 
32 Stone, clay, and glass products 
362 Glass and products   
369 Other non-metallic mineral products   
371 Iron and steel 33 Primary metal industries 
372 Non-ferrous metals   
381 Fabricated metal products 34 Fabricated metal products 
382 Machinery, except electrical 35 Industrial machinery and 
equipment 
383 Machinery electric 36 Electronic and other electric 
equipment 
384 Transport equipment 37 Transportation equipment 
385 Professional and scientific 
equipment 
38 Instruments and related products 
(390) (Other manufactured products) (39) (Misc. manufacturing industries) 
Note: Industries in parentheses are excluded for the estimation of the regression equations. 
Source: Author’s mapping. 
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Table 2.10:  Cost Share of Skilled Labor (skilli) in 17 Two-digit U.S. SIC Manufacturing 
Industries  
 
SIC Industry skilli SIC Industry skilli 
20 Food and kindred products 0.365 31 Leather and leather products 0.320
22 Textile mill products 0.246 32 Stone, clay, and glass products 0.311
23 Apparel and otr. textile products 0.297 33 Primary metal industries 0.291
24 Lumber and wood products 0.265 34 Fabricated metal products 0.369
25 Furniture and fixtures 0.337 35 Ind. machinery and equipment 0.490
26 Paper and allied products 0.314 36 Electronic and otr. elec. equip. 0.524
27 Printing and publishing 0.551 37 Transportation equipment 0.417
28 Chemicals and allied products 0.526 38 Instruments and related products 0.630
30 Rubber and misc. plastic prod. 0.352    
Notes: The cost share of skilled labor is measured as the non-production workers wages as the share in the 
annual payroll in each industry. 
 Manufacturing industries are classified according to the twp-digit 1987 U.S. SIC. The following 
categories are excluded: 21 (tobacco products), 29 (petroleum and coal products), and 39 (misc. 
manufacturing industries).    





Table 2.11:  Regression for Four Countries and 17 Two-digit U.S. SIC Manufacturing 
Industries 
 
Dependent variable = exporter_shareic 
  
Coef. for skilli*log(S/U)c (θ2) 0.762** 
(0.360) 
  
No. of observations 68 
R2 0.64 
Notes: The four countries are Chile, Colombia, India, and the United States. 
The following categories are excluded from the estimation: 21 (tobacco 
products), 29 (petroleum and coal products), and 39 (misc. manufacturing 
industries). 
Country-specific dummies and industry-specific dummies are both included. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 
*** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.12:  Alternative Skilled-labor Cost Share in 17 Two-digit U.S. SIC 
Manufacturing Industries: Wage Share of Workers with One or More Years 
of College Education 
 
SIC Industry skilli SIC Industry skilli 
20 Food and kindred products 0.357 31 Leather and leather products 0.261
22 Textile mill products 0.259 32 Stone, clay, and glass products 0.371
23 Apparel and otr. textile products 0.213 33 Primary metal industries 0.379
24 Lumber and wood products 0.304 34 Fabricated metal products 0.383
25 Furniture and fixtures 0.281 35 Ind. machinery and equipment 0.452
26 Paper and allied products 0.426 36 Electronic and otr. elec. equip. 0.590
27 Printing and publishing 0.590 37 Transportation equipment 0.533
28 Chemicals and allied products 0.647 38 Instruments and related products 0.598
30 Rubber and misc. plastic prod. 0.383    
Note: See Appendix D for the details of calculation.    
Source: Author’s calculation from Morrow (2008). 
 
Table 2.13: Alternative Relative Skilled-labor Abundance (S/U)c in Four Countries: 





Period of measurement 
(Ref)  
Period for Exporter 
Fraction 
Chile  8.9 Average of 1990 & 95 Average over 1990-96 
Colombia   3.8 Average of 1980, 85, and 90 Average over 1981-91 
India  3.2 Average of 1995 & 2000 Fiscal year 1997/98 
United States 27.3 1990 1992 
Notes:  Educational attainment data for each country are selected for periods that correspond to the data 
periods of the exporter fractions. 
 Educational attainment data are available for every five years. 
Source: Barro and Lee (2000). 
 
Table 2.14:  Regression for Four Countries and 17 Two-digit U.S. SIC Manufacturing 
Industries with Alternative Measures of Industry Skill Intensity and Country 
Skill Abundance 
 
Dependent variable = exporter_shareic 
  
Coef. for skilli*log(S/U)c (θ2) 0.277** 
(0.113) 
  
No. of observations 68 
R2 0.66 
Notes: skilli is measured as the cost share of workers with one or more years of college 
education. 
 (S/U)c is measured as the percentage of population with any tertiary schooling. 
Country-specific dummies and industry-specific dummies are both included. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 
*** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% level. 
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Chile 11.164   7.213 5.289 Average 1984-86 
Colombia   9.694   5.670 3.379 Average 1988-90 
India 30.280 13.218 5.662 Average 1997-98 
United States   4.577   3.321 2.462 1992 





Table 2.16: Regression with Relative Factor Price (Skilled-to-Unskilled Wage Ratio) 
 
Dependent variable = exporter_shareic  






Mean Wage Ratio 
(iii) 
Top 10th–Bottom 10th 
Percentile Wage Ratio 
    
Coef. for skilli*log(s/w)c (ψ) -0.351** -0.492** -0.732** 
 (0.166) (0.222) (0.302) 
    
No. of observations 68 68 68 
R2 0.64 0.65 0.65 
Notes: Pooled data for the 17 two-digit U.S. SIC manufacturing industries for Chile, Colombia, India, and 
the United States are used for estimation.  
 skilli is measured as the non-production workers wages as the share in the annual payroll in each 
industry. 
Country-specific dummies and industry-specific dummies are both included. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 
*** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% level. 
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Chile   7.434   5.555 4.894 Average 1985-86 
Colombia   4.665   3.494 3.001 1988 
India   8.987   6.824 5.795 Average 1997-98 
United States   2.974   2.560 2.359 1992 
Note: The relative wage is measured based on the set of the following 25 occupations in the ILO 
October Inquiry codes: 30, 36, 59, 65, 67, 70, 82, 84, 85, 88, 90, 91, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 
129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 140, and 141.  





Table 2.18: Regression with Relative Factor Price (Skilled-to-Unskilled Wage Ratio) 
Measured Based on Same Occupations 
 
Dependent variable = exporter_shareic  






Mean Wage Ratio 
(iii) 
Top 10th–Bottom 10th 
Percentile Wage Ratio 
    
Coef. for skilli*log(s/w)c (ψ) -0.587** -0.645** -0.674** 
 (0.243) (0.273) (0.288) 
    
No. of observations 68 68 68 
R2 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Notes: Pooled data for the 17 two-digit U.S. SIC manufacturing industries for Chile, Colombia, India, and 
the United States are used for estimation.  
 skilli is measured as the non-production workers wages as the share in the annual payroll in each 
industry. 
Country-specific dummies and industry-specific dummies are both included. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 
*** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.C.1: Country-Industry-Year Pooled Regression (1): Without Dummies  
 
Dependent variable = exporter_shareict 
  
Coef. for skillict (θ1) -0.390*** 
(0.105) 
  
Coef. for skillict*log(S/U)c (θ2) 0.977*** 
(0.165) 
  
No. of observations 340 
R2 0.25 
Notes: Data are for 17 manufacturing industries according to the two-digit 1987 U.S. SIC for the 
following countries and years: Chile (1990-96), Colombia (1981-1991), India (1998), and the 
U.S. (1992). 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 




Table 2.C.2: Country-Industry-Year Pooled Regression (2): With Industry Dummies  
 
Dependent variable = exporter_shareict 
  
Coef. for skillict (θ1) -0.758*** 
(0.124) 
  
Coef. for skillict*log(S/U)c (θ2) 0.993*** 
(0.116) 
  
No. of observations 340 
R2 0.61 
Notes: Data are for 17 manufacturing industries according to the two-digit 1987 U.S. SIC for the 
following countries and years: Chile (1990-96), Colombia (1981-1991), India (1998), and the 
U.S. (1992). 
Industry-specific dummies are included. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 





Table 2.C.3: Country-Industry-Year Pooled Regression (3): With Country Dummies  
 
Dependent variable = exporter_shareict 
  
Coef. for skillict (θ1) -0.252 
(0.400) 
  
Coef. for skillict*log(S/U)c (θ2) 0.819 
(0.593) 
  
No. of observations 340 
R2 0.31 
Notes: Data are for 17 manufacturing industries according to the two-digit 1987 U.S. SIC for the 
following countries and years: Chile (1990-96), Colombia (1981-1991), India (1998), and the 
U.S. (1992). 
Country-specific dummies are included. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 




Table 2.C.4: Country-Industry-Year Pooled Regression (4): With Year Dummies  
 
Dependent variable = exporter_shareict 
  
Coef. for skillict (θ1) -0.137 
(0.193) 
  
Coef. for skillict*log(S/U)c (θ2) 0.649** 
(0.300) 
  
No. of observations 340 
R2 0.34 
Notes: Data are for 17 manufacturing industries according to the two-digit 1987 U.S. SIC for the 
following countries and years: Chile (1990-96), Colombia (1981-1991), India (1998), and the 
U.S. (1992). 
Year-specific dummies are included. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 





Table 2.C.5: Country-Industry-Year Pooled Regression (5): With Industry and Country 
Dummies  
 
Dependent variable = exporter_shareict 
  
Coef. for skillict (θ1) -0.663** 
(0.315) 
  
Coef. for skillict*log(S/U)c (θ2) 0.968** 
(0.411) 
  
No. of observations 340 
R2 0.66 
Notes: Data are for 17 manufacturing industries according to the two-digit 1987 U.S. SIC for the 
following countries and years: Chile (1990-96), Colombia (1981-1991), India (1998), and the 
U.S. (1992). 
Industry- and Country-specific dummies are both included. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 




Table 2.C.6: Country-Industry-Year Pooled Regression (6): With Industry and Year 
Dummies  
 
Dependent variable = exporter_shareict 
  
Coef. for skillict (θ1) -0.568*** 
(0.144) 
  
Coef. for skillict*log(S/U)c (θ2)  0.650*** 
(0.192) 
  
No. of observations 340 
R2 0.70 
Notes: Data are for 17 manufacturing industries according to the two-digit 1987 U.S. SIC for the 
following countries and years: Chile (1990-96), Colombia (1981-1991), India (1998), and the 
U.S. (1992). 
Industry- and Year-specific dummies are both included. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 





Table 2.C.7: Country-Industry-Year Pooled Regression (7): With Country and Year 
Dummies  
 
Dependent variable = exporter_shareict 
  
Coef. for skillict (θ1) -0.309 
(0.418) 
  
Coef. for skillict*log(S/U)c (θ2) 0.896 
(0.622) 
  
No. of observations 340 
R2 0.34 
Notes: Data are for 17 manufacturing industries according to the two-digit 1987 U.S. SIC for the 
following countries and years: Chile (1990-96), Colombia (1981-1991), India (1998), and the 
U.S. (1992). 
Country- and Year-specific dummies are both included. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 




Table 2.C.8: Country-Industry-Year Pooled Regression (8): With Industry, Country, and 
Year Dummies  
 
Dependent variable = exporter_shareict 
  
Coef. for skillict (θ1) -0.975*** 
(0.345) 
  
Coef. for skillict*log(S/U)c (θ2) 1.140*** 
(0.442) 
  
No. of observations 340 
R2 0.70 
Notes: Data are for 17 manufacturing industries according to the two-digit 1987 U.S. SIC for the 
following countries and years: Chile (1990-96), Colombia (1981-1991), India (1998), and the 
U.S. (1992). 
Industry-, Country- and Year-specific dummies are all included. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
* indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10% level; 
** indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level; and 







Figure 2.1: “Gap” between Productivity Cutoffs in Costly-Trade Equilibrium  






Note: The rank of industry skill intensities (the Cobb-Douglas production cost shares) are as 
follows: Nβββ <<< ......21 .  
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Figure 2.5: Fraction of Exporters among All Active Firms vs Industry Skill Intensity: 
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 The recent trade literature on export or import variety has grown rapidly. 
Although the increases in product variety have long been known as an important source 
of gains from trade, empirical studies on the significance of the growth of product 
varieties, or “extensive margin,” in international trade are relatively new. For example, 
Kehoe and Ruhl (2003) show that the trade of new goods (extensive margin) explains a 
larger proportion of the growth of trade following trade liberalization than the increase in 
the volume of previously-traded goods (intensive margin) does. Hummels and Klenow 
(2005) demonstrate that more than a half of greater exports of larger countries are 
explained by a larger variety or export margin in their exports. A series of empirical 
studies by Funke and Ruhwedel (2001a, 2001b, 2005) indicates that the growth of 
product variety in exports has a significant effect on the economic growth in various 
countries and regions. Feenstra and Kee (2004b, 2008) also provide evidence supporting 
the positive impact of export variety on productivity growth for a sample of both 
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developed and developing countries. Broda and Weinstein (2004) empirically show how 
much the increase in imported variety mattered for the welfare of United States. Their 
results suggest that the U.S. welfare has increased by 3% due to the increase in the 
extensive margin of its import.66 
 Literature has investigated product varieties in international trade, or the extensive 
margin, as an influential factor on various aspects of the economy such as productivity, 
growth, and welfare. However, influential factors on the extensive margin, or what 
determine the patterns of varieties in trade, have not been much explored, except for a 
very few pieces such as Hummels and Kleknow (2005) that has shown the effect of the 
size of the economy on the extensive margin and Kehoe and Ruhl (2003) demonstrating 
that the reduction of trade friction is associated with an increase in variety in exports. In 
addition, although the preceding research has examined the cross-country patterns of 
product varieties in international trade, few studies have investigated the patterns of 
traded varieties across industries. To fill this gap in literature, in the current paper we 
examine a determinant of the cross-industry patterns of product varieties in the exports of 
countries, as well as how the patterns differ across countries. Specifically, we examine 
whether the traditional theory of comparative advantage based on factor proportions 
explains the observed cross-industry patterns of varieties in countries’ exports.  
                                                 
66 Another important branch of this recent literature focuses on the quality differentiation of exported 
goods. Hummels and Klenow (2005) investigate the “quality margin” in exports in addition to the extensive 
and intensive margins. Hallak (2006a) attemps to identify the effect of product quality on the direction of 
international trade. The paper empirically investigates whether importers at a higher income level tend to 
buy more varieties of products from exporters with higher income as well because they tend to produce 
higher quality products. In a related paper Hallak applies his framework of product quality and uses 
sectoral level data to provide evidence for the Linder hypothesis according to which international trade is 
more intensive between countries with similar income levels than those that differ (Hallak, 2006b). Choi, 
Hummels and Xiang (2006) explore the effect of income distribution on varieties in trade, whose key 
insight is that consumers with higher income will buy goods with higher quality rather than buy greater 
quantities of goods that vary in the quality dimension. 
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Moreover, most of the existing studies on the variety or extensive margin in trade 
have built on the framework of the monopolistic competition model by Krugman (1979), 
which first brought product variety in international trade into focus. However, empirical 
research on the topic has not been well connected to heterogeneous firm models that have 
been recently developed and widespread, while Feenstra and Kee (2008) is an attempt to 
this new direction.67 Our study contributes to this new literature by considering the 
modern framework of heterogeneous firms together with the traditional framework of 
factor proportion theory to explore, both theoretically and empirically, the role for the 
comparative advantage in export variety.  
This study first follows the previous chapter of this dissertation, which extends 
Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) to a broader framework, to 
develop a theoretical model in which countries vary in factor endowment, industries 
differ in factor intensity, and firms are heterogeneous in productivity within industries. 
The paper next derives a prediction that relates product varieties in a country’s exports to 
the degree of relative factor intensity of industries. This prediction is empirically tested 
using data on the U.S. imports from Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002) that finely 
classify traded goods according to the ten-digit Harmonization System (HS). The study 
also employs the data on factor use in various industries from the U.S. Census of 
Manufactures, as well as the data on factor abundance of a number of countries from Hall 
and Jones (1999). The empirical analysis supports our semi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction 
on product varieties in exports; i.e, countries export more varieties in industries in which 
they have a comparative advantage in terms of factor proportions.  
                                                 
67 Theoretical work by Chaney (2008) also investigates the extensive (and intensive) margin in trade under 
the framework of a heterogeneous firm model.  
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 The current paper also adds to the literature on firm-level heterogeneity by 
providing empirical evidence for an unexplored aspect of the recent models. In particular, 
in contrast to the existing studies, this paper performs an empirical test for a 
heterogeneous firm model without relying on firm-level data for a particular country but 
using industry-level data that are more publicly accessible and available for a broader 
range of countries.68  
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 develops the theoretical model in 
order to provide an implication for the relationship between factor proportions and export 
variety. Section 3.3 describes the data. A proposed empirical approach to test the 
theoretical prediction, as well as the results of the empirical tests, is presented in Section 
3.4. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 The Model 
We build this study on the model presented in the previous chapter II, which 
extends the model by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) to the framework of two 
countries, two factors, and multiple industries. Therefore, in what follows we present 
only the key elements of the model to derive our prediction on the relationship between 
product varieties in exports and the comparative advantages of countries. Other details of 
the model are left to Chapter II.  
3.2.1 Basic Framework 
The modeled economy comprises two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F); two 
factors, skilled labor (S) and unskilled labor (U); and N (>2) industries. Within each 
industry there is a continuum of firms that are heterogeneous in productivity. Countries 
                                                 
68 Feenstra and Kee (2008) also utilize country- and industry-level data for the test of a heterogeneous firm 
model.  
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differ in factor endowments: Home is relatively abundant in skilled labor, and Foreign is 







S >  where HS  ( HU ) and FS  ( FU ) 
denote the total inelastic supply of (un)skilled labor in Home and Foreign, respectively. 
3.2.2 Consumption 










NCCCU αααα ∑        (3.2.1) 





















i         (3.2.2) 
where ω indexes product varieties within an industry, iΩ  denotes a set of available 
varieties in Industry i, and ωq  represents the quantity of each variety consumed. The 



























σ  is the constant elasticity of substitution across varieties. 
3.2.3 Production and Export 
Each firm produces a unique variety of products. A firm’s production technology, 
































































      (3.2.4) 
where s is the wage for skilled labor, w  is the wage for unskilled labor, and the 
superscripts H and F denote Home and Foreign, respectively. The intensities of the two 
factors in each industry (βi and 1- βi) are common across countries, but the firm-specific 
productivity level ωφ ,i  varies the marginal cost across firms. The industries are ranked 
according to the skilled-labor intensity (βi) such that 1....0 121 <<<<< − NN ββββ .
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The optimal pricing of each firm equals a constant markup (1/ρ) over the marginal 
cost of production. Therefore, for domestic sales, each firm charges the following price 



































       (3.2.5) 
Firms can also export their products by incurring the (amortized per-period) fixed costs 
ii wsf xi
ββ −1)()(  (fxi > 0), as well as the variable “iceberg” shipping costs such that only 
1/τi (τi > 1) of the shipped quantity reaches to the other country. The optimal price of a 
firm’s product for exporting is thus as follows: 
                                                 
69 To be accurate, βi indicates the Cobb-Douglas cost share of skilled labor. However, since the equilibrium 










β  for any relative wage s/w > 0, 














































     (3.2.6) 
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      (3.2.8) 
where YH and YF are the total national incomes of Home and Foreign, respectively. 
3.2.4 Zero Profit 
Firms need to maintain at least zero profit in each of the domestic and export 
markets. Firms do not export if they are not profitable enough to satisfy the zero-profit 
condition for the export market. Firms do not even serve the domestic market if they are 
not profitable enough to fulfill the zero-profit condition for the domestic market. The 
zero-profit condition for a firm in each market is described such that the firm’s revenue 
net of the variable costs equals the fixed costs: 
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  (3.2.10) 

















































iφ  and 
*
xiφ  in the above equations denote the productivity “cutoffs” for firms serving the 
domestic market (or “domestic producers”) and exporters, respectively. The first cutoff 
divides domestic producers from firms exiting from the domestic market, and the second 
divide exporting firms from domestic producers.70 
3.2.5 Entry and Equilibrium under Costly Trade 
To enter the domestic market, firms must incur a sunk entry cost, which takes the 
following form: 
ii wsfei
ββ −1)()( ,  0>eif        (3.2.12) 
Firms discover their productivity after the entry. The productivity parameter φ  is 
randomly drawn from a distribution )(φG , which is common across countries. Each firm, 
or a potential entrant, decides to enter (to realize its own productivity by paying the sunk 
entry cost) if its pre-entry or ex ante expected future profit stream is at least as large as 
                                                 
70 We focus only on the case in which exporters are more productive than domestic producers; i.e., 
**
ixi φφ > . The reasons and conditions to be satisfied for this are described in Chapter II.  
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the sunk entry cost. In stationary equilibrium, the ex ante expected future profit exactly 
































































δ <1 is an exogenous probability of a firm’s “death” in each period. )(1 *iG φ−  is the (ex 















is the probability for a successful entrant or domestic producer to be an exporter, given 
that ** ixi φφ > . )( ii φπ  is the per-period domestic profit of the averagely productive 
domestic producer, and )( xixi φπ  is the per-period export profit of the averagely 
productive exporter. The average productivity levels of domestic producers (or survivors) 



































































     (3.2.14) 
The zero-profit conditions (3.2.10) and (3.2.11) and the free-entry condition (3.2.13) 
jointly determine the two productivity cutoffs, *iφ  and 
*
xiφ , for the respective two 
countries H and F.  
3.2.6 Mass of Firms and Export Varieties 
Now we examine how many firms in each country will export to the overseas 
market in each industry. In our model, the number of firms is measured by the size of the 
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“mass” of the continuum of firms. Mi denotes the mass of domestic producers, and Mix 
denotes the mass of the exporting firms. Only a portion of the domestic producers will be 
exporters, and that fraction is determined by the two cutoff productivity levels. That is, in 
equilibrium, the ex ante probability for a domestic producer to be an exporter is equal to 

































     (3.2.15) 
Our concern is with the relative size of the exporter mass between the two 
countries in each industry, Fxi
H
xi MM / , and how it will differ across industries in relation 
to the relative factor intensities of the industries and the relative factor abundance of each 
country. To derive and examine Fxi
H
xi MM / , we consider the equilibrium price indexes of 
Industry i in the two countries, which are composed of the number and average price of 
domestically produced products, as well as those of products imported from the other 
country: 
















i pMpMP   (3.2.16) 
















i pMpMP   (3.2.17) 




















































  (3.2.18) 
By rearranging this equation, we can derive the following expression for the ratio of the 





















































  (3.2.19) 
By combining Equations (3.2.15) and (3.2.19) and rearranging further, we obtain the 

































































































That is, the relative size of the exporter mass in each industry depends on the ratio of (or 
the “gap” between) the two productivity cutoffs, ** / ixi φφ , and the ratio of the average 
productivity of exporters to that of domestic producers, ixi φφ / , as well as the ratio of the 






i pp φφ .  
For the purpose of the cross-industry comparison of this relative exporter mass, 
we impose the following two assumptions: 















φ 1)(  for i = 1, 2, ….., N; k > 2σ  
The first assumption implies that (i) both fixed costs for production and fixed costs for 
export, adjusted for the difference due to factor intensity difference, are identical across 
industries; and also that (ii) the “iceberg” shipping cost for export is the same for all 
industries. The second assumption means that (i) the ex ante distribution of firm 
productivity is common (not only across countries but also) across industries, and that (ii) 
                                                 
71 See Appendix for the derivation of Equation (3.2.20).  
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the distribution is a Pareto distribution with 
i
φ  as the minimum value for productivity 
drawn in Industry i ( ),[ +∞∈
ii
φφ ) and k as a shape parameter indicating the dispersion of 
productivity distribution.72 We assume k > 2σ, as assumed in the previous chapter, for the 
variances of both drawn productivities and sizes of firms (measured as domestic sales) to 
be finite.  
By examining Equation (3.2.20) across industries under Assumptions 1 and 2, we 
derive the following proposition regarding the relative size of the masses of exporters 






















Proof: See Appendix. 
This proposition implies that the mass of exporters in a country relative to the mass in the 
other country will be larger in industries in which the country has a comparative 
advantage. That is, the relatively skill-abundant country has a larger exporter mass than 
the other country in a more skill-intensive industry, and vice versa.  
 Can we predict the relative size of the mass of exporters under free trade with 
FPE? It is well-known that with FPE the cross-industry patterns of production and trade 
are indeterminate when the number of industries (sectors) is greater than the number of 
input factors (e.g., Melvin (1968)). This indeterminacy will also apply to our model,73 
and under free trade with FPE there exist multiple equilibrium allocations of the two 
                                                 
72 Chaney (2008) brings some rationale of the use of a Pareto distribution for this type of the model.  
73 We can see this indeterminacy in the relative size of the mass of exporters in Equation (3.2.19). Under 
free trade with FPE, τi = 1, χi = 1 (since all active firms will be exporters), the price of a product variety 
will be the same in the two market, and the industry price index will be equal in the two countries. Hence, 
both numerator and denominator of the right-hand side of the equation is zero, which implies the 
indeterminacy of MiH/MiF.     
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factors across industries. As an overall tendency, however, the production resources will 
on average be allocated more to industries in which the country has its comparative 
advantage (for both factors in the country to be fully employed), so that the mass of firms 
will on average be larger in the comparative advantage industries.  
 Finally, we present the key prediction for the product varieties in exports. Since 
each firm is considered to produce a unique variety of differentiated product, the mass of 
exporting firms in a country, which is examined above, represents the number of product 
varieties exported from the country in each industry. Therefore, the above Proposition has 
the following implication on export varieties, which is expressed as the following 
prediction: 
Prediction: For a certain pair of countries, international trade will 
exhibit the following cross-industry pattern: The relatively skilled-labor 
abundant country will export more product varieties in more skill -
intensive industries (industries with greater β). In contrast, the relatively 
unskilled- labor abundant country will export more varieties in more 
unskilled-labor intensive industries (industries with smaller β). 
3.3 The Data 
An empirical test of the prediction of our model requires data for three variables: 
the number of product varieties exported from each country in each industry, factor 
endowment in each exporting country, and factor intensity in each industry. 
 For the product varieties in exports, we use the data on the U.S. imports in the 
years of 1990, 1995, and 2000 that are from Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002). The 
data contain information on the U.S. imports of each good classified according to the 
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disaggregated ten-digit Harmonized System (HS) exported from each country. The data 
also map each ten-digit HS code onto different and more aggregated industry 
classifications such as the four-digit U.S. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC, the 
1987 version) and the six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS, 
the 1997 version). These different levels of classification in the data enable us to count 
the number of product varieties in each industry by defining “products” or “varieties” 
according to the ten-digit HS and “industries” according to the four-digit SIC.74 Due to 
the limitation of the availability of the data on industry factor intensity, our empirical 
analysis focuses on trade in manufacturing industries (the codes 2011 through 3999 in the 
four-digit SIC, and 311111 through 339999 in the six-digit NAICS). Table 3.1 provides 
the numbers of exporters, numbers of product varieties, and total import values in the 
U.S. total imports and manufacturing imports in each of the three years. In these three 
years, manufacturing industries represent 94% of the total U.S. imports in terms of the 
number of product varieties, and 83% through 86% in terms of value. 
 The data for the factor endowment of each country are from Hall and Jones 
(1999). Since our theoretical model is embedded in a two-factor framework with skilled 
labor ( S ) and unskilled labor (U ), we use the data on human capital per worker as the 
measure of the abundance of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor ( US/ ) in each 
country. The data on human capital per worker are estimated as of 1988 and available for 
127 countries in their study. 
 Our theoretical model assumes a common factor intensity for each industry across 
countries. To measure this world common factor intensity of each industry, we use the 
data from the U.S. Census of Manufactures for the years of 1992, 1997, and 2002. The 
                                                 
74 See the following section for further details. 
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1992 census applies the U.S. SIC (1987 version), while the 1997 and 2002 censuses use 
NAICS to classify manufacturing industries.75 For each classified industry, the censuses 
report the number of production workers (average per worker) separately from the total 
employment. Therefore, we measure industry unskilled-labor intensity as the share of 
production workers in the total employment, and accordingly skilled-labor intensity as 
the share of non-production workers (i.e., one minus unskilled-labor intensity). We thus 
obtain the skill intensities for 458 four-digit SIC industries from the 1992 census that are 
combined with the U.S. import data for 1990, and the skill intensities for 473 six-digit 
NAICS industries from the 1997 and 2002 censuses that are combined with the 1995 and 
2000 import data, respectively.  
 The data for our empirical analysis includes 115 countries whose factor 
endowment measure is available in Hall and Jones (1999) and from which the U.S. 
imported in any one or more manufacturing industry in the years 1990, 1995, and 2000.76 
Table 3.2 lists these 115 countries, and Table 3.3 provides the summary statistics of the 
relative factor endowment (the skilled-labor to unskilled-labor ratio: US/ ) of these 
countries with the lists of the ten most and least skilled labor-abundant countries. The 
data also include 394 (four-digit SIC) manufacturing industries for 1990, and 383 and 
384 (six-digit NAICS) industries for 1995 and 2000, respectively, in which the U.S. 
imported from one or more countries in each year. Tables 3.4.1 through 3.4.3 present the 
summary statistics of the intensities of the two factors ( S  and U ) of these manufacturing 
                                                 
75 NAICS has been modified for the 2002 census (2002 version) from the previous 1997 version. However, 
for manufacturing industries, the two versions are identical.  
76 Of the 115 countries, the following three countries are included only in the data for 1990: 
Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia.  
 93
industries, as well as the ten most and least skilled-labor intensive industries, for the three 
respective years.  
Figures 3.1.1 through 3.1.3 display the number of countries from which the U.S. 
imported in each manufacturing industry for each year. In each table, the industries are 
sorted (from left to right) in the order of skilled-labor intensity. Figures 3.2.1 through 
3.2.3 and 3.3.1 through 3.3.3 plot the number of exporting countries and the total number 
of product varieties in the U.S. imports in each industry, respectively, against the industry 
skilled-labor intensity. These figures indicate that the U.S., one of the world’s most 
skilled-labor abundant countries, tended to import more varieties from more countries in 
relatively unskilled-labor intensive industries, while the U.S. has increased imports in 
relatively skill intensive industries and thus the trend has become unclear in recent years.  
3.4 Empirical Tests 
As stated in Section 3.2, our model provides one key prediction: A country will 
export more varieties of products in industries in which the country has a comparative 
advantage, in terms of factor proportions, than it will in other industries. In this section 
we empirically test this implication using the data described in the previous section. 
3.4.1 Measuring Exported Varieties 
 Our model explains the number of product varieties in each industry that are 
exported from each country to a common importer—in this case, the U.S.— in terms of 
two elements: the relative factor abundance of the exporting country and the relative 
factor intensity of the industry. As described in the previous section, we define a variety 
as each ten-digit HS good and an industry as each four-digit SIC (for 1990) or six-digit 
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NAICS (for 1997 and 2000). We thus measure the number of product varieties in 
Industry i exported from Country c, or nic, as follows: 
icn  ≡  No. of ten-digit HS goods exported from Country c in a four-digit 
SIC or six-digit NAICS Industry i 
 Some four-digit SIC or six-digit NAICS industries may contain by nature more 
ten-digit HS goods in their catalogue than other industries, and thus in the U.S. imports 
we may observe more varieties in those industries than in other industries, regardless of 
the role of the comparative advantage. Therefore, for a proper cross-industry comparison, 




nsharen =_  
where iN  is the total number of varieties that the U.S. imports from the world in Industry 
i : icci nN ∑= .78 It should be noted that the imports of the same ten-digit commodities 
from different countries are considered as different product varieties, following the 
theoretical assumption that products are differentiated across firms and thus across 
countries.  
3.4.2 Regressions for Aggregate North and South 
 We first test our two-country, two-factor, and multi-industry model with the data 
for country aggregates. We divide the 115 countries into two groups to construct two 
country aggregates, one of which consists of countries that are relatively skilled-labor 
                                                 
77 This variable is consistent with the idea of the “relative size of firm mass” described in Proposition in 
Section 3.2. Here, due to the limitation of the employed data, the number of exported varieties from one 
country in one industry is expressed as the relative value to the number of varieties exported from the rest 
of the world in that industry, instead of the ratio to the number of varieties exported from the trading 
partner (i.e., the U.S.).    
78 Accordingly, the total number of varieties in each industry, Ni, includes the number of varieties exported 
to the U.S. from countries other than 115 countries in the sample.   
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abundant (or with high US/ ). We refer to this group as the “North.” The other consists of 
countries that are relatively unskilled-labor abundant (or with low US/ ), which we call 
the “South.” The North consists of 51 countries whose US/  is above the average of all 
the 115 countries, and the South comprises other 64 countries.79 Table 3.5 lists the names 
of the countries constituting each of the aggregates North and South. Table 3.6 compares 
the within-group averages of relative factor abundance US/ . 
 The following equation is estimated using the OLS for the aggregate North and 
South:80 
iiAi skillsharenlog εθγ +⋅+=)_( ,       (3.4.1) 
where AiAcAi sharensharen ,, _=_ ∑ ∈ , A = {North, South} 
skilli = skill intensity of Industy i. 
 Equation (3.4.1) is estimated for the three respective years. The result of the 
estimation is shown in Table 3.7. For all the three years, the result is consistent with the 
prediction of the model. That is, the estimated coefficient for the industry skill intensity is 
positive for the North, indicating that the relatively skilled-labor abundant North exports 
more varieties in more skill-intensive industries; and the coefficient estimate is negative 
for the South, which implies that in the relatively unskilled-labor abundant South the 
number of varieties in exports is higher as the industry is less skill intensive (or more 
unskilled-labor intensive). The result of the analysis for the country aggregates thus 
                                                 
79 We also attempted the following two other “cutoffs” for US/  to divide the countries into the aggregates 
North and South: above or below the 75 percentile (29 countries in the North, 86 in the South), and above 
or below 0.7 relative to US/  of the U.S. (25 countries in the North, 90 in the South). These alternative 
groupings are also indicated in Table 3.5. The qualitative results of the estimation, however, are the same 
regardless of the cutoffs. 
80 n_shareic is skewed in distribution, and therefore scaled to logarithm for the regressions to adjust for 
potential heteroskedasticity. We do not scale the factor intensity measure (skilli) to logarithm, but the 
results do not change even though the log-scaled intensity is used. 
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supports the semi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction of the model about the product varieties in 
exports.81  
3.4.3 Pooled Regression for Dependent Parameter Specification 
We next use the pooled data for all the individual exporting countries to estimate 
cross-industry patterns of exports in terms of product varieties. We consider the 
following regression model: 
icicic skillsharenlog εγ +⋅Π+=)_(       (3.4.2) 
The slope coefficient for skilled-labor intensity, Пc, would differ across exporter 
countries. The theory predicts that the value of the slope coefficient will be higher for 
countries with greater relative endowment of skilled labor, and lower for countries with 
smaller relative skilled labor endowment (or greater relative endowment of unskilled 
labor). This pattern is indeed observed in the result of the estimation of Equation (3.4.2) 
for each individual exporting country. Figures 3.4.1 through 3.4.3 plot the slope 
coefficient cΠ̂  estimated from each individual country regression against the relative 
skilled-labor abundance of the country (in logarithmic scale, log(S/U)). The figures 
exhibit the tendency that the coefficient Пc is greater for a more skill-abundant country, 
which is consistent across years.82 To confirm this pattern in the pooled regression, we 
impose the following structure on the slope coefficient Пc: 
ccc USUS )/(log=))/((= 21 ⋅+ΠΠ θθ       (3.4.3) 
                                                 
81 The level of significance is not very high for the estimate for the North in the year 2000. This should be 
because, as shown in Figures 3.1.3, 3.2.3, and 3.3.3, in recent years the U.S. imports from more countries in 
relatively skill-intensive industries. However, the estimate is more significant (at the 1% level) when the 
alternative cutoffs are applied to group the North and South.  
82 To draw the fitted line in Figures 3.4.1 through 3.4.3, the cases (i.e., the results of individual country 
regressions) are weighted by the number of observations (i.e., the number of industries for each country in 
the data) in each individual country regression.  
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where cUS )/(  is the skilled- to unskilled-labor ratio of Country c.
83 The theoretical 
prediction is that θ1 will be negative (since Πc will be negative for countries with low 
skilled-labor abundance) and θ2 will be positive (since Πc will be larger and to be positive 
for countries with higher skilled-labor abundance). By substituting Equation (3.4.3) into 
(3.4.2), we derive the following equation for our pooled regression: 
iccciiic USskillskillsharenlog εμθθ ++⋅⋅+⋅ )/(log=)_( 21    (3.4.4) 
We include country dummies, μc, to capture the effects of all country-specific factors 
other than the relative factor abundance, such as fixed and variable trade costs (of 
importing to the U.S.) and the size of the country. 
 Table 3.8 presents the result of the estimation of Equation (3.4.4) for each of the 
years 1990, 1995, and 2000 using the fixed-effect OLS. The estimates of both 
coefficients θ1 and θ2 have the signs that are expected from the theory, and they are 
highly significant (at the 1% level).84 This result is consistent across years. Hence, the 
semi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction of our economic model on the exported varieties is also 
supported by the pooled analysis using the U.S. import data.  
Finally, using these estimates we compute the “threshold” factor abundant at 
which the country-specific slope coefficient for skill intensity Πc turns from negative to 
positive (i.e., S/U* such that 0=)/( ∗Π USc ). The value of the “threshold” S/U
* is 2.11 
for the year 1990,85 which is the closest to the relative factor abundance in China (S/U = 
                                                 
83 We use the logarithm of the relative skill abundance to have the size of the coefficient estimate for θ2 
invariant to which of S or U is on the denominator.  
84 This result does not change when the natural-scaled measure of S/U is used in the regression instead of 












US . The value is also computed for the years 1995 and 2000 in the 
same way.  
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2.09, the 39th most skilled-abundant) among the 115 countries. The threshold S/U* is 2.25 
for 1995, which is the closest to S/U in Greece (=2.25, the 29th out of 115); and is 2.32 for 
2000 that is the closest to S/U in Taiwan (=2.31, the 26th). These values for the skill 
abundance can be interpreted as the cutoff to divide countries into the North and South 
for the respective years, which is more accurate than the cutoff value used in the previous 
subsection to divide the countries into the two groups.86 
3.4.4 Alternative Measure of Export Varieties 
For checking the robustness of the results of our empirical tests, we also employ 
an alternative measure of product varieties in countries’ exports that are frequently used 
in literature. Following Feenstra and Kee (2004a) and Hummels and Klenow (2005),87 as 
an alternative to our original measure of export varieties n_shareic, we use the following 
measure of “relative product variety” (Hummels & Klenow use the term of the “extensive 



















The asterisk * denotes the “benchmark country” for comparison, which is the aggregate 
of all countries in the world.88 ω denotes a ten-digit HS good; Ωic is a subset of ten-digit 
HS goods belonging to Industry i (defined by the four-digit SIC or six-digit NAICS) that 
are exported from a particular country c to the U.S.; and Ωi* is a whole set of all the ten-
digit HS goods in Industry i that are exported to the U.S. from all countries (other than 
the U.S. itself) in the world. pω* and xω* are the price and quantity of Product ω exported 
                                                 
86 The average (S/U) of the 115 countries that is used as the cutoff in the previous subsection is 1.88, which 
is a little lower than these values.  
87 Broda and Weinstein (2006) also employ this measure of “relative variety.” 
88 This “benchmark” world aggregate includes countries other than the 115 countries in our data.  
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by the “benchmark country” (i.e., pω*xω* is the value of the exports of Product ω from the 
world country aggregate to the U.S.).89 
We replace the dependent variable in Equation (3.4.4) for the pooled regression 
with this alternative measure of “relative variety” RVic, both in the natural scale and 
logarithm, and estimate the following resulted equations for each of the years 1990, 1995, 
and 2000 using the fixed-effect OLS with country dummies (μc): 
iccciiic USskillskillRV εμθθ ++⋅⋅+⋅ )/(log= 21     (3.4.5) 
iccciiic USskillskillRV εμθθ ++⋅⋅+⋅ )/(log=)log( 21     (3.4.6) 
The results are shown in Table 3.9. In both Equations (3.4.5) and (3.4.6), the estimate of 
the coefficient θ1 is negative and the estimate of θ2 is positive, both of which are 
significant at the 1% level, throughout the years. The results are consistent with the 
prediction from our model as the result in the previous subsection is, and thus confirm 
that the result of the empirical test is robust across measures of export varieties.  
3.5 Conclusion  
In this paper, we have investigated the relationship between export varieties and 
the exporting country’s comparative advantage in terms of factor proportions. We have 
generalized the heterogeneous-firm models by Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Redding, and 
Schott (2007) to the framework with multiple industries, and have derived a prediction 
that relates product varieties in a country’s exports to the relative factor intensity of 
exported industries. To test the prediction we have employed the disaggregated data on 
the U.S. imports, as well as the data on skill abundance in countries and the skill 
                                                 
89 Note that this RVic is a value-based measure while our original measure n_shareic is based on number 
counting. However, the two measures are similar in the sense that both define industries by the four-digit 
SIC or six-digit NAICS and product varieties by the ten-digit HS.   
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intensities of manufacturing industries. The results of a variety of empirical tests provide 
strong evidence for our semi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction: countries tend to export more 
varieties of products in industries in which they have their respective comparative 
advantages.  
3.6 Appendix 
3.6.1 Derivation of Equations (3.2.20) 
By combining the revenue equations (3.2.7) and (3.2.8) and the zero-profit 
conditions (3.2.10) and (3.2.11), we can derive the following equations for the ratio of the 
















































































       (3.A.2) 
The ratio of the industry price indexes in the two countries can be derived, by rearranging 
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  (3.A.4) 
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The optimal pricing equation (3.2.5) implies that the ratio of the prices charged by two 
firms with different productivity in the same market can be expressed as the ratio of the 





φφ ii pp ⋅=            (3.A.5) 
Using this, the price charged by a firm with the average exporter productivity in the 






















φ ⋅=        (3.A.7) 
Substituting these equations (3.A.6) and (3.A.7) into Equation (3.A.4) and re-arranging 



























































































  (3.A.8) 
Equation (3.2.20) is derived from this (3.A.8) and Equation (3.2.15).  
3.6.2 Proof of Proposition 
Without the loss of generality, Industry i is assumed to be more skill intensive 
than Industry j (βi > βj). Then, from the previous chapter II, the relationship of the 








i χχ <  for the relatively 
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     (3.A.10) 
where 11*
*














































YB . The relative exporter mass thus depends on the 
ratio of the fractions of exporters among active firms in the two countries ( Fi
H
i χχ / ), the 

































• Ai vs Aj: As shown in Chapter II, the ratio of (or the “gap” between) the two 
productivity cutoffs is larger in the country’s comparative disadvantage industry. 
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< . Hence, with 
Assumption 1, the first term is larger in Ai than Aj.  






. From Assumption 2, the productivity distribution is the same across 
industries and has a Pareto form. Therefore, by substituting the Pareto density 
function in Assumption 2 into the definition of these productivity averages (3.2.14), 
and with some algebra, we can show that the ratio of the two productivity averages 
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xj . Hence, for 


















































xi ).  
These relationship of the two terms implies Ai > Aj.  
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χ  that are implied by 


















YB χ−= . Since 























: From the optimal pricing Equation (3.2.5), the relative average price 
depend on two factors: the ratio of the average productivity of active firms in the 












































/)(      (3.A.11) 









<  (see Chapter II for the proof) and βi > βj. The first term equals one since 































> , which implies that each country has a larger mass of exporters in its 
comparative advantage industries relative to the other country.  ■ 
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Total Import Manufacturing Import 
Number of Exporting Countries 1990 153 153 
 1995 169 169 
 2000 174 173 
Number of Varieties 1990 182,375 171,322 
 1995 219,329 206,334 
 2000 259,181 243,598 
Total Import Value 1990 495,260 409,953 
(in million $) 1995 743,505 643,128 




1. The data are from Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002).  
 
2. Manufacturing imports are the imports in the industries classified as the 4-digit 1987 U.S. SIC 
2011 through 3999 (for 1990) or the 6-digit NAICS 311111 through 339999 (for 1995 and 
2000).  
 
3. Exporting countries in this table include overseas territories of countries.  
 
4. The number of varieties is defined as the number of goods classified by the 10-digit 
Harmonization System (HS) that the U.S. imports from each exporter. (I.e., the same 10-digit 
HS goods imported from different exporters are counted as different varieties.) 
 
5. Import value is the customs value of general imports. “General Imports measure the total 
physical arrivals of merchandise from foreign countries, whether such merchandise enters 
consumption channels immediately or is entered into bonded warehouses or Foreign Trade 




Table 3.2: Country List (115 countries) 
 
Algeria  Guinea  Peru  
Angola  Guinea-Bissau  Philippines  
Argentina  Guyana  Poland  
Australia  Haiti  Portugal  
Austria  Honduras  Reunion  
Bangladesh  Hong Kong  Rwanda  
Barbados  Hungary  Saudi Arabia  
Belgium  Iceland  Senegal  
Benin  India  Seychelles  
Bolivia  Indonesia  Sierra Leone  
Brazil  Iran  Singapore  
Burkina Faso  Ireland  Somalia  
Burundi  Israel  South Africa  
Cameroon  Italy  South Korea  
Canada  Jamaica  Spain  
Central African Republic  Japan  Sri Lanka  
Chad  Jordan  Sudan  
Chile  Kenya  Suriname  
China  Madagascar  Sweden  
Colombia  Malawi  Switzerland  
Congo  Malaysia  Syria  
Costa Rica  Mali  Taiwan  
Cote d'Ivoire  Malta  Tanzania  
Cyprus  Mauritania  Thailand  
Czechoslovakia*  Mauritius  Togo  
Denmark  Mexico  Trinidad and Tobago  
Dominican Republic  Morocco  Tunisia  
Ecuador  Mozambique  Turkey  
Egypt  Netherlands  U.S.S.R.* 
El Salvador  New Zealand  Uganda  
Fiji  Nicaragua  United Kingdom  
Finland  Niger  Uruguay  
France  Nigeria  Venezuela  
Gabon  Norway  Yugoslavia*  
Gambia  Oman  Zaire  
Germany  Pakistan  Zambia  
Ghana  Panama  Zimbabwe  
Greece  Papua New Guinea   
Guatemala  Paraguay   
 
Note: The data for Years 1995 and 2000 do not include three countries marked with an asterisk 
(*).  
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Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
     
S/U 1.879 0.553 1.075 3.369 
     
log(S/U) 0.589 0.290 0.072 1.215 
Number of countries: 115 
 
 
10 most skilled-labor abundant countries: 
 
Country S/U  log(S/U)  
New Zealand 3.369 1.215  
Hungary 3.086 1.127  
Norway 3.010 1.102  
Canada 3.008 1.101  
Denmark 2.999 1.098  
Australia 2.981 1.092  
Finland 2.833 1.041  
Sweden 2.825 1.039  
Israel 2.818 1.036  
Belgium 2.768 1.018  
 
10 most unskilled-labor abundant countries: 
 
Country Name S/U log(S/U)  
Niger 1.075 0.072  
Guinea-Bissau 1.078 0.075  
Benin 1.098 0.094  
Mali 1.116 0.110  
Rwanda 1.119 0.113  
Gambia 1.119 0.113  
Sudan 1.130 0.122  
Mozambique 1.156 0.145  
Central African Republic 1.184 0.169  
Nigeria 1.217 0.196  
 
 
Note: The relative abundance of skilled labor to unskilled labor (S/U) is measured as the human 




Table 3.4.1: Relative Skilled-labor (S) and Unskilled-labor (U) Intensity of 




Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
     
S-intensity 0.296 0.124 0.078 0.827 
     
U-intensity 0.704 0.124 0.173 0.922 
Number of manufacturing industries: 394 
 
 
10 Most Skilled-labor Intensive Industries 
 
SIC Industry Description S-intensity U-intensity
2721 Periodicals 0.827  0.173 
2731 Book Publishing 0.766  0.234 
3571 Electronic Computers 0.718  0.282 
3761 Guided Missiles & Space Vehicles 0.685  0.315 
2711 Newspapers 0.676  0.324 
2741 Miscellaneous Publishing 0.638  0.362 
2835 Diagnostic Substances 0.633  0.367 
3572 Computer Storage Devices 0.627  0.373 
3826 Analytical Instruments 0.617  0.383 
2086 Bottled and Canned Soft Drinks 0.604  0.396 
 
10 Most Unskilled-labor Intensive Industries 
 
SIC Industry Description S-intensity U-intensity
2322 Men's & Boys' Underwear & Nightwear 0.078  0.922 
2281 Yarn Spinning Mills 0.089  0.911 
2284 Thread Mills 0.097  0.903 
2211 Weaving Mills, Cotton 0.102  0.898 
2436 Softwood Veneer and Plywood 0.105  0.895 
2015 Poultry and Egg Processing 0.108  0.892 
3263 Fine Earthenware Food Utensils 0.111  0.889 
2325 Men's & Boys' Trousers & Slacks 0.116  0.884 
2321 Shirts, Men's and Boys' 0.120  0.880 
3144 Women's Footwear, Except Athletic 0.120  0.880 
 
Notes: 
1. The data for factor intensity is from the 1992 U.S. Census of Manufactures. 
2. Industries are classified according to the 4-digit U.S. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC; 
1987 version). 
3. Skilled-labor (S) intensity is defined as the share of non-production workers in the total 
employment; and unskilled-worker (U) intensity is defined as the share of production workers. 
The sum of S-intensity and U-intensity is thus one for each industry.  
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Table 3.4.2: Relative Skilled-labor (S) and Unskilled-labor (U) Intensity of 




Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
     
S-intensity 0.285 0.111 0.095 0.654 
     
U-intensity 0.715 0.111 0.346 0.905 
Number of manufacturing industries: 383 
 
 
10 Most Skilled-labor Intensive Industries 
 
NAICS Industry Description S-intensity U-intensity
334511 Search, detection, navigation, & guidance instrument 0.654  0.346 
336414 Guided missile & space vehicle 0.640 0.360
334111 Electronic computer 0.639 0.361
334516 Analytical laboratory instrument 0.629 0.371
334210 Telephone apparatus 0.596 0.404
332995 Other ordnance & accessories 0.594 0.406
334517 Irradiation apparatus 0.582 0.418
312112 Bottled water 0.579 0.421
312111 Soft drink 0.568 0.432
334119 Other computer peripheral equipment 0.562 0.438
 
10 Most Unskilled-labor Intensive Industries 
 
NAICS Industry Description S-intensity U-intensity
321212 Softwood veneer & plywood 0.095 0.905
313111 Yarn spinning mills 0.098 0.902
315221 Men's & boys' cut & sew underwear & nightwear 0.098 0.902
315224 Men's & boys' cut & sew trouser, slack, & jean 0.104 0.896
313113 Thread mills 0.107 0.893
311615 Poultry processing 0.109 0.891
327213 Glass container 0.118 0.882
335222 Household refrigerator & home freezer 0.125 0.875
335224 Household laundry equipment 0.127 0.873
321211 Hardwood veneer & plywood 0.128 0.872
 
Notes: 
1. The data for factor intensity is from the 1997 U.S. Census of Manufactures. 
2. Industries are classified according to the 6-digit 1997 North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS).  
3. Skilled-labor (S) intensity is defined as the share of non-production workers in the total 
employment; and unskilled-worker (U) intensity is defined as the share of production workers. 
The sum of S-intensity and U-intensity is thus one for each industry.  
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Table 3.4.3: Relative Skilled-labor (S) and Unskilled-labor (U) Intensity of 




Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
     
S-intensity 0.301 0.120 0.087 0.711 
     
U-intensity 0.699 0.120 0.289 0.913 
Number of manufacturing industries: 384 
 
 
10 Most Skilled-labor Intensive Industries 
 
NAICS Industry Description S-intensity U-intensity
334210 Telephone apparatus 0.711 0.289
334111 Electronic computer 0.704 0.296
334119 Other computer peripheral equipment 0.670 0.330
334511 Search, detection, navigation, & guidance instrument 0.666 0.334
334517 Irradiation apparatus 0.664 0.336
334516 Analytical laboratory instrument 0.662 0.338
334515 Electricity measuring & testing instrument 0.660 0.340
333295 Semiconductor machinery 0.639 0.361
336414 Guided missile & space vehicle 0.628 0.372
336415 Guided missile & space vehicle propulsion unit & parts 0.619 0.381
 
10 Most Unskilled-labor Intensive Industries 
 
NAICS Industry Description S-intensity U-intensity
321212 Softwood veneer & plywood 0.087 0.913
313111 Yarn spinning mills 0.101 0.899
311615 Poultry processing 0.108 0.892
335222 Household refrigerator & home freezer 0.126 0.874
336111 Automobile 0.130 0.870
327213 Glass container 0.131 0.869
313210 Broadwoven fabric mills 0.131 0.869
321113 Sawmills 0.135 0.865
311611 Animal (except poultry) slaughtering 0.135 0.865
311411 Frozen fruit, juice, & vegetable 0.139 0.861
 
Notes: 
1. The data for factor intensity is from the 2002 U.S. Census of Manufactures. 
2. Industries are classified according to the 6-digit 2002 North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS).  
3. Skilled-labor (S) intensity is defined as the share of non-production workers in the total 
employment; and unskilled-worker (U) intensity is defined as the share of production workers. 
The sum of S-intensity and U-intensity is thus one for each industry.  
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Table 3.5: List of Countries in Aggregate North and South 
 
North (51 countries) South (64 Countries) 
Argentina#, ## Norway Algeria Mali 
Australia Panama#, ## Angola Mauritania 
Austria#, ## Peru#, ## Bangladesh Mauritius 
Barbados Philippines#, ## Benin Mexico 
Belgium Poland Bolivia Mozambique 
Canada South Korea Brazil Nicaragua 
Chile#, ## South Africa#, ## Burkina Faso Niger 
China#, ## Spain#, ## Burundi Nigeria 
Costa Rica#, ## Sri Lanka#, ## Cote d'Ivoire Oman 
Cyprus Sweden Cameroon Pakistan 
Czechoslovakia* Switzerland Central African Republic Papua New Guinea 
Denmark Taiwan## Chad Paraguay 
Ecuador#, ## Thailand#, ## Colombia Portugal 
Egypt#, ## Trinidad and Tobago#, ## Congo Reunion 
Fiji## United Kingdom Dominican Republic Rwanda 
Finland Uruguay#, ## El Salvador Saudi Arabia 
France#, ## U.S.S.R.* Gabon Senegal 
Germany Venezuela#, ## Gambia Seychelles 
Greece## Yugoslavia* Ghana Sierra Leone 
Guyana#, ##  Guatemala Singapore 
Hong Kong  Guinea Somalia 
Hungary  Guinea-Bissau Sudan 
Iceland  Haiti Suriname 
Ireland  Honduras Syria 
Israel  India Togo 
Italy#, ##  Indonesia Tunisia 
Japan  Iran Turkey 
Malaysia#, ##  Jamaica Uganda 
Malta##  Jordan Tanzania 
Morocco#, ##  Kenya Zaire 
Netherlands  Madagascar Zambia 
New Zealand  Malawi Zimbabwe 
 
Notes:  
1. The aggregate North consists of countries whose skilled-to-unskilled labor ratio (S/U) is above 
the average of the 115 countries (1.879); and the aggregate South consists of countries with 
S/U below the average.  
2. Countries marked with # are grouped into the South if the 75 percentile value of S/U is applied 
to the North-South cutoff (22 countries in the North and 93 in the South); and countries with 
## are grouped into the South if the 0.7 of the U.S. relative factor endowment (S/U) is applied 
to the cutoff (26 in the North and 89 in the South).  
3. Countries marked with * are not included in the data for Years 1995 and 2000. 
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Table 3.6: Skilled-to-Unskilled Labor Ratios (S/U) of North and South 
 
 S/U 
(average within group) 
log(S/U) 
(average within group) 
North 2.40 0.862 
South 1.47 0.371 
 
Notes:  
1. Human capital to labor ratio in Hall and Jones (1999) is used as the measure of the relative 
factor abundance, or the ratio of skilled- to unskilled-labor (S/U), for each country.  
2. The North comprises 51 countries that have the highest S/U, and the South comprises 64 




Table 3.7: Regressions for Aggregate North and South 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of aggregate no. of varieties as the share in the total no. of varieties 
imported by the U.S. (log(n_sharei,A)) 
 
Year 1990: North South 












Observations 394 385 




Year 1995: North South 












Observations 383 378 




Year 2000: North South 












Observations 384 379 




1. Regressions estimate Equation (3.4.1) in the text for each year. 
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
3. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% level, 5% level, and 
10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.8: Pooled Regressions for Individual Exporters 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of no. of exported varieties in each industry as the share in the total 












































1. Regressions estimate Equation (3.4.4) in the text for each year. Country-specific dummies are 
included. 
2. skilli is skilled-labor intensity of each industry, and (S/U)c is skilled-to-unskilled labor 
endowment ratio in each country. 
3. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country. 
4. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% level, 5% level, and 
10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.9: Pooled Regressions using Alternative Measure of Export Varieties 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Measure of “Relative Product Variety” in exports (RVic),  in natural 
scale or logarithm 













Observations 17,050 17,048 
R2 0.06 0.08 
 













Observations 17,469 17,469 
R2 0.07 0.10 
 













Observations 19,037 19,036 























2. Regressions estimate Equations (3.4.5) and (3.4.6) in the text for each year. Country-specific 
dummies are included. 
3. skilli is skilled-labor intensity of each industry, and (S/U)c is skilled-to-unskilled labor 
endowment ratio in each country. 
4. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country. 
5. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% level, 5% level, and 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.2.1: Number of Exporters vs Industry Skilled-labor Intensity in the U.S. 
Manufacturing Imports; Year 1990 
 
Plot: Number of Exporter v.s. Industry Skilled-labor Intensity, 1990
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Figure 3.2.2: Number of Exporters vs Industry Skilled-labor Intensity in the U.S. 
Manufacturing Imports; Year 1995 
 
Plot: Number of Exporter v.s. Industry Skilled-labor Intensity, 1995
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Figure 3.2.3: Number of Exporters vs Industry Skilled-labor Intensity in the U.S. 
Manufacturing Imports; Year 2000 
 
Plot: Number of Exporter v.s. Industry Skilled-labor Intensity, 2000
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Notes on Figures 3.2.1 through 3.2.3:   
1. Manufacturing industries are classified according to the 4-digit 1987 U.S. SIC for the year 
1990, and according to the 6-digit 1997 NAICS for the years 1995 and 2000.   
2. The number of exporters is the number of countries from which the United States imports in 
each manufacturing industry.    
3. Skilled-labor intensity is defined as the share of non-production workers in the total number of 




Figure 3.3.1: Number of Varieties vs Industry Skilled-labor Intensity in the U.S. 
Manufacturing Imports; Year 1990 
 
Plot: Number of Varieties in US Imports v.s. Industry Skilled-labor Intensity, 1990
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Figure 3.3.2: Number of Varieties vs Industry Skilled-labor Intensity in the U.S. 
Manufacturing Imports; Year 1995 
 
Plot: Number of Varieties in US Imports v.s. Industry Skilled-labor Intensity, 1995
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Figure 3.3.3: Number of Varieties vs Industry Skilled-labor Intensity in the U.S. 
Manufacturing Imports; Year 2000 
 
Plot: Number of Varieties in US Imports v.s. Industry Skilled-labor Intensity, 2000
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Notes on Figures 3.3.1 through 3.3.3:   
1. Manufacturing industries are classified according to the 4-digit 1987 U.S. SIC for the year 
1990, and according to the 6-digit 1997 NAICS for the years 1995 and 2000.   
2. The number of varieties in each industry is defined as the number of 10-digit HS goods that the 
U.S. imports from each country in each 4-digit SIC industry (i.e., the same 10-digit HS 
products imported from different countries are counted as different varieties).   
3. Skilled-labor intensity is defined as the share of non-production workers in the total number of 






Figure 3.4.1: Individual Exporter Country Regression for 1990: Slope Coefficient vs 



































































































































Figure 3.4.2: Individual Exporter Country Regression for 1995: Slope Coefficient vs 














































































































Figure 3.4.3: Individual Exporter Country Regression for 2000: Slope Coefficient vs 








































































































































Notes on Figures 3.4.1 through 3.4.3:   
1. The individual regressions estimate the equation ciiccci skillsharen ,, )_log( εγ +Π+= , 
where i indexes 4-digit SIC industries (for the year 1990) or 6-digit NAICS industries (for the 
years 1995 and 2000), and c indexes exporter countries. The regression is performed for each 
country to estimate the country-specific slope coefficient cΠ̂  for each year.   
2. The figures plot cΠ̂  for each country (marked by the ISO country code) against the skilled-
labor to unskilled-labor ratio of the country ((S/U)c) in logarithm.   
3. The fitted line in each figure is based on the weighted regression of cΠ̂  on log(S/U)c with the 
observations weighted by the number of 4-digit SIC industries for each country in the sample. 








Revisiting the Revisited: An Alternative Test of the 






  New Trade Theory is characterized by a model of international trade with 
monopolistic competition among the varieties of differentiated products in an industry. 
This theory was originally motivated by the fact that a large part of international trade is 
intra-industry rather than inter-industry,90, 91 a characteristic that neo-classical trade 
theory such as the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) Model or the Ricardian Model cannot explain. 
The monopolistic competition models of international trade, first presented in the works 
of Krugman (1979, 1980) and Helpman (1981), have been widely employed and applied 
in numerous studies of international trade.  
  This type of model has implications for the volume of trade; in particular, as 
Helpman and Krugman (1985, Chapter 8) have demonstrated, the volume of trade among 
a group of countries, as a share in the total income of the country group, will be larger as 
the sizes the economies of individual countries in the group are more similar to each 
                                                 
90 The significance of intra-industry trade has been reported by, for example, Grubel and Lloyd (1975). 
91 On the other hand, it is debated in literature whether such intra-industry trade, or “trade overlap,” 
observed in the data is a matter of the aggregation of sectors or commodities. See Finger (1975).  
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other. In other words, if two regions have the same total sizes of their economies and 
consist of the same number of countries, the region in which countries are more equal in 
GDP will trade more within that region.  
 Although this theoretical implication is clear-cut and has an empirically testable 
form, only a few studies have directly examined this implication empirically. Helpman 
(1987) employed time-series data on 14 OECD countries and graphically showed the 
positive relationship between the volume of trade among the countries as a fraction of 
their total GDP and the similarity in their respective GDPs. Hummels and Levinsohn 
(1995) performed more formal empirical tests using panel data on bilateral trade flows 
between pairs of the same 14 OECD countries, as well as those of another 14 non-OECD 
countries. They expected that the data on trade between the OECD countries would fit the 
monopolistic competition model while it would not be the case for trade between the non-
OECD countries, because the former was likely to be more intra-industry trade of 
horizontally differentiated products92 that the theoretical model considers, while the latter 
did not seem to be characterized as such. Their results, however, showed that GDP 
similarity between two trading countries well explained the volume of bilateral trade 
between them, both for the OECD and non-OECD countries, which left a puzzle. 
Debaere (2005) re-examined the study by Hummels and Levinsohn, and claimed that 
their empirical approach may not have been able to properly assess the impact of the 
income similarity on bilateral trade, and this was why their results were puzzling. He thus 
presented a modified equation explaining the relationship between the volume of trade 
                                                 
92 In literature two types of product differentiation are distinguished: horizontal product differentiation and 
vertical product differentiation. The former arises when products of a similar quality vary in certain 
characteristics, while the latter arises when products differ in quality. The product differentiation discussed 
in the current paper is horizontal differentiation, which the monopolistic competition model considers.   
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and GDP similarity between countries, and estimated it using updated data for the same 
set of OECD and non-OECD countries. From the estimation results he concluded that 
positive correlation between the volume of trade and size similarity among trading 
countries was significant only for the OECD countries but not for the non-OECD 
countries, and thus the puzzle was not present any more.93  
 These studies attempted to test the monopolistic competition model in the context 
of aggregate trade, which includes all types of traded goods. However, not all goods that 
are internationally traded are differentiated products, and the trade of those non-
differentiated products may be driven by other mechanisms than the one that is described 
by the monopolistic competition model. In fact, to expand the tested implication—that 
the volume of trade will increase as trading economies become more equal in size—to the 
level of aggregate trade, they assumed that all industries were internally differentiated in 
terms of product varieties, or alternatively that perfect specialization of production took 
place in every sector. These assumptions are very restrictive and thus may not be 
realistic.  
 In this paper, I propose an alternative empirical approach to testing the 
implication of the monopolistic competition model for the volume of trade among 
countries. The key is to focus on the trade of differentiated products. I review the model 
and derive the equation for the volume of bilateral trade of differentiated products 
without imposing such restrictive assumptions as those mentioned above. The derived 
alternative equation suggests that the simple GDP similarity between trading economies 
does not predict the volume of bilateral trade of differentiated products. The equation, 
however, implies that the volume of bilateral trade of differentiated products, as a share 
                                                 
93 The appendix to this chapter reviews the work by Hummels & Levinsohn (1995) and by Debaere (2005). 
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in the domestic production of these products in the two trading countries, will be 
proportional to the two countries’ GDP similarity adjusted for how symmetric the 
countries are in their production structure. In other words, the volume of trade of 
differentiated products between two countries will be larger as the countries are more 
similar in GDP, as well as in the share of the differentiated sectors in GDP.  
  This implication must be tested with data on trade and production in the sectors of 
differentiated products. Therefore, in addition to data on aggregate trade and GDP such 
as those used in the previous studies, I employ disaggregated data on trade and 
production in manufacturing industries for a range of countries. I also use the information 
on product characteristics classified by Rauch (1999) to define the “differentiated 
sectors.” Furthermore, to handle zero-trade observations in the data, I apply non-linear 
estimation methods in addition to the benchmark OLS estimation of log-linear forms of 
the volume-of-trade equations.   
  The empirical analysis, especially the result of the estimation with a non-linear 
method that handles zero-trade observations, shows that the tested implication of the 
monopolistic competition model—that the volume of bilateral trade per production will 
be larger as two trading countries are more similar in GDP and more symmetric in 
production structure—is supported by the data for both OECD and non-OECD countries, 
not only for the differentiated-sector trade but also for aggregate trade. Therefore, in 
terms of the relationship between the volume of trade and the size similarity, we go back 
to Hummels and Levinsohn’s puzzle, contrary to Debaere’s conclusion. However, using a 
unique approach that separates trade of differentiated products from aggregate trade, this 
paper also demonstrates two other things: (i) bilateral trade flows among OECD 
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countries, especially in the sectors of differentiated products, are well explained by the 
monopolistic competition model; but (ii) trade flows among non-OECD countries are not 
equally well-explained by the model. This finding suggests that there should be some 
other mechanism that makes trade patterns among lower-income countries different from 
those among rich countries.  
This study offers some insight for a series of empirical studies on the gravity 
equation, to which the monopolistic competition model provides a theoretical basis. Most 
studies have estimated the gravity equation for aggregate trade. For example, Feenstra, 
Markusen and Rose (2001), Evenett and Keller (2002), and Haveman and Hummels 
(2004) use the gravity equation for aggregate trade to test which theory of international 
trade is the most likely to explain the actual trade flows, following Deardorff (1998) 
pointing out that multiple trade theories can derive the gravity equation. The point of 
Feenstra et al. is the existence of a home-market effect that may distinguish the 
monopolistic competition model from others, while Evenett and Keller, as well as 
Haveman and Hummels, focus on the elasticity of national income with respect to the 
volume of trade, which will be smaller than unity if specialization in production is 
incomplete. However, aggregate trade involves the trade of various products, some of 
which the monopolistic competition model fits well, but others may be characterized by 
product homogeneity and incomplete specialization; thus all trade should not be 
explained by a single model in a unified manner.94 In contrast, Harrigan (1994) and 
Jensen (2000) have estimated the gravity equation at the sectoral level using data on trade 
                                                 
94 Feenstra, Markusen and Rose also divide trade into three categories according to Rauch (1999) to 
estimate their gravity equation, but the explanatory variables are for the aggregate; i.e., GDPs of exporter 
and importer countries.  
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and production in manufacturing industries.95 They, however, do not explicitly consider 
differences in product characteristics (differentiated versus homogeneous) across 
manufacturing industries, to which this paper pays careful attention.96  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section derives the 
equation explaining the volume of trade in the differentiated sectors, and discusses its 
implication in comparison with the equation for aggregate trade that has been used in the 
existing literature. The section presenting the empirical approaches follows. The data 
employed for the empirical analysis are described in the fourth section. The results of the 
analysis are presented and discussed in the fifth section, which is followed by the 
concluding section.  
4.2 Monopolistic Competition Model and Volume of Trade 
 In this section, to account for the volume of trade I derive two formulas from the 
monopolistic competition model of international trade introduced by Helpman and 
Krugman (1985, Chapters 6-8). This model is characterized as follows: (i) some sectors 
have a number of product varieties (I hereinafter call these sectors “differentiated 
sectors”); (ii) each of the product varieties in a differentiated sector is produced 
monopolistically competitively by a single firm; and (iii) consumers throughout the world 
have identical preferences that are characterized by a two-tier utility function: the upper-
                                                 
95 Harrigan introduces a variety of proxies for scale economies in his equation to see whether the home-
market effect would be significant, which would indicate a monopolistic competition rather than 
Armington preference for national varieties. Jensen’s interest is in the size of the estimated elasticity of 
volume of imports to the importer’s income.  
96 Other empirical work such as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) carefully derives a structural gravity-
type equation from a generalized monopolistic competition model, but due to the unobservability of 
variables, their attention is limited to a certain factor such as distance or trade cost. Lai and Zhu (2004), on 
the other hand, have made an extended effort to measure as many variables as possible to estimate their 
structural and generalized volume-of-trade equation with data.  
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tier utility is homothetic, and the sub-utility over product varieties within a sector takes a 
CES functional form.  
  Here I consider an equilibrium of frictionless trade so that the price of each good 
or horizontally differentiated product is equal throughout the world. In this free-trade 
equilibrium, every product in the differentiated sectors produced in each country will be 
divided among all consumers worldwide, according to their share of world income. The 
volume of exports from one country to another is thus expressed as follows: 
∑∑ ∈∈ += Hs j isDs issjji EXQpyEX ,, ,     (4.1) 
where D: group of the differentiated sectors;  
H: group of homogeneous sectors; 
i, j: scripts for countries (i ≠ j); 
EXs,ij: exports from Country i to Country j in Sector s; 
   Qs,i: Country i’s production in Sector s;  
   ps: equilibrium price of (differentiated) products in Sector s 
   yj: Country j's GDP share in the world (= Yj/Yw) 
Note that the volume of trade between a specific pair of countries in the sectors of 
homogeneous products (or “homogeneous sectors”), ,
j
s iEX for s H∈ , is indeterminate. 
That is, although a country will export a homogeneous product when the amount of the 
product that the country domestically produces is greater than the amount it consumes, 
how much of the country’s product will be exported to which country(ies) cannot be 
determined because, in the free-trade equilibrium, importing countries will be indifferent 
about from which country(ies) they import the homogeneous product to supply their 
domestic demand.  
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4.2.1 Aggregate volume of trade 
  The version of the formula for the aggregate volume of trade, which has been 
employed in studies such as Helpman (1987), Hummels and Levinsohn (1995), and 
Debaere (2005), further assumes the following: 
(A1) Each country in the world is also completely specialized in production in the 
homogeneous sectors. That is, every homogeneous product is produced by no 
more than one country. Under this assumption, any product produced by a sole 
producer country (i.e., a sole exporter) will be imported by all other countries, and 
how much each country imports will be determined according to the country’s 
share of world income. Therefore, no indeterminacy will be left for the quantities 
of bilateral trade, and the volume of exports in both homogeneous and 
differentiated sectors from Country i to Country j is expressed as follows: 
  ∑ ∈= HDs issjji QpyEX , , . 
(A2) Products in any sector are tradable, i.e., there exist no non-traded sectors.97 Under 
this assumption, the aggregate value of a country’s production over the sectors 
equals its income, or GDP. That is; 






i YyEX =  
where Yi is GDP of Country i.  
Therefore, following Helpman (1987), the aggregate bilateral trade volume between 
Countries i and j is expressed as follows: 
                                                 
97 This assumption (A2) can be replaced with the following weaker assumption to derive Equation (4.2A) 
below.  
(A2’): Every country has an equal share of non-traded sectors in its GDP.  
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iij YYYyYYYYyYyEXEXVT ⋅==+=+≡  
  ])/()/(1[/ 22 ijjijiijijij YYYYyYVT −−=⇔  
where Yij = Yi + Yj: Country i-j pair’s total GDP 
 yij = Yij/Yw: Country i-j pair’s share of world GDP 
The term in the square brackets on the right-hand side of the second equation indicates 
the similarity of GDPs, or the similarity of the sizes of the economy, of two trading 
countries. This term takes a greater value as the size of the two countries become more 
equal, and takes the maximum value of 0.5 when the two countries are exactly equal in 
GDP; i.e., Yi/Yij = Yj/Yij = 1/2.98 Using this index of size similarity,99 the equation is 
expressed as follows:      
  ijijijij simyYVT ⋅=/ ,        (4.2A) 
where ])/()/(1[ 22 ijjijiij YYYYsim −−= . 
This Equation (4.2A) implies that the volume of aggregate bilateral trade, as a share in 
the total income (GDP) of the two trading countries, will be greater as their respective 
national incomes are more similar.  
4.2.2 Volume of Trade in the Differentiated Sectors 
 The two assumptions A1 and A2 are very restrictive. Since Equation (4.2A) can 
be derived only with these restrictive assumptions, its validity should be limited 
accordingly. However, by focusing our attention on the differentiated sectors, it is 
possible to derive an alternative formula that can explain the volume of trade in such 
sectors in a similar way but without imposing these assumptions. Since countries are 
                                                 
98 Note that Yj/Yij = 1 – Yi/Yij. In theory, this index takes the minimum value of zero when two countries are 
completely dissimilar in GDP; i.e., Yi/Yij = 0 and Yj/Yij = 1, or vice versa.   
99 Helpman (1987), as well as Hummels & Levinsohn (1995), calls this term the “dispersion” index, while 
Debaere (2005) names it the “similarity” index. I follow the latter since this index being larger means two 
countries being more similar in income.  
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considered to be completely specialized in production of unique varieties in the 
differentiated sectors, by taking the first term of Equation (4.1), export from Country i to 
Country j in the differentiated sectors is described as follows: 
  DijDs issj
Dj
i XyQpyEX ==∑ ∈ ,, , 
where EXij,D: export in the differentiated sectors from Country i to  
Country j 
XiD: value of Country i's domestic production in the differentiated  
sectors: ,
D




Therefore, the volume of trade in the differentiated sectors between Countries i and j is 
























































































































where VTijD: volume of trade in differentiated sectors between Countries i and j  
  XijD: Countries i and j’s total domestic production in the differentiated  
sectors (XijD ≡ XiD + XjD). 
The term in the square brackets in this equation is similar to the size similarity index in 
Equation (4.2A) for aggregate trade, but this term depends not only on two countries’ 
relative income sizes but also on the sizes of production in the differentiated sectors of 
the countries (XiD, XjD). The GDP share term for each country ((Yi/Yij)2 or (Yj/Yij)2) is 
“weighted” by the term (XiD/Yi)/(XijD/YijD), and this “weight” term indicates how large the 
share of the differentiated sectors in GDP is in each country, relative to the overall GDP 
share of the differentiated sectors in the two countries. In other words, this term indicates 
GDP similarity between two countries adjusted for how symmetric the two countries are 
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in their production structure. This term takes a larger value as two countries are more 
similar in the size of their economies and more symmetric in production structure. I thus 
call this term the production structure-adjusted size (or GDP) similarity, and re-write the 
equation as follows:   















































































Equation (4.2D) implies that the volume of bilateral trade in the differentiated sectors, as 
a share in the two countries’ total production in those sectors, is predicted by the size 
similarity between the two trading countries adjusted for how symmetric their production 
structures are. That is, two countries will trade more in the differentiated sectors as the 
two countries are more similar in GDP and more symmetric in production.  
4.2.3 Discussion on Production Structure-adjusted Size Similarity 
 As mentioned above, the volume of bilateral trade in the differentiated sectors, as 
a share in the two countries’ domestic production in those sectors, is proportional to the 
similarity in size between the countries that is adjusted for the symmetry of the country 
pair’s production structure. This adjusted index of GDP similarity takes a larger value as 
two trading countries are more similar in GDP and more symmetric in production 
structure. This is true in general, i.e., for more common cases in which a country with 
larger GDP is a larger producer in the differentiated sectors than the other country.100 
However, this index is in fact even greater for less common cases in which a country with 
                                                 
100 For instance, one country has 70% of two countries’ total GDP and 60% of their differentiated-sector 
production.  
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smaller GDP is a larger producer in the differentiated sectors;101 i.e., the two countries 
are dissimilar or asymmetric in an extreme manner.102, 103 This is because, according to 
the monopolistic competition model of trade, a trade flow between countries will be 
larger when the exporter has larger production and the importer has larger income. 
Therefore, having the sizes of GDP and sectoral production adjusted (or normalized), the 
trade flow in the sector will be larger when one country imports the whole domestic 
production of the other country (for a hypothetical case in which one country has 100% 
of a country pair’s GDP but no production in the considered sector, while the other 
country has zero income but 100% of the country pair’s production in that sector), rather 
than when two countries exchange a half of their respective production (for another 
hypothetical case in which two countries are exactly equal in both GDP and sectoral 
production).  
4.3 Empirical Approaches to Estimate Volume-of-Trade Equations 
  In this section, I describe empirical specifications to estimate the volume-of-trade 
equations derived in the preceding section, to test how well bilateral trade is explained by 
the size similarity of two trading economies. Each approach is taken to estimate both 
Equation (4.2A) for aggregate trade and Equation (4.2D) for trade in the differentiated 
sectors. The results of the estimation from each approach, which is presented in the fifth 
section, are compared to examine how the proposed alternative model for the 
differentiated-sector trade differs from the conventional model for aggregate trade.  
                                                 
101 For example, one country has 30% of two countries’ total GDP and 80% of their differentiated-sector 
production.  
102 In fact, in such a case the adjusted similarity index takes a value over 0.5 and up to 1, compared to the 
case in which two countries are perfectly similar and symmetric (sim* = 0.5).  
103 In the data used in the current study, the number of such uncommon cases for the OECD countries is 
228 out of the total 3,630 observations; and 2,144 out of 14,565 for the non-OECD countries. See Section 
4.4 for the detailed description of the data.  
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4.3.1 OLS Estimation of Log-linearized Form 
 As a benchmark, I first estimate the volume-of-trade equations in a log-linearized 
form by the OLS. Recalling Equations (4.2A) and (4.2D), but also considering other 
potential factors that may affect bilateral trade flows:104 
ijtijijtijtijtijt ysimYVT εμ






ββ ⋅⋅⋅= 21*/       (4.2D’) 
Although the underlying monopolistic competition model explains a core mechanism 
determining the volume of trade as Equations (4.2A) and (4.2D) suggest (with both β1 
and β2 equaling one), real trade flows may be affected by other factors. For example, the 
literature on the gravity equation suggests that bilateral trade flows will be affected by 
geographic factors such as distance, border sharing, and commonness of language. The 
term μij is included in the equations to capture these factors that are specific to country 
pairs, as well as other unobserved potential country pair-specific (but time-invariant) 
factors affecting bilateral trade flows. The last term εijt captures idiosyncratic disturbances 
to recorded trade flows or measurement errors in data, which are assumed to be log-
normally distributed. Taking the logarithm of both sides of the two equations (4.2A’) and 
(4.2D’) yields the following linearized equations:  





ijt ysimXVT εμββ ++⋅+⋅= )log()log()/log( 2
*
1    (4.3D) 
Equation (4.3A) for the volume of aggregate bilateral trade is the same as the main 
empirical specification that is employed by Debaere (2005).105 Equation (4.3D), which is 
                                                 
104 Since panel data are used for the estimation, here and in the rest of this paper, variables in the equations 
are expressed with script t to denote a time period.  
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designed to account for the volume of bilateral trade in the differentiated sectors, is an 
alternative empirical approach that this paper proposes. Both equations are estimated by 
OLS regression with country pair-specific dummies (μij). Year-specific dummies are also 
included for the estimation in order to capture any trend in or shocks to trade flows that 
are common for all countries in the world.  
 Equations (4.3A) and (4.3D) are estimated separately for the samples of OECD 
and non-OECD countries.106 This is to examine whether trade among OECD countries 
and trade among non-OECD countries are equally well explained by the volume-of-trade 
equations, following the studies by Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) and Debaere (2005). 
These studies separated a group of OECD countries from that of non-OECD countries for 
estimation, based on the understanding that intra-industry trade of differentiated products, 
which the monopolistic competition model primarily aims to explain, is dominant in trade 
among OECD countries, while trade among non-OECD countries should not be mainly 
characterized by horizontal product differentiation. Their expectation was thus that the 
aggregate version of the volume-of-trade equation (4.3A) would describe bilateral trade 
well for OECD countries but not for non-OECD countries. Although Hummels and 
Levinsohn found a result that was counter to this expectation (i.e., the data support the 
model for both country groups), Debaere’s re-examination found empirical support for 
the model only for OECD countries, as initially expected. In contrast, the current study 
focuses on trade of differentiated products, which the monopolistic competition model 
aims to explain for any country group. Therefore, it is expected that the proposed 
equation (4.3D) for the differentiated-sector trade should explain both trade among 
                                                                                                                                                 
105 See the appendix for more details of the empirical approach of Debaere (2005), as well as Hummels and 
Levinsohn (1995).  
106 See the next section for the list of the countries included in each sample.  
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OECD countries and trade among non-OECD countries equally well, while the 
conventional equation (4.3A) for aggregate trade would not.  
 An empirical issue here in estimating Equations (4.3A) and (4.3D) is the 
treatment of zero-trade observations. A considerable number of country pairs in both 
OECD and non-OECD groups have no bilateral trade in the differentiated sectors in 
certain years. In the data used in this study, observations with no differentiated-sector 
trade are less than one percent of all the observations in the OECD sample, while such 
zero-trade observations comprise more than 60% in the non-OECD sample.107 For the 
estimation of the log-linear equations, these zero-valued observations bring the problem 
of undefined logarithmic values in the left-hand side. To handle this problem, for the 
benchmark estimation I (i) omit such zero-trade observations and use only observations 
with positive differentiated-sector trade; but also (ii) include these zero-trade 
observations for estimation by replacing zero with a very small positive number.108, 109 
4.3.2 Non-linear Model for Zero-trade Observations: Poisson Quasi-maximum 
Likelihood Estimation 
 Although replacing zero with a small positive number has been a convention in 
estimating a logarithmic form, it is not ideal. It is more desirable if there exists an other 
appropriate alternative estimation method that can treat zero in the value of trade as it is. 
Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) estimated (by the OLS) their volume-of-trade equation 
in a level form, instead of a logarithmic form, for their non-OECD sample to avoid 
                                                 
107 The details of the data are described in the next section.  
108 Debaere (2005) also applies a similar procedure to handle zero-trade observations in estimating his log-
linear model.  
109 This number must be at least smaller than the minimum non-zero value of trade in the used data. The 
minimum value of the bilateral trade per production (VTDijt/XDijt) in the data is 9.4e-9, and I thus chose 10-9 
(1.0e-9) for the positive small number replacing zero.   
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omitting zero-trade observations. Debaere (2005) also employed similar level 
specifications110 and estimated the equations by the Tobit method to keep zero-trade 
observations in his non-OECD data. The cost of using such level forms of the equation 
was that (i) they had to give up estimating separately the impact of the two variables of 
interest, the country pair’s size similarity and the country pair’s share of the world GDP; 
or (ii) as in one of Debaere’s two level specifications, for separate estimation of the 
effects of the two variables they had to abandon the strict consistency of a regression 
equation with the theoretical monopolistic competition model. (See Appendix for further 
details of the empirical approaches of Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) and Debaere 
(2005).)  
 In the current paper, I employ an alternative method to handle zero-trade 
observations, which can both maintain the structural consistency of the regression 
equation with the theoretical model and separately estimate the impacts of the two 
variables of interest. The alternative is the (fixed-effect) Poisson quasi-maximum 
likelihood (PQML) estimation. The Poisson regression is usually applied for count data, 
but it is also applicable to non-negative continuous variables. Hausman, Hall and 
Griliches (1984) developed the conditional fixed-effect PQML method in the panel data 
context, which has been shown by Wooldridge (1999) to be consistent and robust across 
distributional assumptions when the conditional mean of the dependent variable is an 
                                                 
110 The level forms of the volume-of-trade equation in the two studies are not the same. Hummels and 
Levinsohn (1995) used the value of (aggregate) trade (VTij) as the dependent variable, while Debaere 
(2005) employed the volume of aggregate trade as the share in GDP (VTij/Yij). Hummels and Levinsohn’s 
approach thus left the term of the country pair’s GDP (Yij) in the right-hand side of the equation, about 
which Debaere argued in terms of its relevance for assessing the impact of the size similarity between 
trading countries.  
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exponential-class function of the linear combination of regressors.111 The PQML method 
has also been applied to the estimation of the gravity equation by Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006) for cross-sectional data and by Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2006) for panel 
data. These studies have shown by simulation that with zero-trade observations the 
PQML method has the advantage of smaller potential estimation bias compared to the 
OLS estimation of a logarithmic form of the equation. I thus employ the PQML method 
and estimate the following form of the volume-of-trade equations: 
ijtijijtijtijtijt ysimYVT εμ
ββ +⋅⋅= 21/  











ijt ysimXVT εμββ ++⋅+⋅=⇔ ])log()log(exp[/ 2
*
1   (4.4D) 
The main difference from the benchmark log-linear form (4.3A) or (4.3D) is that in the 
above form the stochastic error term εijt is additive, instead of multiplicative as in 
Equations (4.2A’) and (4.2D’). 
4.3.3 Tobit Estimation of Log-linearized Form 
 For the purpose of robustness check of the OLS estimation of the log-linear form, 
I also apply the Tobit regression to estimate the volume-of-trade equations. Even for the 
Tobit estimation, zero-trade observations in the data bring the issue of the undefined 
logarithm of zero in principle. However, in the specific data used in the current study,112 
bilateral trade is recorded in thousands of U.S. dollars, and thus no (or zero) value is 
                                                 
111 That is, E[y|x] = α·exp(xβ) where y is the dependent variable, x is the vector of regressors, β is the vector 
of coefficients, and α is a scalar.  
112 The details of the employed trade data are described in the next section.  
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recorded when the value of bilateral trade is less than $500 (rounded to zero thousands). 
Using this feature of the employed data, I apply the Tobit estimation to the following log-
linear specification, which is slightly different from Equations (4.3A) and (4.3D): 
ijtijijtijtijtijt ysimYVT εμββ ++⋅+⋅+= )log()log()log()log( 21   (4.5A) 
log(VTijt) = log(VTijt*)  if VTijt* > 0.5 ($500) 





ijt ysimXVT εμββ ++⋅+⋅+= )log()log()log()log( 2
*
1   (4.5D) 
log(VTijtD) = log(VTijtD*) if VTijtD* > 0.5 ($500) 
log(VTijtD) = log(0.5)  if VTijtD* ≤ 0.5 ($500) 
where VTijt or VTijtD is the observed or recorded value of bilateral trade in the data, while 
VTijt* or VTijtD* is the underlying actual trade value.113 The following two things should be 
noted for this estimation approach. First, a country pair’s total production (XDijt in the 
differentiated-sector equation or Yijt in the aggregate equation) is now moved from the 
denominator of the left-hand side to the right-hand side of the equation. The variable is 
thus included as one of the regressors, but the coefficient for this variable is restricted to 
be one for estimation. Secondly, all the zero values for bilateral trade in the data are 
replaced with $500 or 0.5 in thousands of dollars.  
4.4 The Data 
 To estimate Equations (4.3A) and (4.3D) through (4.5A) and (4.5D) presented in 
the previous section, data on trade, GDP, and industrial production have been collected 
for various countries.  
                                                 
113 It should be noted that the unconditional fixed-effect Tobit model will generally be biased due to the 
problem of incidental parameters (Hsiao, 2003; pp. 48-9, 243). 
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 The data on bilateral trade are from the NBER-Statistics Canada Trade Data 
compiled by Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997) for the period 1970-1992, and the 
UCD-Statistics Canada Trade Data that is compiled by Feenstra (2000) to supplement for 
the period up to 1997. The dataset contains trade flows between each pair of countries. 
Goods in the trade flows are classified according to the four-digit Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC, Revision 2). The value of each trade flow is recorded in 
thousands of nominal U.S. dollars.  
 The data on GDP measured in current U.S. dollars are from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2005). Both GDP of each country and the world 
total GDP have been collected to compute the world income (GDP) share of each country 
pair (yij).114  
 The data on industrial production are from the United Nation’s Industrial 
Statistics Database (INDSTAT3; UNIDO, 2003), which contains the annual data on 
manufacturing production in countries for the years of 1960-2000. Manufacturing 
industries are classified according to the three-digit International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC, Revision 2). The data on gross output in nominal U.S. dollars are 
used.  
 The data for the current study cover 89 countries for the years 1970 through 1997. 
These countries all have population above one million as of the year 1997. The countries 
are divided into two groups, OECD countries and non-OECD countries, according to the 
actual OECD membership as of the year 1973.115 As a result, the data include 20 
                                                 
114 Note that the world GDP (Yw) in this study also counts GDP of countries that are not included in the 
sample, and thus is greater than the sum of GDP of the 89 sample countries.   
115 1973 is the year in which New Zealand joined the OECD. New Zealand was the newest member until 
Mexico joined in 1994.  
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countries (190 bilateral pairs) in the OECD group and 69 countries (1,808 pairs116) in the 
non-OECD group. Table 1 lists the countries and years included in the data for each 
group. The bilateral trade flows between the OECD countries represent 33.8% of the 
world total flows on average over the period 1970-1997 (with an annual share ranging 
0.3% through 62.0%); and the flows between the non-OECD countries represent 1.0% on 
average over the period (with an annual share ranging 0.5% through 1.5%). The panel 
data are kept unbalanced to retain as many observations in the data as possible.117    
4.4.1 Industry/commodity classifications for the production data and trade data 
 Since the trade data and the production data are based on different classification 
schemes, mapping one classification onto the other is required to merge the two datasets 
using a common classification.118 In the production data 28 manufacturing industries are 
classified according to the three-digit ISIC, while in the trade data goods are classified 
into over a thousand categories according to the four-digit SITC. The mapping thus 
requires condensing the four-digit SITC (Revision 2) into the three-digit ISIC (Revision 
2). I have mapped the trade data onto the three-digit ISIC using the concordance 
information sourced from the OECD, which is available on Jon Haveman’s Industry 
Concordances web page 
                                                 
116 The number of country pairs in the data is less than 69C2 = 2,346. This is because the 69 countries 
include countries that appear in the data as one of a country pair in any year(s), while some country pairs 
have no years for which production or GDP data are available for both countries. For instance, the data for 
Mexico are available only for 1994-97 while the data for Hong Kong are available only for 1973-90. As a 
result, bilateral trade between these two countries is not included in the data for any year.    
117 I cannot make the panel balanced for the entire 190 + 1,808 country pairs for the 28 years due to the lack 
of data for one or more variables for some countries in some years.  
118 While the ISIC for the production data is based on industrial activities, the SITC for the trade data is 
based on commodity characteristics. Since the two classifications are based on different principles, the 




 Next, to separate the differentiated sectors from other (non-differentiated) sectors, 
I follow Rauch (1999), which classifies the four-digit SITC commodities into three 
categories based on the degree of product differentiation: goods traded on an organized 
exchange (homogeneous goods), reference priced goods, and differentiated goods. 
Although the production data, which are classified according to ISIC, cannot be simply 
mapped onto Rauch’s three categories, there are ten three-digit ISIC manufacturing 
industries whose corresponding four-digit SITC categories are all classified as Rauch’s 
differentiated goods. These industries are:  322 (wearing apparel), 324 (footwear), 332 
(furniture), 355 (rubber products), 356 (plastic products), 361 (pottery, china, and 
earthenware), 362 (glass and products), 382 (non-electric machinery), 384 (transport 
equipment), and 385 (professional and scientific equipment). I therefore group these 10 
three-digit industries as representative of the differentiated sectors, and accordingly 
compute bilateral trade and production in these differentiated sectors for each country 
pair for each year. These 10 differentiated manufacturing industries comprise 31.2% of 
the world aggregate trade on average, with the share in each year ranging from 24.3 to 
37.0% during the period of 1970-1997.120 These shares in the total trade flows among the 
89 sample countries are: 41% on average with annual shares ranging 33 through 49% for 
the OECD countries; and 13% on average with annual shares ranging 9 through 21% for 
the non-OECD countries.  
                                                 
119 The original mapping is from the five-digit SITC to the three-digit ISIC. However, since the trade data 
have only the detail of the four-digit classification, I disregarded the details of the five-digit SITC in the 
original concordance.   
120 Note that the differentiated-sector industries are selected only from manufacturing industries.  
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4.4.2 Zero-trade Observations 
  In the OECD group, while all country pairs have positive bilateral trade flows in 
all the 28 years, 28 out of 3,630 observations (for 190 country pairs for 28 years) have 
zero trade in the differentiated sectors. In the non-OECD group, 4,551 out of 14,565 
observations (for 1,808 country pairs for 28 years) have no trade flows, and additional 
2,798 observations have zero flows in the differentiated sectors.  
 Figures 4.1A through 4.2D plot bilateral trade per production vs the size similarity 
index with a trend line fitted by locally weighted regression (Lowess121). Figures 4.1A 
and 4.1D are for the OECD countries, and 4.2A and 4.2D are for the non-OECD 
countries. The left panels (Figures 4.1A and 4.2A) plot the value of aggregate trade per 
GDP against the index of GDP similarity between two countries (simijt). The right panels 
(Figures 4.1D and 4.2D) plot the value of trade per production in the differentiated 
sectors against the index of production structure-adjusted GDP similarity (sim*ijt). All the 
variables are in logarithms and mean-differenced, which correspond to the benchmark 
OLS estimation with dummies. The vertical and horizontal lines indicate zeros, which are 
the means of the mean-differenced variables. While the trend line exhibits some positive 
slope on all the figures, the positive relationship between the two variables does not seem 
to be very clear except for Figure 4.1A for aggregate trade between the OECD countries.  
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 OLS Estimation of Log-linear Form 
The results of the benchmark OLS estimation of the log-linear form of the 
volume-of-trade equations are presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. In each table, the second 
                                                 
121 Locally weighted scatterplot smoothing. The smoothing parameter (or bandwidth) is 0.8 for the trend 
line in these figures.  
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through fourth columns show the results for the OECD countries, and the fifth through 
seventh columns show the results for the non-OECD countries. For each country group, 
one column shows the result of the estimation of Equation (4.3A) for aggregate trade, and 
one column shows the result of the estimation of Equation (4.3D) for the differentiated-
sector trade. For the purpose of comparison, the sectoral equation (4.3D) is also estimated 
for a group of three-digit ISIC manufacturing industries that are not included in the 
differentiated sector.122 The estimation result for these “non-differentiated” sectors 
(indicated as “ND”) is shown in another column for each country group.  
The lower part of the tables shows the results of the tests, in the p-values, of the 
hypotheses that (i) the coefficient for the index of size similarity equals one; (ii) the 
coefficient for a country pair’s world GDP share equals one; and (iii) these two 
coefficients are jointly equal to one. These hypotheses are what the monopolistic 
competition model suggests when international trade is frictionless. It should be noted, 
however, that in reality various kinds of trade friction exist, and not all of them may be 
controlled for by country-pair specific dummies in the estimation. Having such trade 
friction, the coefficient estimates may be different from (smaller than) one even though 
the estimation suggests a positive and significant relationship between the volume of 
trade and the respective determinants.  
Table 4.2 shows the result of the OLS estimation using observations with positive 
trade values but excluding zero-trade cases. In the following, to focus on the tested 
                                                 
122 The “non-differentiated” sector group consists of the following 17 three-digit ISIC industries: 311 (food 
products), 313 (beverages), 314 (tobacco), 321 (textiles), 323 (leather products), 331 (wood products), 341 
(paper and products), 342 (printing and publishing), 351 (industrial chemicals), 352 (other chemicals), 353 
(petroleum refineries), 354 (miscellaneous petroleum and coal products), 369 (other non-metallic mineral 
products), 371 (iron and steel), 372 (non-ferrous metals), 381 (fabricated metal products), and 383 (electric 
machinery). The miscellaneous category 390 is excluded from both differentiated and non-differentiated 
groups.  
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prediction on the relationship between the volume of bilateral trade per production and 
the size similarity between trading countries, I put my main focus on the estimate of the 
coefficient for the similarity index (β1).123 The result indicates that among the OECD 
countries the positive relationship between the volume of trade per production and the 
size similarity index is significant for both aggregate and differentiated-sector trade. This 
relationship is also positive for trade in non-differentiated sectors but less significant. In 
addition, the size of the coefficient estimate is the largest for the differentiated sectors 
( 1β̂  = .858), it is smallest for the non-differentiated sectors ( 1β̂  = .312), and the case for 
aggregate trade falls in between ( 1β̂  = .422). The difference between the estimate for the 
differentiated-sector case and those for the other two cases is significant.124 On the other 
hand, for the non-OECD countries, the coefficient is estimated to be positive and 
significant (at the 1% level) for all the three cases; but the difference in the value of the 
estimate is not significant across the cases.125  
The same equations (4.3A) and (4.3D) (, as well as (4.3ND)) are also estimated by 
OLS using all the observations with zero-trade values being replaced with a small 
positive number (10-9). The result is shown in Table 4.3.126 For the OECD countries, the 
overall result is the same as the previous case, except that now the estimate for the non-
                                                 
123 The estimates of the coefficient for the countries’ world GDP share (β2) are discussed in a later 
subsection.  
124 The hypothesis that 1̂β is the same between the aggregate case and the differentiated-sector case is 
rejected at the 5% level of significance.   
125 The p-value of the test of 1β̂ being equal between the differentiated-sector case (with the largest value) 
and the non-differentiated-sector case (with the smallest value) is 0.30.   
126 It should be noted that the result is somewhat sensitive to the choice of the small positive number for 
zero-trade values, except for the case of aggregate trade between the OECD countries. In particular, when a 
much smaller number (such as 10-18 or smaller) is applied, the estimate of coefficient for the similarity 
index (β1) is insignificant (or its p-value exceeds 10%) for the differentiated-sector equation even for the 
OECD countries. On the other hand, for the non-OECD countries the result for the differentiated sectors 
does not qualitatively change in terms of the signs and significance of the estimates of two coefficients (β1 
and β2).    
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differentiated sector is not significant even at the 10% level. However, for the non-OECD 
countries, the coefficient estimate is insignificant for all the three cases.127 The point 
estimate for differentiated-sector trade is larger than that in the other two cases, but the 
difference is not significant.128 In other words, for the non-OECD countries, the OLS 
estimation of the log-linear form of the volume-of-trade equation gives a different picture 
depending on whether zero-trade observations are excluded or included.   
4.5.2 Alternative Estimation of the Log-linear Form: Tobit 
The Tobit estimation of the log-linear equations is also performed to see the 
robustness of the result when both zero- and nonzero-trade observations are included. 
Equations (4.5A) and (4.5D) are estimated for aggregate and differentiated-sector trade, 
respectively. As in the OLS estimation, Equation (4.5D) is also estimated for non-
differentiated sectors (ND). The result is shown in Table 4.4. The overall picture is 
similar to Table 3 for the OLS estimation having zero-trade observations included, but 
the coefficient estimate 1β̂  increases its significance in the differentiated-sector equation 
(4.5D) for both country groups. In particular, for the non-OECD countries the estimate is 
weakly significant (at the 10% level) in (4.5D) while it is insignificant in other two 
equations (4.5A) and (4.5ND).129 This result indicates that the separation of the 
differentiated sectors in estimating the volume-of-trade equation, which the current paper 
proposes, gives evidence of the prediction of the monopolistic competition model more 
clearly than the conventional aggregate trade approach does.  
                                                 
127 Note that the result for aggregate trade is consistent with Debaere’s (2005).  
128 The p-value of the test of 1β̂ being equal between the differentiated-sector case (with the largest value) 
and the non-differentiated-sector case (with the smallest value) is 0.22. 
129 However, the difference in the estimate across the three cases is not significant for the non-OECD 
countries. On the other hand, for the OECD countries, the estimate in the differentiated-sector equation is 
significantly larger than that in the other two cases at the 1% significance level.  
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4.5.3 Poisson Quasi-maximum Likelihood (PQML) Estimation 
 The above three estimation methods do not treat the zero value in the trade data as 
it is. On the other hand, the proposed estimation of Equations (4.4A) and (4.4D) by the 
Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood (PQML) procedure can treat zeros in observations as 
they are. Table 4.5 presents the result of the PQML estimation. Equation (4.4D) is also 
estimated for the non-differentiated sectors (ND).  
 The result for the OECD countries is consistent with the estimation results by the 
previous three methods, while the estimated coefficient for the similarity index is 
significant at the 1% level not only in the aggregate and differentiated-sector equations 
but also in the non-differentiated-sector equation. In other words, the estimation shows 
that among the OECD countries the positive correlation between the volume of trade per 
production and the adjusted size similarity is indicated even in the non-differentiated 
sectors. However, this may be because these non-differentiated sectors comprise 
manufacturing industries. These industries are excluded from the “pure” differentiated 
sectors, but that does not mean that products in these industries are all homogeneous. A 
more important thing in the estimation result is that the size of the estimated coefficient is 
the largest for the differentiated-sector trade, the median for the aggregate trade, and the 
smallest for the non-differentiated sectors. The coefficient estimate in the differentiated-
sector equation is significantly larger than the estimate in the other two equations.130    
 For the non-OECD countries, the coefficient estimate is also significant in all the 
three equations (4.4A), (4.4D) and (4.4ND), at least at the 5% level. However, the 
                                                 
130 The difference is significant at the 10% level between (4.4D) and (4.4A), and at the 5% level between 
(4.4D) and (4.4ND).  
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estimate for the differentiated sector is the smallest and least significant,131 which is 
counter to the expectation from the theory. In other words, the result of the PQML 
estimation implies that, among the non-OECD countries, the positive correlation between 
the volume of trade per production and the size similarity between countries is more 
striking as international trade contains more non-differentiated products.         
4.5.4 Comparison of Four Approaches to Estimation 
 The above four estimation approaches give consistent results for the OECD 
countries, but for the non-OECD countries they provide different results from each other. 
To see which method describes the data, especially for the non-OECD countries, better 
than the others, I use the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)132 for the four estimation 
specifications. The AIC measures the goodness of fit of an empirical model, and a model 
with a lower AIC value is preferred to that with a higher AIC value. Table 4.6 compares 
the value of the AIC of each estimated model for the two country groups and the three 
versions (A, D, and ND). For any country group and any version, the estimated model by 
the PQML has the lowest AIC value, the OLS with only positive-trade observations gives 
the next lowest, the Tobit gives the third, and the estimated model by the OLS including 
(value-replaced) zero-trade observations has the highest AIC value. This comparison 
indicates that, for any case, the equation estimated by the PQML describes the data the 
best.  
4.5.5 Summary and Discussion 
 As described above, the result for the OECD countries is consistent across the 
four estimation approaches. The estimated coefficient for the size similarity index is 
                                                 
131 However, the difference of the estimate between (4.4D) and the other two equations is not significant 
(the p-value is 0.15).  
132 Akaike (1974).  
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positive and significant not only in the differentiated-sector-trade equation but also in the 
aggregate-trade equation. The estimate for the differentiated sectors, however, is 
significantly larger than that in the other cases, and is also close to one.133 On the other 
hand, the estimation for the non-differentiated sectors gives a smaller and less significant 
coefficient estimate than the other two cases, implying that the monopolistic competition 
model does not describe trade in the non-differentiated sectors as well as it does trade in 
the differentiated sectors. Therefore, this study, by separating differentiated (and non-
differentiated) sectors from aggregate trade in estimation, clearly demonstrates that the 
positive correlation between the volume of trade among OECD countries and size 
similarity among the countries, which has been found in the previous studies, is driven by 
such correlation in trade of the differentiated products, as the monopolistic competition 
model suggests.  
 On the other hand, for the non-OECD countries, the results are mixed in the four 
approaches. Some methods estimate the coefficient for the similarity index being 
insignificant even in the differentiated-sector equation, but other methods estimate the 
coefficient being significant even for the non-differentiated sectors. However, the 
estimation by the PQML, which has econometric advantages (small potential estimation 
bias with zero-valued data) and better describes the data with a lower AIC value than the 
other three approaches, shows that the coefficient for the size similarity index is 
significant regardless of whether the traded sectors are differentiated or not. This result 
brings us back to Hummels and Levinsohn’s puzzle; and also implies that Debaere’s 
finding may be due to his way of handling zero-trade observations in estimation. 
                                                 
133 The p-value of the test of the hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero ranges from 0.38 through 0.85 
across the four estimation procedures.  
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Moreover, the current study deepens the puzzle. That is, the estimation indicates that for 
the non-OECD countries the correlation between the volume of trade and the size 
similarity between trading economies is weaker in the differentiated sectors than in the 
less differentiated sectors, while the correlation should be driven by product 
differentiation if the monopolistic competition model applies. The current study thus 
implies that some different mechanism from horizontal product differentiation may 
underlie the observed relationship between the volume of trade and the size similarity 
among these lower-income countries.        
4.5.6 World GDP Share of Trading Countries 
So far the analysis has been focused on the significance of the size similarity of 
two trading economies, which is one of the two determinants of the volume of trade per 
production in the model. In this subsection, I briefly discuss the estimation results for the 
other determinant: the GDP of two trading countries as a share in the world GDP (or, 
more simply, the country pair’s world GDP share, yij). According to the monopolistic 
competition model, two countries’ world GDP share should also be positively correlated 
with the volume of bilateral trade as a share in the countries’ total production.  
The results of the estimation from the four different approaches are as shown in 
Tables 4.2 through 4.5. For the OECD countries, the coefficient for the world GDP share 
(β2) is insignificant in any estimation for any country group and trading sector. This result 
suggests that among rich countries how large trading countries are in the world may not 
be very important for the volume of trade per production. Exceptions, however are the 
estimates in the differentiated- and non-differentiated-sector equations, (4.4D) and 
(4.4ND), estimated by the PQML. In these cases the coefficient is estimated to be 
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positive and significant. In particular, for the differentiated sectors the estimate is fairly 
large (but smaller than one) and very significant (at the 1% level). This should be 
additional evidence that the monopolistic competition model explains the flows of trade 
in differentiated sectors among rich countries. On the other hand, for the non-OECD 
countries, the result varies across estimations. However, in the estimation by the PQML 
and the log-linear OLS without zero-trade observations that give the two lowest AIC 
values, the coefficient is positive and significant for all sectors. This result implies that 
trading countries’ world income share plays an important role in determining the volume 
of trade among non-rich countries. This finding is consistent with the study by Jensen 
(2000) that estimates equations for bilateral one-way trade (import or export) derived 
from the monopolistic competition model. He has also found that the importer’s income 
(GDP) is not significant for trade between rich countries but significant for trade between 
middle-income or poor countries.134              
4.5.7 Robustness Check: Alternative Groupings of Differentiated Sectors          
 Finally, for the purpose of checking the robustness of the estimation results, I re-
estimate the volume-of-trade equations by varying criteria for selection of the group of 
the differentiated (and non-differentiated) sectors. The first alternative is to include in the 
differentiated sectors the three-digit ISIC industries in which corresponding Rauch’s 
“differentiated” four-digit SITC goods share more than 90% of the world trade value 
throughout the period of 1970-1997. This grouping adds the following three industries as 
differentiated sectors to the 10 industries in the benchmark grouping: 323 (leather 
                                                 
134 However, Jensen re-estimated the coefficient by replacing country pair-specific dummies with direct 
measures of barriers to trade such as bilateral distance and the importing country’s tariff. As a result, he 
found that the importer’s income is rather insignificant when the importing country is poor than when the 
importer is a rich country, which was counter to his initial finding.  
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products), 342 (printing and publishing), 383 (electric machinery). The second alternative 
is to include the three-digit ISIC industries that include none of Rauch’s four-digit SITC 
goods “traded in an organized market,” or homogeneous goods. The grouping further 
adds to the first alternative the following five industries: 313 (beverages), 352 (other 
chemicals), 354 (miscellaneous petroleum and coal products), 369 (other non-metallic 
mineral products), and 371 (iron and steel). Table 7 compares the benchmark and these 
two alternative groupings of the differentiated sectors by showing which three-digit ISIC 
manufacturing industries are included. Note that these two alternative groupings of the 
differentiated sectors cover broader sets of industries than the benchmark, and the second 
grouping includes more industries than the first.  
 The results of estimation by the respective four methods are presented in Tables 
4.8.1 through 4.8.4 for the first alternative differentiated-sector grouping, and in Tables 
4.9.1 through 4.9.4 for the second alternative grouping. The estimation results for both 
alternative groupings do not differ from the results of the estimation for the benchmark 
differentiated-sector grouping that are shown in Tables 4.2 through 4.5; and they thus 
confirm that the estimation results are robust across groupings of (non-)differentiated 
sectors.  
It should also be noted that, for the OECD countries, the estimated coefficient for 
the size similarity is smaller in the differentiated-sector equation (D), and so is it in the 
non-differentiated-sector equation (ND), for the grouping with a broader range of 
industries (i.e., the first alternative compared to the benchmark; and the second 
alternative compared to the first). This finding for the OECD countries is consistent with 
what the model suggests, since the correlation between the volume of trade and the 
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(adjusted) size similarity is less clear as the sectors consist of less differentiated or more 
homogeneous industries, in which the monopolistic competition model does not primarily 
aim to describe the trade. However, for the non-OECD countries, the coefficient estimate 
in the non-differentiated-sector equation (ND) is larger for a non-differentiated-sector 
grouping that covers less differentiated industries. This implies that for lower-income 
countries the correlation between the trade volume and the size similarity among trading 
economies is greater as the traded sectors are more homogeneous, which is counter to the 
theoretical expectation. Varying the grouping of sectors in estimation thus underlines the 
puzzle in the results for non-rich countries.  
4.6 Conclusion 
  This paper proposes an alternative approach to testing the monopolistic 
competition model of international trade. The monopolistic competition model, in which 
the main driving force of international trade is horizontal product differentiation, suggests 
that the volume of trade will be larger as trading countries are more similar in the size of 
the economy. In the preceding studies such as Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) and 
Debaere (2005), this implication of the model has been tested for the relationship 
between aggregate trade and GDP similarity among countries, while aggregate trade 
includes sectors that are not characterized by product differentiation.  
In contrast to the existing literature, this paper focuses on trade of differentiated 
products that the monopolistic competition model directly aims to describe. The paper 
derives the equation for the volume of trade of differentiated products under less 
restrictive assumptions than those required to derive the aggregate-trade equation. The 
derived equation predicts that the volume of trade in the differentiated sectors will be 
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larger as the trading countries are more similar in GDP and more symmetric in 
production structure. This prediction is tested using the disaggregated data on trade and 
manufacturing production for various countries, in which industries are classified into the 
differentiated and non-differentiated sectors using the information on the degree of 
product differentiation provided by Rauch (1999). The test employs not only the 
conventional OLS regression for the log-linearized form of the equation but also the non-
linear estimation methods such as PQML to handle zero-trade cases in the data.  
The result shows that the predicted positive correlation between the volume of 
trade and the size similarity among countries is significant for both aggregate and 
differentiated sectors, regardless of whether the trade is among the OECD or non-OECD 
countries. This result, contrary to Debaere’s conclusion, brings us back to the puzzle 
presented by Hummels and Levinsohn. Moreover, the proposed alternative approach in 
this paper reveals the following. First, for OECD countries the relationship between trade 
and the size similarity is shown more evidently by separating the differentiated sectors 
from aggregate trade, indicating that the monopolistic competition model explains very 
well trade in the differentiated sectors among OECD countries. Secondly, however, for 
non-OECD countries the predicted relationship between the volume of trade and the size 
similarity among countries is more pronounced in the non-differentiated sectors than in 
the differentiated sectors, which is counter to what is suggested by the model. The second 
point implies that trade flows among non-rich countries may be driven or crucially 
influenced by some other mechanism than what is described by the monopolistic 
competition model.  
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4.7 Appendix A 
 This appendix is to review empirical approaches of the two preceding studies; 
Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) and Debaere (2005). Both studies estimated some 
versions of the equation for the volume of aggregate bilateral trade, which are derived 
from the monopolistic competition model based on the two assumptions A1 and A2 
described in the second section of this paper. The derivation of the equation is left to the 
section.  
4.7.1 Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) 
 Hummels and Levinsohn estimated the following forms:135 
for OECD countries: ijtijijtijtijt simYVT εμβ ++⋅⋅= )log()log(   (*) 
for non-OECD countries: ijtijijtijtijt simYVT εηβ ++⋅⋅= )(    (**) 
where ])/()/(1[ 22 ijjijiij YYYYsim −−= . 
Some points should be noted, in terms of differences from the equation applied in the 
current paper. First, they used the (logarithm of) the volume of aggregate trade itself as 
the dependent variable, rather than the volume of trade per GDP as in Equation (4.3A) in 
this paper. A country pair’s GDP, which appears as the denominator on the left-hand side 
in Equation (4.3A), was put on the right-hand side as the product term with the size 
similarity index in their forms. Secondly, they accordingly estimated only one coefficient 
for the product term of GDP and the similarity index136; but did not estimate the impacts 
of the two factors separately. Thirdly, they assumed, as Helpman (1987) did, that the 
world income share of a pair of two countries would not change (at least much) across 
                                                 
135 Notations are not the same as those used in the original paper.  
136 Imposing the restriction that the coefficients for the two elements are the same is not a problem by itself, 
since the model suggests that the both elements are strictly proportional to the volume of trade. However, 
Debaere claims an econometric problem in this approach, as described later.  
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years, so that the term for the world income share (yij) was considered to be time-
invariant and thus merged into the country pair-specific dummies ηij in their equation for 
the OECD countries. (In the equation for the non-OECD, the time-invariant income share 
term was absorbed into the slope coefficient β.) They estimated the equation in the log-
linear form (*) for the OECD countries but in the level form (**) for the non-OECD 
countries to keep observations with zero trade (VTijt = 0) in their estimation. They used 
balanced panel data on bilateral aggregate trade among 14 OECD countries in 1962-1983 
to estimate Equation (*), and data for 14 non-OECD countries in 1962-1977 to estimate 
Equation (**).They applied the pooled OLS, random-effect OLS, and fixed-effect OLS 
regressions to both equations. In any case, they obtained an estimate for the coefficient β 
that was positive and significant for both country groups.  
4.7.2 Debaere (2005) 
 Debaere started with a claim that the result of Hummels and Levinsohn, which 
was counter to the expectation for non-OECD countries, may have been driven by a high 
correlation between the volume of trade and GDP of country pairs rather than a 
correlation between trade and the size similarity of trading economies. He argued that, 
although the size similarity would not at all relate to, and thus be totally independent of, 
the volume of bilateral trade, the coefficient estimate for the product term of GDP and the 
similarity index (Yijt·simijt) would be significant if GDP (Yijt) is highly correlated to the 
volume of trade. This is in fact highly likely since in general the absolute volume of trade 
of large countries is greater than that of small countries.137 Therefore, he used regression 
                                                 
137 However, it should be noted that Hummels and Levinsohn seem to have noticed this issue by 
themselves. In fact, as they mentioned in their paper (Hummels and Levinsohn, 1995; pp. 808, footnote 
14), they also estimated an equation separating the term for income size or GDP (Yijt) from the similarity 
index, from which they concluded that the impact of the similarity index was still significant.   
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equations whose dependent variable was the volume of bilateral aggregate trade as the 
share in GDP of the country pair. His benchmark is the estimation of the log-linear 
equation, which was the same as Equation (4.3A) in this paper, by the OLS with country 
pair-specific and year-specific dummies. For zero-trade observations in his non-OECD 
data, he applies a similar “replacement method” to the one that is used in the current 
paper.138  
 In addition to his benchmark log-linear form, he estimated the following two level 
forms of the equation for the volume of aggregate trade per GDP: 
ijtijijtijtijtijt simyYVT εμβ ++⋅⋅= )(/  
ijtijijtijtijtijt ysimYVT εμββ ++⋅+⋅= 21/  
These equations were estimated by the OLS for OECD countries, and by the Tobit 
regression for non-OECD countries. (The regressions also included year-specific 
dummies.) For the estimation, he constructed balanced panel data on bilateral (aggregate) 
trade and GDP for 14 OECD countries and 12 non-OECD countries for the period of 
1970 through 1989. The results of the OLS estimation of his benchmark log-linear 
equation led him to conclude that the monopolistic competition model was supported for 
OECD countries but not for non-OECD countries, as he expected (and Hummels and 
Levinsohn also expected initially).139  
4.7.3 Countries in the Data 
The table below lists countries that Hummels and Levinsohn selected for each of 
their OECD and non-OECD groups. The 14 countries in their OECD data are the same as 
                                                 
138 See the third section of this paper.  
139 Although Debaere claimed that the results of his other estimations showed support for this conclusion, 
the evidence does not seem to be very clear but mixed.   
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those originally chosen by Helpman (1987). Debaere selected exactly the same sets of 
OECD and non-OECD countries as those in Hummels and Levinsohn’s study, except that 
he excluded Congo and Cote d’Ivoire from the non-OECD group due to the 
unavailability of the data for these countries.140 Note that the data in the current study 
cover a broader range of countries for both OECD and non-OECD groups (see Table 
4.1).   
 






























Note:  Countries marked with asterisk (*) are not included in the data used by Debaere 
(2005).  
 
                                                 
140 Hummels and Levinsohn, as well as Debaere, included Greece and Norway in their non-OECD group, 
while these two countries have been the original OECD members since 1961. In contrast, both countries are 
included in the OECD group for the current study.   
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Table 4.1: List of Countries and Years in Data 
 
OECD (20 Countries)* Non-OECD (69 Countries)
Country Years Country Years Country Years
Australia 1970-92 Albania 1993, 96 Morocco 1976
Austria 1970-97 United Arab Emirates 1977-78, 81 Moldova 1990-92
Belgium 1970-84 Argentina 1984-90, 93-96 Madagascar 1970-77
Canada 1970-94 Armenia 1994-97 Mexico 1994-97
Germany (West) 1971-84 Azerbaijan 1990-94 Macedonia 1990-96
Denmark 1970-91 Benin 1974-81 Mongolia 1993
Spain 1970-92 Bangladesh 1970-92, 95 Mozambique 1986-87, 91
Finland 1970-94 Bolivia 1981, 96, 97 Malawi 1970-75, 79-85
France 1970-79 Chile 1970-97 Malaysia 1970-97
United Kingdom 1970-92, 94, 95 Colombia 1970-97 Nigeria 1981-85, 91-96
Greece 1970-97 Costa Rica 1970-83, 91-97 Nicaragua 1970-85
Italy 1970-91 Dominican Republic 1970-84 Nepal 1997
Japan 1970-97 Algeria 1970-80 Oman 1994-97
Netherlands 1970-80 Ecuador 1970-97 Pakistan 1970-91
Norway 1970-91 Egypt 1970-96 Panama 1970-79, 92-95, 97
New Zealand 1970-89 Ethiopia 1981-96 Peru 1982-92, 94-96
Portugal 1970-89, 93-95 Gabon 1980-82, 91-95 Philippines 1970-97
Sweden 1970-97 Ghana 1970-87 Poland 1989-97
Turkey 1970-95 Gambia 1975-82 Russia 1993-97
United States 1970-95 Guatemala 1971-88, 91-95, 97 Saudi Arabia 1989
Hong Kong 1973-90 Sudan 1972, 76
Honduras 1971-75, 81-96 Senegal 1974-84, 89-90, 95, 97
Croatia 1990-92 El Salvador 1970-85, 95-97
Hungary 1970-97 Syria 1971-1979
Indonesia 1994-96 Thailand 19774, 75, 77, 79, 82,
India 1970-97 84, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94
Iran 1974-77, 79-90, 93 Tunisia 1970-81
Iraq 1970-77 Tanzania 90-91
Israel 1970-89 Uganda 1971, 89
Jordan 1971, 74-97 Uruguay 1971-86, 91-97
Kyrgyz Republic 1994 Venezuela 1970-97
Korea (South) 1970-96 Serbia & Montenegro 1994-97
Kuwait 1970-97 South Africa 1970, 72-86, 96
Liberia 1984 Zambia 1970-75, 80-82
Sri Lanka 1970-74, 79-85. 96, 97 Zimbabwe 1970-86, 96  
 
Note: The OECD countries are grouped according to the OECD membership as of Year 1973. 
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Table 4.2: Result of OLS Estimation, with Positive-Trade Observations 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed
Eq. (4.3A) Eq. (4.3D) Eq. (4.3ND) Eq. (4.3A) Eq. (4.3D) Eq. (4.3ND)
log(similarity) 0.422*** 0.858*** 0.312* 0.577*** 0.675*** 0.562***
(s.e.) (0.133) (0.201) (0.175) (0.150) (0.148) (0.150)
[p-value] [0.002] [0.000] [0.076] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
log(world GDP share) -0.163 0.284 -0.069 0.586*** 0.514*** 0.736***
(s.e.) (0.163) (0.270) (0.195) (0.147) (0.159) (0.137)
[p-value] [0.318] [0.293] [0.724] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
R-square 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03
# observations 3,617 3,617 3,628 7,216 7,216 9,040
(Tests for Coefficient = 1: P-values )
coef. for similarity = 1 0.000 0.481 0.000 0.005 0.028 0.004
coef. for income share = 1 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.054
coef. for similarity = coef. for i-share =1 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.011
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries
log(Volume of Trade Per Production) log(Volume of Trade Per Production)
 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. The OECD group includes 20 countries and the non-OECD group includes 69 
countries, both for years 1970-97. Observations with zero trade in differentiated sectors are excluded from the 
regression. Country pair-specific and year-specific dummies are included in the regression. Standard errors are 
clustered by country pair. ***, **, * indicate the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The 
lower parts of the table shows the results of the Wald test for the hypotheses of each coefficient equaling one 
and the two coefficients jointly equaling one, in p-values. 
Differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 322, 324, 332, 355, 356, 361, 362, 382, 384, and 385. 
Non-differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 311, 313, 314, 321, 323, 331, 341, 342, 351, 352, 353, 354, 369, 




Table 4.3: Result of OLS Estimation, with All Observations 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed
Eq. (4.3A) Eq. (4.3D) Eq. (4.3ND) Eq. (4.3A) Eq. (4.3D) Eq. (4.3ND)
log(similarity) 0.397*** 0.793*** 0.195 0.062 0.246 0.012
(s.e.) (0.138) (0.235) (0.226) (0.242) (0.202) (0.230)
[p-value] [0.004] [0.001] [0.389] [0.796] [0.224] [0.960]
log(world GDP share) -0.155 0.281 -0.105 0.000 0.733*** 0.314
(s.e.) (0.169) (0.305) (0.219) (0.254) (0.225) (0.240)
[p-value] [0.361] [0.358] [0.632] [0.999] [0.001] [0.192]
R-square 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.03
# observations 3,630 3,630 3,630 14,565 14,565 14,565
(Tests for Coefficient = 1: P-values )
coef. for similarity = 1 0.000 0.379 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
coef. for income share = 1 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.236 0.004
coef. for similarity = coef. for i-share =1 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
log(Volume of Trade Per Production) log(Volume of Trade Per Production)
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries
 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. The OECD group includes 20 countries and the non-OECD group includes 69 
countries, both for years 1970-97. Observations with zero trade in differentiated sectors are included in the 
regression. Country pair-specific and year-specific dummies are included in the regression. Standard errors are 
clustered by country pair. ***, **, * indicate the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The 
lower parts of the table shows the results of the Wald test for the hypotheses of each coefficient equaling one 
and the two coefficients  jointly equaling one, in p-values. 
Differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 322, 324, 332, 355, 356, 361, 362, 382, 384, and 385. 
Non-differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 311, 313, 314, 321, 323, 331, 341, 342, 351, 352, 353, 354, 369, 
371, 372, 381, and 383. 
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Table 4.4: Result of Tobit Estimation 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed
Eq. (4.5A) Eq. (4.5D) Eq. (4.5ND) Eq. (4.5A) Eq. (4.5D) Eq. (4.5ND)
log(similarity) 0.397*** 1.03*** 0.287** 0.070 0.484* 0.265
(s.e.) (0.133) (0.171) (0.142) (0.269) (0.261) (0.274)
[p-value] [0.003] [0.000] [0.044] [0.794] [0.063] [0.334]
log(world GDP share) -0.353 -0.517 -0.290 -0.784** -0.068 -0.199
(s.e.) (0.226) (0.474) (0.419) (0.317) (0.313) (0.326)
[p-value] [0.118] [0.276] [0.489] [0.013] [0.828] [0.541]
R-square 0.81 0.63 0.77 0.31 0.37 0.31
# observations 3,630 3,630 3,630 14,565 14,565 14,565
(Tests for Coefficient = 1: P-values )
coef. for similarity = 1 0.000 0.851 0.000 0.001 0.048 0.007
coef. for income share = 1 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000
coef. for similarity = coef. for i-share =1 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries
log(Volume of Trade Per Production) log(Volume of Trade Per Production)
 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. Log of GDP (for the aggregate specification) or log of sectoral production (for 
the differentiated-sector specification) is included as a regressor, but the coefficient for the term is constrained 
to be 1. The OECD group includes 20 countries and the non-OECD sample includes 69 countries, both for years 
1970-97. All observations are included, and left-censored at the value of ln($500). Country pair-specific and 
year-specific dummies are included in the regressions. Standard errors are clustered by country pair. ***, **, * 
indicate the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The lower parts of the table shows the results 
of the Wald test for the hypotheses of each coefficient equaling one and the two coefficients jointly equaling 
one, in p-values.  
Differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 322, 324, 332, 355, 356, 361, 362, 382, 384, and 385. 
Non-differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 311, 313, 314, 321, 323, 331, 341, 342, 351, 352, 353, 354, 369, 




Table 4.5: Results of Poisson Quasi-maximum Likelihood (PQML) Estimation 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed
Eq. (4.4A) Eq. (4.4D) Eq. (4.4ND) Eq. (4.4A) Eq. (4.4D) Eq. (4.4ND)
log(similarity) 0.628*** 0.875*** 0.497*** 0.862*** 0.434** 0.710***
(s.e.) (0.120) (0.149) (0.140) (0.311) (0.194) (0.182)
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.006] [0.025] [0.000]
log(world GDP share) 0.102 0.583*** 0.297** 0.652*** 0.664*** 0.527***
(s.e.) (0.125) (0.167) (0.150) (0.134) (0.192) (0.146)
[p-value] [0.412] [0.000] [0.048] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
# observations 3,630 3,630 3,630 12,329 10,218 11,869
(Tests for Coefficient = 1: P-values )
coef. for similarity = 1 0.002 0.399 0.000 0.657 0.004 0.111
coef. for income share = 1 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.009 0.080 0.001
coef. for similarity = coef. for i-share =1 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.026 0.008 0.005
log(Volume of Trade Per Production) log(Volume of Trade Per Production)
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries
 
Notes: The dependent variable is in level, while all the regressors are in logarithm. The OECD group includes 20 
countries and the non-OECD group includes 69 countries, both for years 1970-97. All observations are 
included. The conditional fixed-effect PQML estimation follows Hausman et al. (1984), including time-specific 
dummies. Observations for country pairs that have data for only one year or whose volume of trade is zero for 
the entire period (1970-97) are omitted for the estimation. Standard errors are clustered by country pair. ***, **, 
* indicate the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The lower parts of the table shows the 
results of the Wald test for the hypotheses of each coefficient equaling one and the two coefficients jointly 
equaling one, in p-values.  
Differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 322, 324, 332, 355, 356, 361, 362, 382, 384, and 385. 
Non-differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 311, 313, 314, 321, 323, 331, 341, 342, 351, 352, 353, 354, 369, 
371, 372, 381, and 383. 
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Table 4.6: Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) of Estimated Models 
 
Differentiated Non-diff'ed Differentiated Non-diff'ed
Sectors Sectors Sectors Sectors
Estimated Models (A) (D) (ND) (A) (D) (ND)
OLS (3): 
 excluding zero-trade observations
OLS (3): 
 including zero-trade observations
Tobit (5) 2,523.50 5,419.98 3,048.18 50,750.46 37,745.48 47,753.59
PQML (4) 134.10 198.73 148.90 99.50 126.52 123.00
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries














Note: The number in the parentheses () following the name of estimation method indicates the equation 
number in the text. 
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Table 4.7: Alternative Groupings of Differentiated Sectors 
 





311 Food products    
313 Beverages   X 
314 Tobacco    
321 Textiles    
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear X X X 
323 Leather products  X X 
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic X X X 
331 Wood products, except furniture    
332 Furniture, except metal X X X 
341 Paper and products    
342 Printing and publishing  X X 
351 Industrial chemicals    
352 Other chemicals   X 
353 Petroleum refineries    
354 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal 
products   X 
355 Rubber products X X X 
356 Plastic products X X X 
361 Pottery, china, earthenware X X X 
362 Glass and products X X X 
369 Other non-metallic mineral 
products   X 
371 Iron and steel   X 
372 Non-ferrous metals    
381 Fabricated metal products    
382 Machinery, except electrical X X X 
383 Electric machinery  X X 
384 Transport equipment X X X 
385 Professional and scientific 
equipment X X X 
Number of manufacturing industries 
included in the differentiated sector group 10 13 18 
 
Notes: 
1.  Manufacturing industries are classified according to the three-digit ISIC (Revision 2).  
2. “X” indicates an industry included in the differentiated sector group for each grouping. The 
corresponding non-differentiated sector group comprises manufacturing industries that are not 
marked with “X.” 





Table 4.8.1: Result of OLS Estimation for Alternative Sector Grouping (1), with 
Positive-Trade Observations 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed
Eq. (4.3A) Eq. (4.3D) Eq. (4.3ND) Eq. (4.3A) Eq. (4.3D) Eq. (4.3ND)
log(similarity) 0.423*** 0.741*** 0.571*** 0.510*** 0.592*** 0.571***
(s.e.) (0.133) (0.206) (0.157) (0.149) (0.147) (0.157)
[p-value] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
log(world GDP share) -0.166 0.217 0.663*** 0.569*** 0.578*** 0.663***
(s.e.) (0.164) (0.274) (0.141) (0.147) (0.149) (0.141)
[p-value] [0.312] [0.429] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
R-square 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
# observations 3,619 3,619 8,905 7,562 7,562 8,905
(Tests for Coefficient = 1: P-values )
coef. for similarity = 1 0.000 0.210 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.006
coef. for income share = 1 0.000 0.005 0.017 0.003 0.005 0.017
coef. for similarity = coef. for i-share =1 0.000 0.012 0.010 0.001 0.004 0.010
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries
log(Volume of Trade Per Production) log(Volume of Trade Per Production)
 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. The OECD group includes 20 countries and the non-OECD group includes 69 
countries, both for years 1970-97. Observations with zero trade in differentiated sectors are excluded from the 
regression. Country pair-specific and year-specific dummies are included in the regression. Standard errors are 
clustered by country pair. ***, **, * indicate the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The 
lower parts of the table shows the results of the Wald test for the hypotheses of each coefficient equaling one 
and the two coefficients  jointly equaling one, in p-values. 
Differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 322, 323, 324, 332, 342, 355, 356, 361, 362, 382, 383, 384, and 385. 





Table 4.8.2: Result of OLS Estimation for Alternative Sector Grouping (1), with All 
Observations 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed
Eq. (4.3A) Eq. (4.3D) Eq. (4.3ND) Eq. (4.3A) Eq. (4.3D) Eq. (4.3ND)
log(similarity) 0.397*** 0.680*** 0.150 0.062 0.131 0.017
(s.e.) (0.138) (0.239) (0.235) (0.242) (0.208) (0.233)
[p-value] [0.004] [0.005] [0.523] [0.796] [0.528] [0.940]
log(world GDP share) -0.155 0.223 -0.242 0.000 0.792*** 0.237
(s.e.) (0.169) (0.309) (0.225) (0.254) (0.223) (0.241)
[p-value] [0.361] [0.471] [0.284] [0.999] [0.000] [0.326]
R-square 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02
# observations 3,630 3,630 3,630 14,565 14,565 14,565
(Tests for Coefficient = 1: P-values )
coef. for similarity = 1 0.000 0.183 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
coef. for income share = 1 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.351 0.002
coef. for similarity = coef. for i-share =1 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries
log(Volume of Trade Per Production) log(Volume of Trade Per Production)
 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. The OECD group includes 20 countries and the non-OECD group includes 69 
countries, both for years 1970-97. Observations with zero trade in differentiated sectors are included in the 
regression. Country pair-specific and year-specific dummies are included in the regression. Standard errors are 
clustered by country pair. ***, **, * indicate the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The 
lower parts of the table shows the results of the Wald test for the hypotheses of each coefficient equaling one 
and the two coefficients  jointly equaling one, in p-values. 
Differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 322, 323, 324, 332, 342, 355, 356, 361, 362, 382, 383, 384, and 385. 
Non-differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 311, 313, 314, 321, 331, 341, 351, 352, 353, 354, 369, 371, 372, 
and 381. 
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Table 4.8.3: Result of Tobit Estimation for Alternative Sector Grouping (1) 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed
Eq. (4.5A) Eq. (4.5D) Eq. (4.5ND) Eq. (4.5A) Eq. (4.5D) Eq. (4.5ND)
log(similarity) 0.397*** 0.960*** 0.238* 0.070 0.421 0.239
(s.e.) (0.133) (0.176) (0.138) (0.269) (0.258) (0.282)
[p-value] [0.003] [0.000] [0.085] [0.794] [0.103] [0.396]
log(world GDP share) -0.353 -0.830* -0.370 -0.784** -0.089 -0.213
(s.e.) (0.226) (0.486) (0.374) (0.317) (0.298) (0.325)
[p-value] [0.118] [0.088] [0.323] [0.013] [0.766] [0.513]
R-square 0.81 0.65 0.76 0.31 0.37 0.30
# observations 3,630 3,630 3,630 14,565 14,565 14,565
(Tests for Coefficient = 1: P-values )
coef. for similarity = 1 0.000 0.820 0.000 0.001 0.025 0.007
coef. for income share = 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
coef. for similarity = coef. for i-share =1 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries
log(Volume of Trade Per Production) log(Volume of Trade Per Production)
 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. Log of GDP (for the aggregate specification) or log of sectoral production (for 
the differentiated-sector specification) is included as a regressor, but the coefficient for the term is constrained 
to be 1. The OECD group includes 20 countries and the non-OECD sample includes 69 countries, both for years 
1970-97. All observations are included, and left-censored at the value of ln($500). Country pair-specific and 
year-specific dummies are included in the regressions. Standard errors are clustered by country pair. ***, **, * 
indicate the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The lower parts of the table shows the results 
of the Wald test for the hypotheses of each coefficient equaling one and the two coefficients jointly equaling 
one, in p-values.  
Differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 322, 323, 324, 332, 342, 355, 356, 361, 362, 382, 383, 384, and 385. 





Table 4.8.4: Results of Poisson Quasi-maximum Likelihood (PQML) Estimation for 
Alternative Sector Grouping (1) 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed
Eq. (4.4A) Eq. (4.4D) Eq. (4.4ND) Eq. (4.4A) Eq. (4.4D) Eq. (4.4ND)
log(similarity) 0.628*** 0.843*** 0.418*** 0.862*** 0.362* 0.722***
(s.e.) (0.120) (0.143) (0.139) (0.311) (0.190) (0.193)
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.006] [0.057] [0.000]
log(world GDP share) 0.102 0.589*** 0.201 0.652*** 0.681*** 0.466***
(s.e.) (0.125) (0.178) (0.131) (0.134) (0.167) (0.147)
[p-value] [0.412] [0.001] [0.125] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
# observations 3,630 3,630 3,630 12,329 10,478 11,824
(Tests for Coefficient = 1: P-values )
coef. for similarity = 1 0.002 0.271 0.000 0.657 0.001 0.149
coef. for income share = 1 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.009 0.057 0.000
coef. for similarity = coef. for i-share =1 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.026 0.001 0.001
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries
log(Volume of Trade Per Production) log(Volume of Trade Per Production)
 
Notes: The dependent variable is in level, while all the regressors are in logarithm. The OECD group includes 20 
countries and the non-OECD group includes 69 countries, both for years 1970-97. All observations are 
included. The conditional fixed-effect PQML estimation follows Hausman et al. (1984), including time-specific 
dummies. Observations for country pairs that have data for only one year or whose volume of trade is zero for 
the entire period (1970-97) are omitted for the estimation. Standard errors are clustered by country pair. ***, **, 
* indicate the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The lower parts of the table shows the 
results of the Wald test for the hypotheses of each coefficient equaling one and the two coefficients jointly 
equaling one, in p-values.  
Differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 322, 323, 324, 332, 342, 355, 356, 361, 362, 382, 383, 384, and 385. 
Non-differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 311, 313, 314, 321, 331, 341, 351, 352, 353, 354, 369, 371, 372, 
and 381. 
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Table 4.9.1: Result of OLS Estimation for Alternative Sector Grouping (2), with 
Positive-Trade Observations 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed
Eq. (4.3A) Eq. (4.3D) Eq. (4.3ND) Eq. (4.3A) Eq. (4.3D) Eq. (4.3ND)
log(similarity) 0.424*** 0.660*** 0.263* 0.516*** 0.576*** 0.569***
(s.e.) (0.133) (0.204) (0.153) (0.147) (0.160) (0.157)
[p-value] [0.002] [0.001] [0.087] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
log(world GDP share) -0.166 0.108 -0.034 0.548*** 0.395** 0.785***
(s.e.) (0.164) (0.266) (0.185) (0.145) (0.156) (0.142)
[p-value] [0.315] [0.685] [0.853] [0.000] [0.011] [0.000]
R-square 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02
# observations 3,622 3,622 3,628 7,960 7,960 8,642
(Tests for Coefficient = 1: P-values )
coef. for similarity = 1 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.006
coef. for income share = 1 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.131
coef. for similarity = coef. for i-share =1 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.022
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries
log(Volume of Trade Per Production) log(Volume of Trade Per Production)
 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. The OECD group includes 20 countries and the non-OECD group includes 69 
countries, both for years 1970-97. Observations with zero trade in differentiated sectors are excluded from the 
regression. Country pair-specific and year-specific dummies are included in the regression. Standard errors are 
clustered by country pair. ***, **, * indicate the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The 
lower parts of the table shows the results of the Wald test for the hypotheses of each coefficient equaling one 
and the two coefficients  jointly equaling one, in p-values.  
Differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 313, 322, 323, 324, 332, 342, 352, 354, 355, 356, 361, 362, 369, 371, 
382, 383, 384, and 385. 




Table 4.9.2: Result of OLS Estimation for Alternative Sector Grouping (2), with All 
Observations 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed
Eq. (4.3A) Eq. (4.3D) Eq. (4.3ND) Eq. (4.3A) Eq. (4.3D) Eq. (4.3ND)
log(similarity) 0.397*** 0.572** 0.142 0.062 0.052 0.049
(s.e.) (0.138) (0.236) (0.212) (0.242) (0.218) (0.234)
[p-value] [0.004] [0.016] [0.501] [0.796] [0.810] [0.833]
log(world GDP share) -0.155 0.081 -0.065 0.000 0.456** 0.492**
(s.e.) (0.169) (0.300) (0.209) (0.254) (0.224) (0.240)
[p-value] [0.361] [0.787] [0.755] [0.999] [0.042] [0.041]
R-square 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.04
# observations 3,630 3,630 3,630 14,565 14,565 14,565
(Tests for Coefficient = 1: P-values )
coef. for similarity = 1 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
coef. for income share = 1 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.035
coef. for similarity = coef. for i-share =1 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries
log(Volume of Trade Per Production) log(Volume of Trade Per Production)
 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. The OECD group includes 20 countries and the non-OECD group includes 69 
countries, both for years 1970-97. Observations with zero trade in differentiated sectors are included in the 
regression. Country pair-specific and year-specific dummies are included in the regression. Standard errors are 
clustered by country pair. ***, **, * indicate the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The 
lower parts of the table shows the results of the Wald test for the hypotheses of each coefficient equaling one 
and the two coefficients  jointly equaling one, in p-values.  
Differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 313, 322, 323, 324, 332, 342, 352, 354, 355, 356, 361, 362, 369, 371, 
382, 383, 384, and 385. 
Non-differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 311, 314, 321, 331, 341, 351, 353, 372, and 381.  
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Table 4.9.3: Result of Tobit Estimation for Alternative Sector Grouping (2) 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed
Eq. (4.5A) Eq. (4.5D) Eq. (4.5ND) Eq. (4.5A) Eq. (4.5D) Eq. (4.5ND)
log(similarity) 0.397*** 0.821*** 0.214* 0.070 0.203 0.301
(s.e.) (0.133) (0.161) (0.126) (0.269) (0.278) (0.279)
[p-value] [0.003] [0.000] [0.088] [0.794] [0.464] [0.281]
log(world GDP share) -0.353 -0.712 -0.142 -0.784** -0.102 -0.064
(s.e.) (0.226) (0.488) (0.317) (0.317) (0.314) (0.324)
[p-value] [0.118] [0.144] [0.655] [0.013] [0.745] [0.843]
R-square 0.81 0.69 0.75 0.31 0.36 0.30
# observations 3,630 3,630 3,630 14,565 14,565 14,565
(Tests for Coefficient = 1: P-values )
coef. for similarity = 1 0.000 0.266 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.012
coef. for income share = 1 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
coef. for similarity = coef. for i-share =1 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries
log(Volume of Trade Per Production) log(Volume of Trade Per Production)
 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. Log of GDP (for the aggregate specification) or log of sectoral production (for 
the differentiated-sector specification) is included as a regressor, but the coefficient for the term is constrained 
to be 1. The OECD group includes 20 countries and the non-OECD sample includes 69 countries, both for years 
1970-97. All observations are included, and left-censored at the value of ln($500). Country pair-specific and 
year-specific dummies are included in the regressions. Standard errors are clustered by country pair. ***, **, * 
indicate the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The lower parts of the table shows the results 
of the Wald test for the hypotheses of each coefficient equaling one and the two coefficients jointly equaling 
one, in p-values.  
Differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 313, 322, 323, 324, 332, 342, 352, 354, 355, 356, 361, 362, 369, 371, 
382, 383, 384, and 385.  




Table 4.9.4: Results of Poisson Quasi-maximum Likelihood (PQML) Estimation for 
Alternative Sector Grouping (2) 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed Aggregate Differentiated Non-Diff'ed
Eq. (4.4A) Eq. (4.4D) Eq. (4.4ND) Eq. (4.4A) Eq. (4.4D) Eq. (4.4ND)
log(similarity) 0.628*** 0.763*** 0.403*** 0.862*** 0.469** 0.742***
(s.e.) (0.120) (0.138) (0.134) (0.311) (0.194) (0.191)
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.006] [0.015] [0.000]
log(world GDP share) 0.102 0.536*** 0.225* 0.652*** 0.514** 0.585***
(s.e.) (0.125) (0.164) (0.136) (0.134) (0.201) (0.139)
[p-value] [0.412] [0.001] [0.098] [0.000] [0.011] [0.000]
# observations 3,630 3,630 3,630 12,329 10,831 11,659
(Tests for Coefficient = 1: P-values )
coef. for similarity = 1 0.002 0.086 0.000 0.657 0.006 0.176
coef. for income share = 1 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.009 0.016 0.003
coef. for similarity = coef. for i-share =1 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.026 0.004 0.012
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries
log(Volume of Trade Per Production) log(Volume of Trade Per Production)
 
Notes: The dependent variable is in level, while all the regressors are in logarithm. The OECD group includes 20 
countries and the non-OECD group includes 69 countries, both for years 1970-97. All observations are 
included. The conditional fixed-effect PQML estimation follows Hausman et al. (1984), including time-specific 
dummies. Observations for country pairs that have data for only one year or whose volume of trade is zero for 
the entire period (1970-97) are omitted for the estimation. Standard errors are clustered by country pair. ***, **, 
* indicate the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The lower parts of the table shows the 
results of the Wald test for the hypotheses of each coefficient equaling one and the two coefficients jointly 
equaling one, in p-values.  
Differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 313, 322, 323, 324, 332, 342, 352, 354, 355, 356, 361, 362, 369, 371, 
382, 383, 384, and 385.  
Non-differentiated Sectors: 3-digit ISIC = 311, 314, 321, 331, 341, 351, 353, 372, and 381.  
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Figures 4.1: Volume of Bilateral Trade per Production vs Size Similarity Index; for 
OECD Countries (in logarithm; mean-differenced)  
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Figures 4.2: Volume of Bilateral Trade per Production vs Size Similarity Index; for 
Non-OECD Countries (in logarithm; mean-differenced)  
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Notes: The GDP similarity index (for 4.1A and 4.2A) or the production structure-adjusted size 
similarity index (for 4.1D and 4.2D) is on the horizontal axis, and the volume of bilateral 
trade as the share in GDP (for 4.1A and 4.2A) or production (for 4.1D and 4.2D) on the 
vertical. All the variables are in logarithm and mean-differenced (for the fixed-effect 
OLS). The vertical and horizontal lines indicate zero. The solid line in each figures is the 










This dissertation has investigated the patterns of international trade in various 
dimensions such as firms (Chapter II), products (Chapter III), and the volume of flows 
(Chapter IV), in terms of the roles of three forces: comparative advantage, monopolistic 
competition, and firm-level heterogeneity. Although these concepts have risen at different 
stages of the evolution of trade theory, these three are key elements of today’s research in 
international trade.  
The second and third chapters rest on an economic model that combines the 
traditional framework with the recent theoretical development. This integrated model has 
illustrated how comparative advantage operates when all the three forces function and 
interact. Having empirical analyses added to the theoretical investigation, the two 
chapters have demonstrated the significance of the traditional comparative advantage 
even in the firm-level and product-level phenomena of international trade, which the 
factor proportion theory did not consider in its original form.  
In contrast, Chapter IV has put the research focus on monopolistic competition 
and its key feature—horizontal product differentiation—with the other two elements left 
aside. Through the empirical examination using the information on product 
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characteristics, the chapter has shown that monopolistic competition well explains trade 
flows among a group of relatively homogeneous countries (such as OECD countries) but 
does not very well when trading countries are more diverse (such as non-OECD 
countries). This finding also suggests the potential importance of country-level factors, 
which include comparative advantage highlighted in the preceding chapters, as 
determinants of trade patterns.  
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